Judson v. Essex Agr. and Technical Institute

• Citation: 635 N.E.2d 1172,418 Mass. 159
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 05 July 1994
• Parties: , 92 Ed. Law Rep. 640 Carol Ann JUDSON v. ESSEX AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL INSTITUTE & others. 1

Page 1172

635 N.E.2d 1172

418 Mass. 159, 92 Ed. Law Rep. 640

Carol Ann JUDSON v. ESSEX AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL INSTITUTE & others.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Essex.

Argued May 3, 1994.

Decided July 5, 1994.

Daniel T. Chabot, Haverhill, for plaintiff.

Patrick M. Hamilton, Boston, for defendants.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). We transferred the case here on our own motion. After the case was transferred, we invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the possible effect of St.1993 c. 495, §§ 57 and 144 on this action. We affirm.

Facts. The following facts are not in dispute for the purpose of summary judgment. On July 19, 1988, while a student at Essex Agricultural and Technical Institute (EATI), the plaintiff was injured while working at Bradvue Morgan Farm (Bradvue). As part of the curriculum at EATI, students were required to participate in some type of employment related to their course work. It was the student's responsibility to find such related employment ² and to have her employer complete EATI's placement agreement. EATI entered into a placement agreement (agreement) with Bradvue and the plaintiff. The agreement was signed by the plaintiff, her father, her employer, and her project instructor at EATI. The agreement contains the following notation: "Student must be covered by Workman's [sic] Compensation Insurance " (emphasis in original). This statement is followed with the query, "Is student covered by Workman's Compensation?" Bradvue answered, "Yes," to this inquiry. ³ The plaintiff concedes that she was aware that Bradvue was responsible for providing workers' compensation insurance. The agreement further provides:

"It is understood by the employer that the student's project instructor will visit or call the student on the job for the purpose of consultation, to insure that both the employer and the student get the most out of this situation. The instructor will show discretion in the time and the circumstances of these visits.

"The employer is aware of, and agrees to abide by, labor and wage laws as they may apply to this employment. This agreement may be terminated by mutual agreement at any time by either the cooperating employer or the school."

On July 19, 1988, while working at Bradvue, the plaintiff was injured when she fell from a barn loft. Contrary to the agreement, Bradvue did not provide workers' compensation insurance for the plaintiff. ⁴

The plaintiff filed an eighteen-count complaint against the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were contractually bound to confirm that the plaintiff was covered by workers' compensation insurance and to provide supervision to ensure that the plaintiff had a reasonably safe place to work; that the defendants were negligent in failing to confirm that the plaintiff was covered by workers' compensation insurance, and that the plaintiff had a reasonably safe work place; and that Bradvue was an agent of the defendants, therefore the negligence of Bradvue in failing to provide a reasonably safe work place was imputed to the defendants. ⁵ On October 23, 1992, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was allowed.

Discussion. "The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 404 Mass. 624, 626 (1989); Leavitt v. Mizner, 404 Mass. 81, 88 (1989); Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). We may consider any ground supporting the judgment. Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction, 395 Mass. 382, 386 (1985)." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991). "[A] party moving for summary judgment in a case in which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates, by reference to material described in Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), unmet by countervailing materials, that the party opposing the motion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of that party's case." Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991).

The plaintiff contends that the judge erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues exist concerning whether EATI had a duty to inspect the plaintiff's work place and whether EATI had a duty to determine whether Bradvue had workers' compensation insurance covering the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that the special relationship exception to the public duty rule and the agreement imposed a duty of care on EATI. We hold that EATI had no duty to inspect the plaintiff's work place or to ascertain that Bradvue provided workers' compensation insurance for the plaintiff. Because we conclude that no such duty exists, we need not consider what effect, if any, St.1993, c. 495, § 57, has on the plaintiff's claims.

"The public duty rule holds that the employment duties of public employees are generally owed only to the public as a whole and not to private individuals. There is an exception to the public duty rule, however, when there is a 'special relationship' between the public employee and certain individual members of the public." Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 609-610, 562 N.E.2d 1341 (1990), S.C., 411 Mass. 657, 584 N.E.2d 619 (1992). The plaintiff's principal claims concern injuries alleged to have been caused by a public employee's negligence in failing to inspect the plaintiff's place of employment and to assure that Bradvue provided workers' compensation coverage for the plaintiff. The defendants' duty to members of the general public did not require them to inspect places of employment or to ascertain the extent of an employer's insurance coverage. Therefore, we decline to discuss the allegations against the defendants in the context of the special duty or special relationship cases. See Mamulski v. Easthampton, 410 Mass. 28, 29, 570 N.E.2d 1028 (1991).

The plaintiff's complaint also alleges that the defendants have a duty under the agreement to inspect her place of employment and to ensure she was covered by workers' compensation insurance. In support of her argument, the plaintiff relies heavily on Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983). This reliance is misplaced. In Mullins, we decided that a college owed a duty to protect its students against the criminal acts of third persons and that the college's duty was grounded in existing social values and customs which demonstrated...