Cuticchia v. Town of Andover
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-P-571.,18-P-571. |
| Citation | 121 N.E.3d 703,95 Mass.App.Ct. 121 |
| Parties | James CUTICCHIA & others v. TOWN OF ANDOVER & others. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Harold L. Lichten for the plaintiffs.
John Foskett (Ryan P. Dunn also present), Boston, for the defendants.
Present: Milkey, Maldonado, & Kinder, JJ.
In 2016, the town of Andover increased the percentage share that retired town employees had to pay for their health insurance. Three retired town employees brought this action alleging that G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (e ), prohibited the town from implementing such increases prior to July 1, 2018.3 On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled that the language of § 22 (e ) unambiguously supported the town's position that the increases were lawful. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment.
1. Statutory background. A municipality may, but is not required to, provide health insurance coverage to its employees and retirees. Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 564, 24 N.E.3d 552 (2015). Where a municipality has chosen to provide such coverage, it generally has a variety of options regarding the percentage it will contribute towards the insurance premiums. Although G. L. c. 32B, § 9, states that retirees are to bear the full cost of their health insurance, municipalities may elect to pay a share of those premiums by "accept[ing] the more generous provisions of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A or § 9E." Id. at 565, 24 N.E.3d 552. By opting into § 9A, the municipality can pay fifty percent of the premiums, and by opting into § 9E, they can pay a higher percentage. Id.
In Somerville, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question whether a municipality that had elected to opt into § 9E could "unilaterally reduce[ ] its percentage contribution to retired employees' health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees." Id. at 573, 24 N.E.3d 552. The court held that a town could do so, thus reaffirming that municipalities enjoyed broad statutory authority to raise the percentage share that retirees had to pay for their health insurance premiums. See id.
In 2011, the Legislature enacted a law to allow municipalities to pursue additional cost savings in the provision of their health insurance plans. See St. 2011, c. 69, § 3, inserting G. L. c. 32B, §§ 21 - 23 (2011 act). Specifically, municipalities now could elect to opt into a program through which they could redesign their health insurance plans, e.g., through changing the copayments and deductibles that those enrolled in the plans had to pay, and through adopting "tiered provider network copayments and other cost-sharing plan design features." G. L. c. 32B, § 22 (a ). The 2011 act created a sui generis, streamlined process through which such changes were to be negotiated or, barring an agreement, determined by a specially constituted "municipal health insurance review panel." G. L. c. 32B, § 21 (c ). While union representatives were given an important role in that process,4 the process otherwise by-passed ordinary collective bargaining. See G. L. c. 32B, § 23 (a ), (c ), (g ) ().
Notably, the new authority offered by the 2011 act was layered on top of the authority that municipalities already possessed to decrease the percentage share that they contributed to their retirees' health insurance premiums. See G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9A, 9E. This meant that retirees now potentially could be subjected to two types of increases implemented outside the traditional collective bargaining process: increases to the percentage share that they had to pay for their premiums, and increases to their copays, deductibles, and the like. As both sides agree, when the Legislature enacted the 2011 act, it placed temporary limits on the ability of municipalities to subject retirees to increases on both fronts. Specifically, municipalities who elected to use their new authority to implement design changes to their insurance plans outside collective bargaining temporarily were precluded from using their already existing authority to raise the percentage share that retirees had to pay. As Governor Patrick stated in proposing the language establishing this moratorium,5 the purpose was "the protection of current retirees from short-term increases in premiums." Governor's Message, 2011 House Doc. No. 3581. Although the parties before us generally agree about the role that the moratorium was intended to serve, they disagree about the details as to how the moratorium was intended to operate and, most specifically, when municipalities would be relieved from its effects.
As enacted by St. 2011, c. 69, § 3, the moratorium language set forth in § 22 (e ) reads as follows:
"The first time a public authority implements plan design changes under this section or section 23, the public authority shall not increase before July 1, 2014, the percentage contributed by retirees, surviving spouses and their dependents to their health insurance premiums from the percentage that was approved by the public authority prior to and in effect on July 1, 2011."
