Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth

• Citation: 652 N.E.2d 580,420 Mass. 749
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 17 July 1995
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2076, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 1047, 52 A.L.R.5th 887 Elizabeth G. CURTIS & others 1 v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF FALMOUTH & others. 2

Page 580

652 N.E.2d 580

420 Mass. 749, 64 USLW 2076, 101 Ed.

Law Rep. 1047,

52 A.L.R.5th 887

Elizabeth G. CURTIS & others ¹ v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF FALMOUTH & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Argued March 7, 1995.

Decided July 17, 1995.

Larry L. Crain, of Tennessee (Joseph C. Paruti, with him) for plaintiffs.

Edward T. Hinchey, (Robert G. Eaton with him) for defendants.

Catherine Weiss, of New York, & Sarah Wunsch, for American Civil Liberties Union & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Scott Harshbarger, Atty. Gen., & Amy Spector, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Com., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

A. Van C. Lanckton, Darren R. Klein & Nancy Weissman, for American Jewish Congress & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs, students and parents of students in the Falmouth public school system, appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the school committee of Falmouth (school committee) and three individual defendants. We granted the school committee's application for direct appellate review. We affirm.

This case involves a program of condom availability established by the defendants in the junior and senior high schools of Falmouth. The plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants in response to the implementation of the program. They requested declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), and G.L. c. 12, § 11I (1994 ed.), in the Superior Court, alleging violations of the their Federal constitutional rights. A judge in the Superior Court denied relief and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. ³

The plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint, and now argue before this court, that the condom-availability program, as it stands, violates their right to familial privacy and their guaranteed liberties as parents in the control of the education and upbringing of their children, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also argue that the program violates their right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, and art. 2 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. ⁴ The plaintiffs ask us to reverse the judge's entry of summary judgment for the defendants and to enjoin the school committee from continuing to make condoms available to students without the inclusion of a provision which would permit parents to opt out of the program and without a system of parental notification of their child's requests for a condom.

The motion judge set forth the facts as follows: "On January 2, 1992, following an authorizing vote of the FSC [Falmouth school committee], the Superintendent of Schools issued a memorandum to the teaching staff of grades 7 through 12, detailing the condom availability program. At Lawrence Junior High School, students could request free condoms from the school nurse. Prior to receiving them, students would be counseled. The nurse was also instructed to give students pamphlets on AIDS/HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. At Falmouth High School, students could request free condoms from the school nurse, or students could purchase them for $.75 from the condom vending machines located in the lower level boys' and girls' restrooms. Counseling by trained faculty members would be provided to students who requested it, and informational pamphlets were available in the [school] nurse's office. The Superintendent's memorandum instructed the staff to reserve their own opinions regarding condom availability in order to respect students' privacy. The memorandum also indicates that the Superintendent's presentation of the condom availability to the student body would stress abstinence as the only certain method for avoiding sexually transmitted diseases. The condom availability program took effect on January 2, 1992.

"The FSC condom program does not provide for an 'opt out' for students' parents whereby the parents have the option of excluding their student child from the availability of condoms. Nor is there a parental notification provision in the FSC program by which parents would be notified of their children's requests for condoms.

"Because no high school currently exists in the town of Mashpee, Mashpee residents attend Falmouth High School pursuant to a five-year contract between the Mashpee and Falmouth school committees. The contract does not provide for Mashpee residents to vote in the elections of FSC members. The contract does not prohibit the Mashpee School Committee (MSC) from entering into a similar contract with other neighboring schools or school committees. On September 20, 1992, the MSC voted 4-1 to object to the FSC condom availability program. Pursuant to the contract between the FSC and the MSC, this vote was not binding on the FSC." (Footnote omitted.)

The judge concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the threshold requirement for each of their claims because they were unable to demonstrate that the condom-availability program placed a coercive burden on their rights. The plaintiffs argue that they were not required to show coercion in order to survive the summary judgment motion. They further argue that, even if coercion is the proper standard, the program meets that standard. Thus, they argue, the State was required to prove the existence of a compelling State interest in maintaining the condom-availability program.

As we shall discuss in more detail below, the condom-availability program in Falmouth is in all respects voluntary and in no way intrudes into the realm of constitutionally protected rights. Because no threshold demonstration of a coercive burden has been made, nor could have been made on these facts, the defendants properly were granted summary judgment. ⁵

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we examine whether all material facts have been established and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Judson v. Essex Agric. & Technical Inst., 418 Mass. 159, 162, 635 N.E.2d 1172 (1994); McDonough v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 412 Mass. 636, 638, 591 N.E.2d 1079 (1992). "[A] party moving for summary judgment in a case in which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates, by reference to material described in Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), unmet by countervailing materials, that the party opposing the motion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of that party's case." Judson v. Essex Agric. & Technical Inst., supra, quoting Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991).

The plaintiffs dispute the judge's conclusion that there were no material facts at issue. They point to affidavits filed with the court which allegedly contravene the defendants' underlying rationale for implementing the program. These affidavits contain expert opinions on the possible negative repercussions of making condoms available to young people. An argument could be made that these expert opinions might be relevant to a determination of the State's interest in implementing the program against the plaintiffs' interest in their constitutionally protected rights. However, the judge found no infringement of the plaintiffs' rights and, thus, did not reach the stage of constitutional analysis which would have required him to examine the extent of the State's interest. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829, 101 S.Ct. 95, 66 L.Ed.2d 33 (1980). These affidavits involve considerations "not germane to the narrow constitutional issue presented." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 310, 72 S.Ct. 679, 682, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). The issues before the judge were issues of law, i.e., whether the condom-availability program, the provisions of which are not in dispute, infringes on the rights of the plaintiffs to familial privacy, parental liberty, and free exercise of religion. We conclude that the judge properly decided the case on a motion for summary judgment. Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 374, 436 N.E.2d 139, cert. denied sub nom. Bailey v. Bellotti, 459 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 301, 74 L.Ed.2d 282 (1982). We turn now to a review of the judge's determination of the issues. See McNulty v. McDowell, 415 Mass. 369, 370, 613 N.E.2d 904 (1993), and cases cited.

We begin our discussion by defining the role of the courts with respect to the administration of public education. Public education of children is unquestionably entrusted to the control, management, and discretion of State and local school committees. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826, 106 S.Ct. 85, 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985). See G.L. c. 72, § 37, wherein the Legislature explicitly delegates this authority to local school committees.

"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas, supra. Furthermore, courts must take caution before they order changes in educational programs adopted by duly chosen local authorities. ⁶ Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1029, 98 L.Ed.2d 993 (1988). Obviously, "a State's interest in universal education ... is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests...." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526,...