Daley v. Clark, No. A06A1166.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A06A1166. |
| Citation | 282 Ga. App. 235,638 S.E.2d 376 |
| Parties | DALEY et al. v. CLARK et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Peter F. Boyce, P.C., Duluth, David F. Walbert, Parks, Chesin, Walbert, Atlanta, for appellants.
Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Carothers & Mitchell, Atlanta, Richard A. Carothers, Cheryl Regina Benton Reid, Stewart, Melvin & Frost, William H. Blalock, Jr., Herman, Mathis, Casey, Kitchens & Gerel, Andrea S. Hirsch, for appellees.
Christopher Daniel Daley ("Chris"), then a high school student, was punched in the back of the head during an after-school altercation on M. Stringer Road. Chris suffered sudden cardiac arrest, apparently due in part to a latent, undisclosed heart condition. Students called 911, summoned a nearby Hall County sheriff's deputy, and administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Ultimately, emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics were able to restore Chris's breathing and pulse, but he suffered a brain injury which has left him neurologically impaired. Chris's parents, Dan Daley and Tami Daley, individually and as Chris's guardians, sued law enforcement officers who responded to the scene, including Hall County sheriff's deputies Edward Clark, Matthew Earl Gaudio, and Shawn Douglas Jackson (the "Hall County defendants"), and City of Oakwood police chief Randall Moon and sergeant Thomas L. Wilson (the "Oakwood defendants"), alleging that they arrived prior to the EMTs, hindered the students' efforts to perform CPR, refused the students' pleas to assist Chris, and failed to exercise a ministerial duty to render emergency aid to Chris. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants on three grounds. The court held that pursuant to the public duty doctrine, the defendants owed Chris no legal duty. Alternatively, the court held that the defendants were protected by official immunity and statutory immunity.1 Although we deem the public duty doctrine inapplicable, we affirm on the ground that the defendants are entitled to official immunity for their discretionary actions.
1. The Daleys argue that the trial court erred in holding that the defendants owed no legal duty to Chris pursuant to the public duty doctrine. We agree.
The public duty doctrine, adopted by the Supreme Court in City of Rome v. Jordan,2 provides that a municipality may not be held liable for the failure to provide police protection to individual citizens, except where a special relationship exists between the victim and the municipality.3 As noted in Jordan, this emanated from the concept that
a person does not have a duty to control the conduct of a potential tortfeasor, so as to prevent that person from harming a third person, unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the tortfeasor's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the tortfeasor which gives to the third person a right to protection.4
Subsequently, in Hamilton v. Cannon,5 the Court limited the application of the public duty doctrine to the "police protection" context.6 In Hamilton, the Court held that a deputy sheriff who interfered with ongoing efforts at resuscitation upon answering an emergency call to a swimming pool where a patron had collapsed could not assert the doctrine to claim that he did not owe a duty to the patron.7 A few years later the Court broadened the application of the doctrine to "other protective police services," including "hazardous conditions caused by nature," so that a sheriff who decided not to erect a barricade to a road washed out by a torrential rainstorm was immune from liability for damages sustained by motorists whose cars were wrecked.8
In the case at bar, the doctrine does not apply because the Daleys do not allege that the defendants had any duty to control the conduct of the tortfeasor, i.e., the student who battered Chris. The Daleys' action is based upon the defendants' alleged failure to render aid to Chris or hindrance of others who were providing aid once the defendants arrived upon the scene, in violation of their own policies. It follows that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this ground.9 Nevertheless, "[a] summary judgment right for any reason will be affirmed,"10 and the court properly held that the defendants were entitled to official immunity.
