Curtis v. State
| Decision Date | 24 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-7201 (LTS) |
| Parties | KEANE CURTIS, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, sued in their official capacities, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Keane Curtis, who is currently incarcerated in the Elmira Correctional Facility,[1]filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. He seeks damages and sues the State of New York. He also seems to intend to sue unspecified individual state officials, who appear to be employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), in their official capacities, and perhaps, in their individual capacities.
By order dated October 5, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.[2] For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York and against individual DOCCS officials, in their official capacities. The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's claims under state law against individual DOCCS officials, in their individual capacities. The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in which he names individuals as defendants, and asserts claims under Section 1983 against those individuals, in their individual capacities.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
Plaintiff alleges the following: On February 15, 2020, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Sing Sing Correctional Facility (“Sing Sing”), Correctional Officer Ashman closed Plaintiff's cell door on Plaintiff's right hand. Plaintiff's right hand began to throb and swell, and he experienced “extreme pain.” (ECF 2, at 2.) He was first escorted to the Sing Sing clinic, and then to Mount Vernon Hospital (“MVH”) for evaluation. At MVH, Plaintiff was evaluated and x-ray photographs were taken of his right hand. A physician at that hospital told him that “there was not[h]ing he could do” (id. at 3), and Plaintiff was then escorted to the Westchester Medical Center (“WMC”).
At WMC, Plaintiff's right had was placed in a soft cast. Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff underwent an operation in which screws and wires were inserted into his right hand. He remained at that hospital between February 15, 2020, and April 2, 2020. When Plaintiff was released from that hospital and returned to Sing Sing, he was scheduled to begin physical therapy, “but [D]efendant has failed to schedule[] the p[r]ocedure.” (Id.)
Plaintiff states that his “claim is based on the continue[d] treatment doctrine on the grounds that [D]efendants failed to provide the necessary adequate medical care as required by the doctor who performed the surgery at [WMC].” (Id. at 4.)
A. Claims under Section 1983 and under state law against the State of New York and against individual DOCCS officials, in their official capacities, and claims under state law against individual DOCCS officials, in their individual capacities
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 and state law against the State of New York and against individual DOCCS officials, in their official capacities under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff's claims under state law against individual DOCCS officials, in their individual capacities, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). Congress has not abrogated the States' immunity for claims under Section 1983, see Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990), and the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Eleventh Amendment therefore precludes Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 for damages against the State of New York. The Eleventh Amendment also precludes Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 for damages against any individual DOCCS officials, who are all New York State officials, in their official capacities. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, 28 F.4th 383, 392 (2d Cir. 2022) (). The Eleventh Amendment additionally precludes Plaintiff from seeking here, in federal court, relief under state law against the State of New York, and against individual DOCCS officials, in their official capacities. See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540-42 (2002); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 120-21; see generally Bertoldi v. State, 275 A.D.2d 227, 228 (1st Dep't 2000) (). Moreover, Section 24 of the New York Correction Law precludes Plaintiff from asserting any claims for damages under state law against any individual DOCCS officials, in their individual capacities, arising from any act or failure to act within the scope of their employment; such claims may only be brought against the State of New York in the New York Court of Claims. See N.Y. Corr. Law § 24(1), (2); Baker v. Coughlin, 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996); Parris v. N.Y. State Dep't Corr. Servs., 947 F.Supp.2d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York, and his official-capacity claims against individual DOCCS officials, under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) ; Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (); Atl. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims under state law against individual DOCCS officials for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); N.Y. Corr. Law § 24(1), (2); Parris, 947 F.Supp. at 365-66.
B. Claims under Section 1983 arising from denial of medical care
The...
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