Currier v. McKee

• Decision Date: 13 December 1904
• Parties: CURRIER v. McKEE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

59 A. 442

99 Me. 364

CURRIER

v. McKEE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 13, 1904.

(Official.)

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Aroostook County.

Action on the case by Alice M. Currier against Robert J. McKee under the civil damage act (Rev. St. 1883, c. 27, § 49; now Rev. St. 1903, c. 29, § 58), brought by the plaintiff to recover of the defendant damages for selling intoxicating liquor to her son, by means of which she alleged she had been injured in her means of support, etc. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, on motion of defendant, the presiding justice ruled that on the evidence of the plaintiff the action could not be maintained, and ordered a nonsuit, and plaintiff excepted. Exceptions sustained.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

Frank L. White and Ira G. Hersey, for plaintiff.

George H. Smith and Louis C. Stearns, for defendant.

POWERS, J. This is an action under the civil damage act, and comes to the law court on exceptions to the ruling of the presiding justice directing a nonsuit.

There was evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff lived with her son, Will A. Currier, aged 34, upon his farm, and was dependent upon him for her support; that the defendant sold intoxicating liquor to the son, which caused his intoxication; that while so intoxicated he entered the store of one Boulier, who ordered him out of the store; that he went out, but turned, and tried to come back, with the intention of striking at Boulier and having a fight with him; that he did strike at Boulier, who thereupon struck him and broke his jaw, by reason whereof his ability to labor was decreased, and the support which he afforded his mother sensibly diminished.

The defendant contends that no recovery can be had except for those injuries of which the intoxication is the proximate cause; that the Independent act of an intelligent and responsible human being intervened, and caused the broken jaw, from which all damage to the plaintiff resulted; and that the intoxication was therefore the remote, and not the proximate, cause of the injury.

Rev. St 1883, c 27, J 49 (Rev. St. 1903, c. 29, § 58), creates a new cause of action unknown to the common law, and, so far as is material, reads as follows: "Every wife, child, parent guardian, husband or other person who is injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, has a right of action in his own name against any one who by selling or giving any intoxicating liquors, or otherwise, has caused or contributed to the intoxication of such person." The statute is aimed at the suppression of a great evil, and, while no effort should be made by a forced interpretation to extend its meaning beyond what was fairly intended, it should be literally construed, so as to effect the beneficent purpose for which it was enacted. In its terms it is very broad. It is not confined to unlawful sales, as was the original act of 1858, p. 34, c. 33, § 11 (Rev. St. 1871, c. 27, § 32), which was repealed by the Public Laws of 1872, p. 39, c. 63, § 4, and the present statute substituted. The giver, equally with the seller, is made liable for the injurious consequences of his act. It is not necessary that the intoxicating liquor furnished by the person sued should have been the sole cause of the intoxication. It is sufficient if it "contributed" to it in an appreciable degree. A right of recovery is given for injuries produced in two ways: First, "by any intoxicated person," and, second, "by reason of the intoxication of any person." When the injury is caused by an intoxicated person, it need not be shown that the intoxication caused the injurious act in such case it is sufficient if, while in a state of intoxication, to which liquors furnished by the defendant contributed, such intoxicated person commits the act which results in injury to the "person, property, means of support, or otherwise" of the plaintiff. The furnishing by the defendant of the intoxicating liquor must have contributed as a proximate cause to the intoxication, and the act of the intoxicated person must have been the cause of the injury; but it is not necessary that the intoxication should have been the proximate cause of injury, or of the act which caused it. Neu v. McKechnie, 95 N. Y. 632, 47 Am. Rep. 89; Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122, 40 N. W. 192, 1 L. R. A. 708. The Legislature seems to have regarded intoxicating liquor as dangerous to society, and to have intended that whoever, by furnishing liquor, contributed to the intoxication of any person, should be held responsible for injuries inflicted by him while in that condition, without placing upon the sufferer the burden of showing that the injury was due to the intoxication.

This, however, is but to show the scope of the statute, and that it should be construed in no narrow or illiberal spirit. The plaintiff claims that she was injured in her means of support not by an intoxicated person, but "by reason of the intoxication" of her son.

If this provision is to be regarded as calling for the same sequence and connection of causation required by the maxim of the common law which the defendant invokes, that the law looks to the proximate, and not to the remote, cause, the oft-embarrassing question remains of what is a proximate and effective, although not the immediate, cause of the injury. Giving to the defendant the full benefit of the application of the principle which he claims, still the statute does not require that the furnishing of the liquor by the defendant should be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, but only that it should have contributed to her son's intoxication, and that the intoxication should have beep the proximate cause of the injury. It is urged that the act of an intelligent and responsible human being —the blow struck by Boulier—intervened between the intoxication of the son and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Upon the evidence, however, the jury might have found that the illegal sales of intoxicating liquor by the defendant to the plaintiff's son caused his intoxication, and that his intoxication caused him to make an assault upon Boulier, and that the blow of the latter was solely in self-defense when struck at by the intoxicated son. If so, the intervention of Boulier was rightful. It is the wrongful or negligent act of a third party intervening which breaks the chain of causation and relieves the wrongdoer of the consequences of his wrongful act; but, if in the right, he...