Digregorio v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & Another.1

• Decision Date: 17 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–P–292.,10–P–292.
• Citation: 78 Mass.App.Ct. 775,942 N.E.2d 998
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: William B. DiGREGORIOv.REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES & another.1

78 Mass.App.Ct. 775

942 N.E.2d 998

William B. DiGREGORIO

v.REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES & another.1

No. 10–P–292.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Argued Nov. 4, 2010.Decided Feb. 17, 2011.

Edward J. Partyka for the plaintiff.Kerry David Strayer, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.Present: DUFFLY, KANTROWITZ, & MILKEY, JJ.²MILKEY, J.

Because the plaintiff, William B. DiGregorio, had been convicted, for a third time, of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (registrar) was prohibited by statute from restoring his driving privileges until a designated date. See G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)( b ), (1)( c )(3). The main issue on appeal has to do with how long this automatic statutory prohibition lasts. The plaintiff argues that he can seek restoration of his driving privileges upon the eight-year anniversary of his third conviction. The defendants maintain that the operative date is eight years after the registrar learned of that conviction. DiGregorio also appeals from the denial of his request for a hardship license. We reverse the judgment insofar as it affirms the date that the defendants set as to when DiGregorio can seek restoration of his license.

Background. The plaintiff is a chiropractor who lives in Wales, a Massachusetts town that lies near the Connecticut border. He has a long history of driving infractions in both States. In 1997, he was convicted in Massachusetts of OUI, his first such conviction. He was then convicted of OUI in Connecticut on April 18, 2000. For this conviction, Connecticut suspended his driving privileges in that State, and on May 24, 2000, Connecticut placed a notice of that suspension in the National Driver Register (NDR), an interstate repository for the sharing of driving records.³ The Massachusetts registrar did not learn of the out-of-State conviction or suspension at that time.

On November 29, 2002, the registrar suspended DiGregorio's license because he had been convicted of illegal possession of a Class D substance earlier that year. Upon DiGregorio's application, the registrar restored his license on January 16, 2004. However, in the process of reviewing the request, the registrar checked DiGregorio's driving history in the NDR system and learned of his 2000 OUI-related suspension in Connecticut. As a result, the same day that the registrar restored DiGregorio's driving privileges, the registrar sent him a notice informing him that his Massachusetts license would be suspended indefinitely effective February 15, 2004. DiGregorio has not had permission to drive in Massachusetts since that date.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that DiGregorio continued to drive at least for a time, because he was again arrested in Connecticut for OUI in June of 2004. ⁴ He was convicted of that offense on October 4, 2004 (his second OUI conviction in Connecticut and his third overall). The record indicates that Connecticut issued two new suspension notices related to the June, 2004, incident and that Connecticut entered a record of these suspensions (but not of the October, 2004, conviction itself) into the NDR database on July 6, 2004, and November 24, 2004. However, the registrar apparently had no occasion to check the NDR database at this time and instead first learned of the 2004 Connecticut incident from her review of NDR records in April of 2007. ⁵

In January of 2005, Connecticut informed DiGregorio that he could not get his driving privileges there restored until he completed a certified alcohol treatment program. He successfully completed such a program in 2007,⁶ and Connecticut on November 20, 2007, removed its suspension, effective December 3, 2007. At this time, Connecticut officially entered a record of his 2000 and 2004 OUI convictions into the NDR database.

Although Connecticut had lifted its suspension, the registrar's February, 2004, revocation of DiGregorio's Massachusetts license remained in effect. He applied to have his license restored, and this prompted the registrar to check the NDR records. There, in April, 2007, the registrar found the references to the 2000 and 2004 Connecticut convictions (as noted infra, the registrar learned of the suspensions that were based on the incidents underlying the convictions in 2004 and 2007, respectively). On December 26, 2007, the registrar sent DiGregorio a notice that, effective January 5, 2008, his license (which, at the time, was already under an indefinite suspension) was being revoked for an additional eight years because he had been convicted of a third OUI charge.

