Through His Parent, Joseph P. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 16-5230
• Parties: SANTINO P., by and through his Parent, JOSEPH P., Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

SANTINO P., by and through his Parent, JOSEPH P., Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-5230

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 15, 2017

PAPPERT, J.

MEMORANDUM

This case requires the Court to decide whether a parent who prevailed in a due process hearing against a public charter school can recover attorneys' fees from the Pennsylvania Department of Education when the Department was not a party to that hearing and separately satisfied its obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The parties stipulated to all facts and filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court grants the Department's motion for two related reasons: The Plaintiff did not prevail against the Department at the due process hearing and Congress declined to make fee shifting integral to a free appropriate public education under IDEA.

I.

A.

IDEA requires states receiving federal funding to make a "free appropriate public education available to all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010). A free appropriate public education "includes both 'special education' and 'related services.'" Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(26), (29)). IDEA mandates instruction that is "specially . . . designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction." D.S., 602 F.3d at 556 (quotation and citation omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Under IDEA, states "must confer an education providing 'significant learning' and 'meaningful benefit' to the child." Id. (quoting Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)). IDEA thus "ensures that students with special education needs receive the type of education that will 'prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.'" Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).

States seeking funding under IDEA must submit a plan of compliance to the Secretary of Education. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-14. IDEA then gives the State Education Agency ("SEA")—i.e., the state department of education, id. § 1401(32)—the responsibility of apportioning the funds to Local Education Agencies ("LEAs")—i.e. school districts or public charter schools, id. § 1401(19)(A). See id. § 1413(a). "The SEA is responsible for ensuring that LEAs comply with the mandates of the IDEA in providing educational services to those eligible students." Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F. Supp. 3d 510, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A)). The LEA is the entity that actually provides services to children under IDEA. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). It is the SEA, however, that "retains primary responsibility to ensure that all children with disabilities receive theeducation that is their right under the IDEA." Charlene R., 63 F. Supp. at 513; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(11)(A), 1413(g)(1); Kruelle v. New Castle Cty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 696 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 2006); St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. State of Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1998); Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 943 (4th Cir. 1997).

B.

IDEA requires states to establish extensive safeguards to ensure all disabled children receive a free appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). Three primary mechanisms exist to settle such disputes: a due process hearing, a state complaint and formal mediation.

A due process hearing provides an "opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). "In Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth's Office of Dispute Resolution ("ODR") is responsible for conducting IDEA due process hearings." H.E. v. Palmer, 220 F. Supp. 3d 574, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing 22 Pa. Code § 14.162). Any party "aggrieved by" the hearing officer's "findings and decision" may seek review of the decision by filing a civil action in state court or in a district court of the United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Alternatively, parents may file a complaint directly with the SEA. "Upon receipt of such a complaint, the SEA must evaluate the complaint and carry out, as necessary, an independent investigation before reaching a final decision containing findings of fact and conclusions." R.V. v. Rivera, 220 F. Supp. 3d 588, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing 34C.F.R. §§ 300.151-.153)). The due process hearing and state complaint process are parallel proceedings, "either of which a parent may opt to pursue in the first instance," however, "the due process complaint procedure takes priority over the state complaint procedure." Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)(1) (explaining that an SEA must stay its investigation when a due process complaint is filed)).

Finally, IDEA provides for formal mediation. States must "ensure that procedures are established and implemented to allow parties . . . to resolve such disputes through a mediation process." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1). This process must be voluntary, cannot be "used to deny or delay a parent's right to a due process hearing . . . or to deny any other rights" and must be "conducted by a qualified and impartial mediator who is trained in effective mediation techniques." Id. § 1415(e)(2)(A).

C.

Separate from the procedural protections described above, IDEA allows prevailing parties the opportunity to recover attorneys' fees. See id. § 1415(i)(3). That provision provides that in "any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability."¹

Notably, § 1415(i)(2), which provides for court review of a hearing officer's decision, and § 1415(i)(3), providing for fee shifting, "contain separate jurisdictional grants, and the weight of authority holds that they create two distinct causes of action." D. G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2015); see Zipperer v.Sch. Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997); Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also B.K. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 471 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing with approval Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851). But see King v. Floyd Cty. Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622, 626 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000)

Under § 1415(i)(2), parties "aggrieved by the findings and decision made" by the hearing officer may bring a civil action within "90 days from the date of the decision of the hearing officer." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). In contrast, "prevailing parties" may bring a civil action under § 1415(i)(3) to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Courts, recognizing these two distinct causes of action, have also held that a different statute of limitation applies to actions brought under § 1415(i)(3).² See, e.g., D.G., 806 F.3d at 317; Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851.

II.

The facts of this case are unique. Santino is a student eligible for special education services under IDEA. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 5, ECF No. 17.) In October 2013, Santino enrolled in the eighth grade at the Walter D. Palmer Leadership and Learning Charter School, an LEA that received federal financial assistance under IDEA. (Id.¶¶ 9-11.) His father Joseph requested that Santino receive an independent educational evaluation to determine his current level of functioning. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) In March 2014, Palmer approved the request for an evaluation at public expense and in April 2014, Palmer's CEO David Weathington acknowledged in writing that it was Palmer's obligation to pay for Santino's evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13 & 14.) Santino received an independent neuropsychological evaluation from Dr. Kara Schmidt in August 2014, (id. ¶ 15), and Dr. Schmidt submitted an invoice to Palmer totaling $4,000, (id. ¶ 16).

Despite agreeing in advance to pay for this evaluation, Palmer ultimately refused to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.) Joseph filed a due process complaint against Palmer on December 4, 2014 seeking full payment for the evaluation. (Id. ¶ 17.) Later that month, after all parties submitted filings but before the hearing officer entered a decision, Palmer permanently closed due to financial difficulties. (Id. ¶ 23.) On January 12, 2015, the hearing officer ruled in Joseph's favor, ordered Palmer to pay $4,000 and declared Joseph the prevailing party. (Id. ¶ 22.) