Currid v. Dekalb State Ct. Probation Dept., No. A05A0149.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A0149. |
| Citation | 618 S.E.2d 621,274 Ga. App. 704 |
| Parties | CURRID v. DeKALB STATE COURT PROBATION DEPARTMENT et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Samuel L. Starks, Martin & Jones, Atlanta, for appellant.
Robert D. Ware, Wade W. Mitchell, Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, Atlanta, for appellee.
Vincent Currid died after falling from a garbage truck while performing court-ordered community service for the DeKalb County Public Works Department. Currid's estate and his father ("Appellants") brought a wrongful death action against DeKalb County, its employees Vicki Carter and Harrison Hoskins, the Georgia Department of Corrections ("DOC"), and its employee Mattie Gabriel. All the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims to Carter, Gabriel and the DOC; granted summary judgment to DeKalb County, except to the extent the county waived immunity by purchasing an automobile liability insurance policy pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-51; and denied summary judgment to Hoskins. This appeal followed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Carter, Gabriel and the DOC, but reverse the grant of summary judgment to DeKalb County.
Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 "Once the movant has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence."2 "We apply a de novo standard of review to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant."3
Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that the State Court of DeKalb County sentenced Currid to 12 months probation and ordered him to serve 40 hours of community service as a condition of his probation. Currid initially met with both a DeKalb County probation officer and community services coordinator Vicki Carter to discuss his probation, and he signed a waiver of liability for injuries he might receive while performing community service.
On September 20, 1999, Currid reported to the central DeKalb probation office to begin performing community service. Carter and Mattie Gabriel, a DOC employee, were making community service assignments that day. They sat next to each other at a table where probationers came to sign in for community service. Carter was overseeing misdemeanor probationers for DeKalb County, while Gabriel was overseeing felony probationers for the DOC. Both misdemeanor and felony probationers were assigned on a first-come, first-served basis to the community service agencies that had requested workers for the day. Gabriel informed Currid that he would be working with the sanitation department. Currid did not receive any training or safety equipment before being sent to work at the sanitation department.
At the sanitation department, Currid was assigned to a garbage truck driven by Harrison Hoskins. Currid was given gloves, but wore his own clothes and shoes, although the sanitation department requires its employees to wear steel-toe shoes. In fact, probationers who do community service with the sanitation department are generally given gloves, but none of the other equipment that is mandatory for employees.
Currid and sanitation worker Antonio Simpson rode inside the cab of the truck until they got to the first stop on the route. At the first stop, Currid got on the rear of the truck, and Hoskins instructed him how to stand on the steps at the rear of the truck, how to get off the truck, and how to operate the levers for trash compaction. They then began to collect garbage on the route.
The garbage truck which Currid rode has a warning sign on it stating that no one should ride on the steps on the back of the truck when the truck is exceeding ten miles per hour or traveling more than 2/10 of a mile between stops. Currid and Simpson remained on the rear of the truck, however, as it made a left hand turn from a residential neighborhood onto six-lane Lawrenceville Highway, which has a thirty-five mile per hour speed limit. Hoskins was driving about 15 miles per hour. As the truck turned from Lawrenceville Highway onto a side street, Currid fell off the back of the truck, and ultimately died as a result of the injuries received.
1. Preliminarily, we must address several shortcomings in the Appellants' brief, which have greatly hampered our review. First, Appellants have submitted a compound enumeration of errors in violation of this Court's rules.4
Our requirements as to the form of appellate briefs were created not to provide an obstacle, but to aid parties in presenting their arguments in a manner most likely to be fully and efficiently comprehended by this Court; a party will not be granted relief should we err in deciphering a brief which fails to adhere to the required form.5
Furthermore, the sequence of Appellants' argument does not follow the enumeration of errors, making it difficult for the court to identify which arguments apply to each alleged error.6 And, although Appellants provide a detailed factual summary, they have not related these facts to the appropriate analysis, leaving us to determine the facts which might support each argument. We take this opportunity to remind counsel that failure to adhere to this Court's rules may subject the offending party and/or counsel to a finding of contempt and/or dismissal of an appeal.7 Nonetheless, to the extent we are able to ascertain those errors properly raised and preserved with argument and citation, we have attempted to do so.8 All other arguments are deemed abandoned.9
2. For the reasons set forth in Division 1, Appellants' arguments on appeal are not entirely clear. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of various defendants. Appellants also cite generally to several legal principles, which they arguably contend support their claims. Specifically, Appellants cite to OCGA § 42-8-71(d) (the "Community Service Act"), which governs participation of probationers in community service programs. Appellants also point to DeKalb County policies, which allegedly were violated. Keeping these legal principles in mind, we address whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the various defendants.
The Community Service Act limits the liability of an agency and its employees for actions taken as part of a community service program for probationers. An agency or employee has immunity from claims of ordinary negligence,10 and can only be held liable for actions "which constitute gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct."11 Therefore, DeKalb County, the DOC, Carter and Gabriel ("Appellees") are entitled to summary judgment if they can show that, as a matter of law, the record contains no evidence that their actions towards Currid in the community service program constituted gross negligence, recklessness, or wilful misconduct.
"Gross negligence is defined as the failure to exercise that degree of care that every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or similar circumstances; or lack of the diligence that even careless men are accustomed to exercise."12 Recklessness is a conscious disregard for the safety of others.13 Wilful misconduct "is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury."14
(a) Appellants contend that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether DeKalb County was grossly negligent (1) in failing to ensure that Currid was placed with an appropriate court-approved agency to perform his community service, and (2) in assigning him to ride on the back of a garbage truck without proper safety equipment and training.
Agencies such as the DeKalb County Public Works Department must file an application with the court before they may participate in a community service program for probationers.15 In arguing that DeKalb County was grossly negligent because it did not satisfy this requirement, Appellants point to interrogatory responses of former DeKalb County State Court Chief Judge McLaughlin. Judge McLaughlin stated that, to his knowledge, he had never signed any documentation authorizing the sanitation division of the DeKalb County Public Works Department to participate in the community service program. Appellants ignore, however, the fact that such an application is in the record, signed by Judge Smith of the DeKalb County State Court. The trial court concluded that this application authorized the Public Works Department to utilize misdemeanor probationers, and we agree. We also find no support for Appellants' contention that the application is invalid because it describes the type of work to be done by probationers as "manual labor" rather than specifying "work[ing] as refuse collectors on the back of garbage trucks." As the DeKalb County Public Works Department was authorized to utilize probationers for community service work, Appellants have shown no genuine issue of material fact that, simply by placing Currid there, DeKalb County was grossly negligent, reckless, or committed wilful misconduct.
Appellants assert that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether DeKalb County, through its Public Works Department, was grossly negligent, reckless, or committed wilful misconduct in assigning Currid to ride on the back of a garbage truck with inadequate safety equipment and training. The sanitation department requires garbage collectors to wear safety shoes; however, Currid was not given shoes. A sanitation department employee testified that the safety shoes provide better traction than athletic shoes, which Currid wore. A supervisor testified that it would be a violation of...
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