2. "The 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution provides that [s]tate officers and employees `may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions.'"11 Thus, under the doctrine of official immunity, law enforcement officers may be personally liable for negligent actions taken in the performance of ministerial functions, but are immune from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority and performed without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.12 A discretionary act is one calling for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.13 On the other hand, "[a] ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty."14
Stated succinctly, a public officer or employee may be personally liable only for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with malice or an intent to injure. The rationale for this immunity is to preserve the public employee's independence of action without fear of lawsuits and to prevent a review of his or her judgment in hindsight.15
In the case at bar, the Daleys allege that all defendants violated a ministerial duty owed to Chris by failing to perform CPR on him and/or hindering students' efforts to perform CPR. They contend that this duty derives from policies and procedures established by both departments. In this regard, Hall County policy states: The Oakwood Police Department operations manual provides:
"[A]nalysis of a public official's acts as ministerial or discretionary is dependent upon the facts of the individual case, particularly such fact or facts as specifically relevant to the official act or omission from which liability arises."16 "The question whether a duty is ministerial or discretionary turns on the character of the specific act, not the general nature of the official's position."17 Whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to official immunity is a question of law for the court to decide.18 Here, the trial court determined that the defendants' actions were discretionary and that the record contained no evidence of wilfulness, malice, or corruption.
Because our analysis is dependent upon the facts, we begin with a review of the depositions and other evidence of record, bearing in mind that this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the plaintiff's case. Our review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo.19
We cannot resolve the facts on motion for summary judgment, however.20
Viewed most favorably to the Daleys, the evidence shows that on February 14, 2000, a group of 15-25 high school students gathered to watch a fight between Chris and A.M.21 on M. Stringer Road, a dirt road near the school. One of those students, Hebreth G. Miranda, deposed that at first, Chris and A.M. were "just grappling with each other." Then Miranda heard something loud, like a hard knock on wood. A.M. A.M. hit Chris again as he was falling down, "but the first hit was . . . the loudest one." Miranda went after A.M., but he was able to escape in his friend's car.
Miranda, who was the only person on the scene certified to perform CPR, ran back to Chris, started doing breathing and chest compressions, and instructed fellow student Nancy Nicole "Nicky" Wright on how to help. Miranda deposed that he kept giving Chris air, then checking his pulse. Initially, Chris had a faint pulse, but soon his heart stopped beating. Then Chris's lips started turning purple. When Miranda could not detect a pulse, he asked Wright to hold Chris's neck and started giving chest compressions. While giving Chris air, Miranda looked up and saw a deputy walking toward him. Miranda then testified,
I screamed to him to help me, and he basically just . . . ignored me. And he walked right behind me, and all I could hear was him screaming for everybody to get away, get back. And Nicky Wright started screaming at him, please help us. She was crying. And I remember him grabbing her and pulling her away....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Black v. Wigington
...does not support an inference of actual malice. See Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2007) ; Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga.App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376, 386 (2006). Nothing in this record suggests that the deputies acted with actual malice. The deputies consistently stated that they ......
-
Bohanan v. Paulding Cnty.
...does not support an inference of actual malice. See Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2007) ; Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga.App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376, 386 (2006). Id. In short, the mere fact that a police officer's decisionmaking was "misguided" or even "reckless" is not enough to ......
-
Carter v. Butts Cnty.
...not include willful, wanton or reckless conduct or implied malice.’ " McDaniel, 2012 WL 526078, at *19 (quoting Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga.App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376, 386 (2006) ). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to introduce any evidence suggesting that Sheriff Pope acted with the deliberate intent......
-
Marshall v. Mcintosh Cnty. Marshall, s. A14A0639
...actual malice necessary to defeat a claim of official immunity” predicated on a discretionary act). See also Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga.App. 235, 247(2)(b), 638 S.E.2d 376 (2006); Smith v. Little, 234 Ga.App. 329, 330(1), 506 S.E.2d 675 (1998). Rather, “wanton and willful” misconduct can encomp......
-
Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
...does not show the actual malice or intent to injure necessary to strip him of official immunity." Id. at 168, 643 S.E.2d at 545. 285. 282 Ga. App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376 (2006). 286. Id. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 378. A fellow student punched the plaintiffs' son in the back of the head, causing su......
-
Torts - Deron R. Hicks and Travis C. Hargrove
...(2002)). 41. Id. at 759, 642 S.E.2d at 425. 42. 282 Ga. App. 229, 638 S.E.2d 390 (2006). 43. O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-1-40 (2000). 44. Becks, 282 Ga. App. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 394. 45. Id. at 229, 638 S.E.2d at 391. 46. Id. at 229-30, 638 S.E.2d at 391. 47. Id. at 232, 638 S.E.2d at 392. 48. Id. a......