In 2014, the Legislature amended this language by substituting "2016" for "2014." St. 2014, c. 165, § 76. In 2016, the Legislature again amended the language by substituting "2018" for "2016." St. 2016, c. 133, § 45. On both occasions, the remainder of the language was left the same.
2. Background. The town previously had elected to opt into § 9E, under which towns pay more than fifty percent of their retirees' health insurance premiums. Specifically, as of 2011, the town was covering between sixty-five percent and eighty-six percent of those premiums.
In 2012, the town board of selectmen voted to make use of the statutory authority provided by the 2011 act so that the town could restructure the health insurance benefits it provided to its existing employees and retirees. Following the procedures required by the 2011 act, the town implemented its first set of design changes to its health insurance plan effective July 1, 2012. Those design changes, inter alia, included increased copays and deductibles that current employees and retirees alike would have to pay. The percentage contribution that retirees would have to pay for their premiums was not changed at that time.6
In 2016, the town implemented a second set of design changes effective July 1, 2016. At that time, the town also decreased the percentage contribution it would make to cover the premiums of its retirees (thereby increasing the share retirees had to pay). Because the Legislature by this time had extended the end date included in § 22 (e ) to July 1, 2018, the plaintiffs challenged the 2016 increase to their percentage contribution as violating the moratorium.7 On cross motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in the town's favor, explaining his reasoning in a thoughtful memorandum of decision. In short, the judge accepted the town's argument that under the plain language of § 22 (e ), it could increase the percentage contribution that retirees would have to pay even prior to July 1, 2018, because the moratorium applied only to "the first time" a municipality implemented design changes to its health insurance plans, not to second or subsequent changes. Although the judge recognized that the town's interpretation "imposes a very real financial hardship upon [retirees]," he concluded that it was compelled by unambiguous statutory text. Relatedly, the judge concluded that the plaintiffs' interpretation would render superfluous the introductory language about "the first time" a municipality restructures its health insurance plans. See Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 796, 955 N.E.2d 905 (2011) ().
3. Discussion. When discerning the intent of the Legislature, we, of course, must "begin with the language of the statute, and [w]hen a statute is plain and unambiguous, we interpret it according to its ordinary meaning" (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810, 985 N.E.2d 1179 (2013). See DiGregorio v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 775, 780, 942 N.E.2d 998 (2011) (). However, "we look to the language of the entire statute, not just a single sentence, and attempt to interpret all of its terms ‘harmoniously to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.’ " Hanson H., supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 745, 905 N.E.2d 545 (2009).
The key language of § 22 (e ) states as follows: "The first time a public authority implements plan design changes under this section or section 23, the public authority shall not increase before July 1, 2018, the percentage contributed by retirees ...." The town's contention that this language is unambiguous has some force, especially if that language is read in isolation. However, the town passes over the fact that the statutory text does not directly address what constraints may apply the second time a municipality implements plan design changes; the town's interpretation relies on an inference that "the first time" means "but not the second or subsequent time." That inference is permissible, but not mandatory. Moreover, "meaning and ambiguity are creatures of context." Downer & Co., LLC v. STI Holding, Inc., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 792, 927 N.E.2d 471 (2010). For the reasons set forth below, ambiguity emerges here when we examine the key language in the context of the statute as a whole.
It is uncontested that the moratorium set forth in § 22 (e ) served to place temporary limits on the authority that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lyons v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth
...somewhat curious. But we have never required perfectly crafted statutes, only constitutional ones. See Cuticchia v. Andover, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 128 n.10, 121 N.E.3d 703 (2019) ("It often has been observed that ‘people who love sausage and respect the law should never watch either one be......
-
Sullivan v. Bd. of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds
...the Legislature did not include it, would also have the undesirable effect of "render[ing] superfluous," Cuticchia v. Andover, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 125, 121 N.E.3d 703 (2019), the word "conviction" where it appears elsewhere in § 24.10 See id., citing Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 796......