D.D. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, C057260 (Cal. App. 8/12/2009)

• Decision Date: 12 August 2009
• Docket Number: C057260
• Parties: D.D., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF STOCKTON et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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D.D., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF STOCKTON et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C057260

Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, San Joaquin.

August 12, 2009

Not to be Published

Appeal from the Super. Ct. No. CV031440.

BUTZ, J.

This case requires us to explore the many revisions and amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,¹ a special statute of limitations governing causes of action alleging childhood sexual molestation.

Plaintiff, who has been designated the fictitious name D.D., appeals from a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer, without leave to amend, to his complaint for damages against defendants The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton and the Pastor of St. Anne Church (Church defendants).

Plaintiff alleges that in the 1970's while he was a pupil at a Catholic school, Doe 4, a priest, teacher and employee of the Church defendants, subjected him to horrific and continuous acts of sexual abuse. Defendants allegedly knew of the abuse and concealed, condoned, and otherwise failed to protect plaintiff from Doe 4, despite actual or constructive notice that he had also abused other minors and was a chronic child molester. Plaintiff claims he repressed all memory of the abuse, but recovered his memory and linked it to his psychological problems in the summer of 2005. He filed this action in late 2006, 30 years after the childhood sexual abuse had ended.

Section 340.1, revised in 2002 when the Legislature also opened up a one-year "revival window" for bringing childhood sexual abuse claims, sets an outer date for commencement of an action to recover damages as the result of childhood sexual abuse of "three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse . . . ." (§ 340.1, subd. (a).) The question on appeal is whether this language applies retroactively to childhood sexual abuse claims that had already lapsed² by virtue of the statute of limitations.

We agree with the trial court that the answer to this question is "no." The delayed discovery provisions of section 340.1, subdivision (a) were not intended to operate retroactively. Nor may plaintiff avail himself of common law theories of delayed accrual, since the Legislature has withdrawn its sanction of such theories in its revisions to the statute.³ We shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that from 1973 to 1976, while he was between the ages of 8 and 11, he was abused "numerous times" and "often a few times a week" by Doe 4, a priest and teacher who was employed by the Church defendants.

According to the complaint, the Church defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that Doe 4 was a habitual child molester, but condoned the misconduct and concealed it from public view.

Most of the acts of sexual abuse took place after plaintiff was summoned to the vestibule "to help DOE 4 clean up." It was in the vestibule, "where DOE 4 would sexually harass, molest and abuse Plaintiff." However, plaintiff "felt as if he had to show up [at] the vestibule as DOE 4 had required, and could not easily terminate his relationship with Defendant DOE 4."

Plaintiff alleges that "[f]ollowing the above-described sexual harassment, abuse, and molestation," he "repressed all memories of said harassment, abuse, and molestation . . . and had no awareness of the actions, injury or wrongfulness of such acts." Only when plaintiff received a letter of apology from Doe 4 in the summer of 2005 did he "beg[i]n realizing and becoming aware of the wrongfulness of the abuse." The letter triggered plaintiff's realization that the "multiple mental and emotional problems" that he was experiencing were being caused by the childhood sexual abuse inflicted on him by Doe 4. Furthermore, "[d]ue to Defendants' manipulation of [p]laintiff, he was incapable of discovering that his psychological injury or illness was caused by the sexual harassment, molestation and abuse he endured at the hands of DOE 4 at an earlier date."

Plaintiff filed suit on December 22, 2006, by which time he was approximately 41 years old, seeking damages against defendants for, inter alia, negligent supervision, negligent hiring and retention, failure to warn, sexual battery and sexual harassment.

The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, finding that plaintiff's claim lapsed in 1984 under former section 340 and was therefore time-barred under Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759, 765-766 (Hightower).

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Principles

Because this appeal arises from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543.) "We apply well-established principles of statutory construction in seeking `to determine the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute "`so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.'"'" (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 211 (Shirk).) The statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. However, if the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history,⁴ public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute. (Shirk, supra, at p. 211.)

II. Analysis

"Section 340.1 sets forth a special statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse." (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1268.) It therefore prevails over more general statutory limitations periods that may apply. (Aetna Cas. etc. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 785, 787.)

A. The Church Defendants Are Section 340.1, Subdivision (b)(2) Defendants

Section 340.1 contains varying limitations periods for bringing actions for childhood sexual abuse against different groups of defendants. Interpreting the statute is rendered more complicated by the fact that these limitations periods have been amended several times over a period of years. To clarify our analysis at the outset, we observe that the Church defendants are being sued as defendants identified in subdivision (b)(2) of the statute. "The words of subdivision (b)(2) create three conditions that must be met before it applies to a particular case: (1) the nonperpetrator defendant `knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice'; (2) that the perpetrator—'an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent'—had engaged in `unlawful sexual conduct'; and (3) `failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment.'" (Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 545.)

Here, plaintiff alleged that the Church defendants knew or should have known of Doe 4's past sexual abuse of minors and other pupils under his charge and failed to take reasonable safeguards to prevent him from coming into contact with children such as plaintiff; on the contrary, it is alleged that defendants concealed the abuse and knowingly failed to take reasonable steps to prevent Doe 4 from sexually abusing plaintiff.

Accordingly, as all parties agree, plaintiff seeks to avail himself of the statute of limitations applicable to subdivision (b)(2) defendants.⁵

B. The Issue in Controversy

Plaintiff claims his action is timely based on the "delayed discovery" provision of section 340.1, which permits bringing an action against subdivision (b)(2) defendants until eight years from the age of majority, or within "three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse," whichever is later. (§ 340.1, subds. (a), (b)(1), (2).) However, subdivision (c) of section 340.1 also features a one-year "window" for reviving claims that had already lapsedby virtue of the statute of limitations. It provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in [subdivision (a)(2) or (3)] that is permitted to be filed pursuant to [subdivision (b)(2)] that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003." (Italics added.) Because he did not file his complaint until December 2006, plaintiff undisputedly missed the one-year revival deadline provided for in subdivision (c).

Plaintiff contends the delayed discovery provision applies to the present claim, such that his causes of action did not even accrue until the summer of 2005 when he recovered his memory of the sexual abuses perpetrated by Doe 4. Alternatively, he argues that his claim was timely under equitable, common law theories of delayed discovery or delayed accrual.

The Church defendants maintain that the Legislature gave plaintiffs in D.D.'s position only one chance to bring childhood sexual abuse claims that had previously lapsed—the calendar year 2003—and plaintiff's failure to avail himself of that opportunity forever barred his action. Moreover, defendants say the Legislature has decisively precluded use of common law doctrines of delayed discovery by deleting language in section 340.1 that had previously permitted their application.

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