Curtis v. Pracht

Decision Date09 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. DKC 2001-2512.,CIV.A. DKC 2001-2512.
Citation202 F.Supp.2d 406
PartiesGerald CURTIS v. Gordon PRACHT, PFC, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Robert H. Law, Robert H. Law PA, Bowie, MD, Susan Elizabeth Mays, Law Office of Susan E. Mays, Bowie, MD, for plaintiff.

John F. Breads, Jr., Columbia, MD, for Gordon Pracht, Matthews, defendants.

Ariana Wright Arnold, Office of U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, for Antoine Keith Weston, defendant.

Michael E. Miller, Robert R. Rigsby, Assist. Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for Government of District of Columbia, U.S. Marshals Service, defendants.

Ariana Wright Arnold, Office of U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, for U.S., movant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case are (1) the motion to dismiss by the local Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, (2) the motion to substitute the United States as sole proper Defendant as to Counts I, II, and III, (3) the motion to dismiss by the federal Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and (4) the motion by Plaintiff, Gerald Curtis, for leave to amend his complaint. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For reasons that follow, the court shall (1) grant the local Defendants' motion to dismiss in part and grant summary judgment in part, (2) grant the motion for substitution, (3) grant the federal Defendants' motion to dismiss in part, (4) order Plaintiff to show cause why Count IX as against Defendant Antoine Weston in his individual capacity should not be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), and (5) deny Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend as futile.

I. Background

The following facts are alleged by Plaintiff, uncontroverted or stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

This suit arises out of an investigation conducted by the United States Marshal Service ("USMS") Fugitive Task Force in connection with the execution of a warrant for the arrest of murder suspect Lawrence Davis. Antoine Weston, a Metropolitan Police Officer serving in his capacity as a deputized United States Marshal, was assigned to the Fugitive Task Force and to assist with the apprehension of Davis, who was a fugitive.

On August 12, 1999, Weston observed a black sports utility vehicle he believed to be a 1989 Ford Bronco identified by him several days prior as Davis' vehicle. Paper no. 28, Ex. 1. On instructions from a superior, Weston contacted the Greenbelt Police Department for assistance in arresting the man whom he believed to be Davis. Officers Gordon Pracht and George Matthews of the Greenbelt City Police Department were dispatched at approximately 3:33 pm on August 12 to the parking area of Beltway Plaza Shopping Mall to assist with service of an open arrest warrant for murder. Paper no. 11, Ex. 1. Matthews was dispatched to another incident as he arrived at the mall, but Pracht encountered Weston. Weston advised him that he had followed a person whom he believed to be the murder suspect, later identified as Plaintiff Gerald Curtis, into the parking area and that the suspect had entered the mall. Weston also informed him that when the suspect had been previously stopped in the District of Columbia, he produced fake identification and was released. Paper no. 11, Ex. 1.

Officer Weston observed the suspect leaving the parking area and pointed Pracht to an older model black Chevrolet Blazer he believed to be Davis' car, despite the fact that it was not the Ford Bronco previously identified by him. Plaintiff, driving the Blazer, was pulled over by three Greenbelt police cars after exiting the parking lot and turning east onto Greenbelt Road. Paper no. 16, Ex. F. Pracht approached the driver side door with his pistol drawn and pointed at Plaintiff and ordered Plaintiff out of the car. The other officers, possibly including Matthews, also had their weapons drawn. Plaintiff was told to kneel down in the street and put his hands behind his head. Pracht handcuffed Plaintiff, read him his rights, informed him he was wanted for murder and put him in the back of the police car. Id.

While Plaintiff was in the back of the police car, he observed the Greenbelt police officers search his car and heard one officer say that Plaintiff was Gerald Curtis, not Davis. Plaintiff remained in the back seat of the police car for at least half an hour. Reginald Bradshaw, Weston's superior at the USMS, arrived on the scene, turned Plaintiff's head side-to-side and told the other officers that Plaintiff was not the murder suspect. Bradshaw apologized to Plaintiff and released him. Id.

On September 8, 1999, Plaintiff contacted Chief Craze of the Greenbelt Police Department to inform him of the incident and to request assistance gaining information about the identity of the officers involved and the justification for the seizure of Plaintiff. Paper no. 16, Ex. E. Plaintiff did not make a notice of claim for damages under the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 5-301 et seq. (1998 & Supp. 1999), to the Greenbelt City authorities until May 25, 2000.

On August 10, 2000, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the USMS which was neither approved nor denied and more than six months elapsed after the filing of the claim.1 On or about August 2, 2001, Plaintiff filed an action in Maryland state court against Pracht, Matthews, the City of Greenbelt ("Greenbelt"), Weston2, the USMS, and the District of Columbia. On August 23, 2001, the action was removed to this court.

All of Plaintiff's claims arise out of the incident recounted above. Defendant District of Columbia was dismissed on March 28, 2002. Plaintiff attempts to state Maryland tort claims against Weston in Counts I and II, against the USMS in Count III, against Pracht in Count IV, against Pracht and Matthews in Count V, and against Greenbelt in Count VI. Counts VII and IX allege U.S. Constitutional claims and Count VIII alleges a violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against all Defendants. Weston and the USMS move to substitute the United States as the sole proper Defendant as to Counts I, II, and III, the local Defendants and the federal Defendants make separate motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint.

II. Standards of Review
A. Motion to dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). All that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require of a complaint is that it contain "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 860 (4th Cir.1997). "Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, `[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, ___, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

In reviewing the complaint, the court accepts all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.1997). The court must disregard the contrary allegations of the opposing party. A.S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir.1969). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal conclusions, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979).

B. Summary Judgment

Some of the defendants have moved for dismissal, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Both sides have submitted material outside the pleadings so the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiff's claims, to the extent that they survive dismissal, is that for summary judgment. While Plaintiff requests in his response that a ruling on Defendants' motion be withheld until he has had an opportunity for discovery (Paper no. 16, at 3), he has not filed an affidavit under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f) opposing summary judgment on the grounds that information necessary for his opposition is unavailable or more discovery is necessary.3 "`[A] party may not simply assert in its brief that discovery was necessary and thereby overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 56(f) to set out reasons for the need for discovery in an affidavit.'" Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.1995), quoting Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 215 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, it is insufficient for Plaintiff merely to lament the lack of discovery where he "does not focus our attention on an affidavit presented to the district court that particularly specifies legitimate needs for further discovery." Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242. Though the court proceeds with due caution when considering a motion for summary judgment before discovery has occurred, here Plaintiff not only has gained access to police reports of the incident, but, as he has done, can set forth...

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