DiGregorio filed a timely appeal with the board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board). He also requested—by way of alternative relief—that the board give him a hardship license. After the board held a hearing on May 6, 2008, it issued an order upholding the registrar's revocation of his license until January 5, 2016. In an accompanying “[s]tatement of [r]eason for [d]ecision,” the board explained its view that it was statutorily “mandated to take action and suspend the appellant's license for eight years” and that the registrar could do so only upon receiving official notice of the third OUI conviction. Although the board did not expressly rule on DiGregorio's request for a hardship license, it declined to offer him that relief. The board also specifically concluded that his having to hire a paid driver, which he had already been doing at the time of his hearing, “to get to and from his obligations” amounted to only an “inconvenience[ ],” not a “hardship.” ⁷

On DiGregorio's judicial appeal filed pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, a Superior Court judge upheld the board's decision. He concluded that “the Registry properly applied a January 5, 2008 revocation date” and that “[t]he Board's discretion in this regard ‘should not be disturbed.’ ” As to DiGregorio's request for a hardship license, the judge concluded that since the eight-year suspension had just begun to run, that request was premature. ⁸

Discussion. 1. Length of the revocation. We begin by providing a quick road map to the applicable statutory provisions. Along with its neighboring sections, G.L. c. 90, § 24, governs the licensing consequences of driving while intoxicated.⁹ With certain exceptions not here applicable, § 24(1)( b ) requires the registrar to revoke the driver's license of anyone convicted of OUI in violation of § 24(1)( a ) (1). This subsection does not itself specify how long the mandated revocation is to last. However, § 24(1)( c ) serves to prohibit the registrar from restoring the driving privileges of the offender before a specified date. See Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 131, 134, 872 N.E.2d 1182 (2007). That date is determined by the number of previous convictions that the offender has had for OUI or “a like offense” (regardless of whether such convictions are in “a court of the commonwealth or any other jurisdiction”). See G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)( c ), as amended through St.2006, c. 428, § 13. Fifth-time offenders lose their privileges permanently. See G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)( c )(3 3/4).

Because DiGregorio's most recent OUI conviction was his third such offense, the applicable provision here is § 24(1)( c )(3).¹⁰ Under the express terms of that subsection, the registrar is prohibited from restoring the driving rights of a third time offender “until eight years after the date of conviction.” ¹¹ Notwithstanding this language, the defendants argue that the registrar's hands remain tied until eight years after she learned of the third conviction (which occurred here more than three years after the conviction), at least where the conviction that triggers the statutory provision occurs outside Massachusetts.

Statutory text is, of course, the principal source from which courts, and agencies, are to discern legislative purpose. See Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). “Where the words are ‘plain and unambiguous' in their meaning, we view them as ‘conclusive as to legislative intent.’ ” Water Dept. of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744, 920 N.E.2d 33 (2010), quoting from Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839, 494 N.E.2d 1008 (1986). Courts must follow unambiguous statutory language “unless ‘following the Legislature's literal command would lead to an absurd result, or one contrary to the Legislature's manifest intention.’ ” Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142, 899 N.E.2d 829 (2009), quoting from White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 253, 700 N.E.2d 526 (1998).

The defendants have not pointed to any ambiguity in the language of § 24(1)( c )(3); indeed, they pay virtually no attention to that language. ¹² Instead, they focus on § 22( c ), which states that upon receiving official notice of out-of-State violations, “the registrar shall give the same effect to said conviction for the purposes of said suspension, revocation, limitation or reinstatement of the right to operate a motor vehicle, as if said violation had occurred in the commonwealth.” G.L. c. 90, § 22( c ), as amended by St.2006, c. 134, § 1. But DiGregorio does not question the registrar's authority to rely on the 2000 and 2004 Connecticut convictions once she received official notice of them or to treat these out-of-State convictions as if they had occurred in the Commonwealth. Section 22( c ) simply does not speak to the question at hand: how long a suspension based on those convictions must last, regardless of whether they occurred in or out of State. That issue is addressed by § 24(1)( c ) (3), not § 22. ¹³

Even if we could deviate from the unambiguous language that the Legislature has enacted, the defendants have not presented any compelling reason to do so. Their principal argument is that relying on the date of...