Curtin v. State

• Decision Date: 07 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 0523,0523
• Citation: 884 A.2d 758,165 Md. App. 60
• Parties: Raymond Alan CURTIN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

884 A.2d 758

165 Md. App. 60

Raymond Alan CURTIN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 0523, September Term, 2004.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

October 7, 2005.

Natalie Kraner (Jennifer P. Lyman, Community Legal Clinics, on brief), Washington, DC, for appellant.

Sarah Page Pritzlaff (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Panel MURPHY, C.J., BARBERA, DANIEL M. LONG, (Specially Assigned) JJ.

LONG, J.

On December 17, 2003, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, convicted Raymond Curtin, appellant, of armed robbery and several related offenses, including use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. On February 19, 2004, he was sentenced to twenty-five years without the possibility of parole and an additional five years of supervised probation with drug and alcohol counseling. On March 10, 2004, appellant moved for reconsideration of his sentence, requesting a hearing in order to demonstrate his rehabilitative progress. This motion was denied, and appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 15, 2004.

In his appeal, appellant contends 1) the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to ask his proposed "use of a handgun" voir dire question; 2) there was insufficient evidence to establish the use of a dangerous weapon, handgun, or firearm; 3) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial after approximately two days of deliberations; and 4) multiple sentences for the handgun charges violate the double jeopardy clause and thereby render appellant's sentence unconstitutional. Appellant requests that the Court reverse the unconstitutional convictions and grant a new trial or, in the alternative, conduct a new sentencing hearing for all the remaining offenses.

I. Refusal to Ask the Proposed Use of a Handgun Voir Dire Question

Appellant's proposed voir dire question asked: "Does anyone have strong feelings concerning the use of handguns that would not allow them [sic] to be fair and impartial?" Arguing that the trial court's refusal to ask this question constituted a reversible error that requires a new trial, appellant emphasizes that in Baker v. State, 157 Md.App. 600, 853 A.2d 796 (2004), we considered a proposed jury voir dire instruction addressing handgun bias, and determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to ask whether any member of the jury panel had any bias or prejudice concerning handguns.

Baker involved a defendant who was defending assault and "use of a handgun" charges on the ground that he had acted in self-defense and/or in defense of his girlfriend. Id. at 613, 853 A.2d 796. Because the evidence would show that the defendant shot an unarmed man, the defense requested that the court propound several voir dire questions, including "do you have any bias or prejudice concerning handguns which would prevent you from fairly weighing the evidence in this case?" Id. at 608, 853 A.2d 796. Over Baker's objection, the trial court denied that request. Id. at 610, 853 A.2d 796. Recognizing that a prospective juror's bias may be based on the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged, we determined that the trial court should have asked whether any prospective juror had strong feelings about handguns that would have affected his or her ability to weigh the issues fairly. Id. at 613, 853 A.2d 796 (citing Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 806 A.2d 265 (2002), and State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002)).

Appellant contends that his present appeal fits squarely within our holding in Baker, and that he is thereby entitled to a reversal of his conviction. According to appellant, his proposed voir dire question was designed to detect potential bias towards the nature of the crime and to uncover potential cause for disqualification. Further, appellant argues that because the proposed question was succinct, direct, and went "straight to the heart of jury disqualification," the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to ask this question.

The State, on the other hand, contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing appellant's request that the "handgun bias" question be asked on voir dire. This argument is founded on the premise that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the fact that a handgun was used in the commission of the crime is not sufficient basis to require the trial judge to elicit possible juror bias regarding handguns. The State also argues that a proposed voir dire question is not mandatory unless the question is directly relevant to a potential bias that is particular to the defendant's case, or is based upon the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged. According to the State, this case is distinguishable from Baker, a case in which the jurors were presented with the issues of self-defense and the reasonableness of the use of a gun. The State asks us to hold that, because this case does not present the issue of whether the use of a handgun was reasonable under the circumstances, the voir dire question requested by appellant was not reasonably likely to identify jurors who could be fair and impartial.

In Maryland, the overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury. Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33 (1996). The purpose of voir dire examination, therefore, is to exclude from the venire potential jurors for whom there exists cause for disqualification, so the jury that remains is capable of deciding the matter before it based solely on the facts presented, and uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995). If there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind that will even subconsciously affect his or her decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 35, 150 A.2d 895 (1959). The proper focus is on the venire person's state of mind and whether there is some bias, prejudice, or preconception. State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 210, 798 A.2d 566 (2002). As a result, the defendant is entitled to have the trial judge ask a voir dire question aimed at uncovering a venire person's bias arising out of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Id. at 214, 798 A.2d 566 (citing Alexander v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 419, 30 A.2d 757 (1943)).

At the same time, however, the scope of voir dire and the form of questions propounded are firmly within the discretion of the trial judge. Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 A.2d 867 (1993). Questions which are not directed towards a specific ground for disqualification, but instead are "speculative, inquisitorial, catechising, or `fishing,' asked in the aid of deciding on peremptory challenges, may be refused in the discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have asked them." Id. at 34-35, 633 A.2d 867 (quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194 (1959)). This Court has identified areas of mandatory inquiry when conducting voir dire: (1) racial, ethnic, and cultural bias; (2) religious bias; (3) predisposition as to the use of circumstantial evidence in capital cases; and (4) placement of undue weight on police officer credibility. Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 562, 832 A.2d 869 (2003). Any other inquiries should not be peripheral, but should go directly to the potential bias that would be a basis for the prospective juror's disqualification. Id.

Since appellant's proposed voir dire was not within the mandatory areas of inquiry, the trial court was required to assess whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the proposed question would have revealed a basis for disqualification. Id. at 560, 832 A.2d 869. When making this determination, the trial court should ask "whether a proposed inquiry is reasonably likely to reveal disqualifying partiality or bias," and should weigh "the expenditure of time and resources in the pursuit of the reason for the response to a proposed voir dire question against the likelihood that pursuing the reason for the response will reveal bias or partiality." Id. at 560-61, 832 A.2d 869 (citing Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 220, 686 A.2d 274 (1996)). The trial court retains broad discretion through this process, and it need not make any particular inquiry of the prospective jurors unless that inquiry is directed toward revealing cause for disqualification. Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 8, 759 A.2d 819 (2000).

Here, appellant was charged with multiple counts of armed robbery, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and assault. The charges arose from an incident where, according to the State's evidence, appellant and an accomplice entered a bank armed with a gun. They told everyone to "get down," jumped over the bank teller's station, and proceeded to rob the bank. There was no evidence presented at trial that the gun was ever fired. Appellant's defenses were based on theories suggesting that appellant was not a participant in the bank robbery or, alternatively, that there was no evidence that a real gun was in fact used. Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask appellant's proposed voir dire question regarding attitudes of potential jurors toward guns.

In Baker, jurors were required to consider (1) whether the defendant actually believed he was in immediate danger, and, if this belief was reasonable, (2) whether, by discharging his gun, the defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary. Under those circumstances, a juror who believed that use of a handgun is never appropriate would not be able to give fair and impartial consideration to Baker's self-defense argument. At the same time, a juror with strong feelings in favor of handguns...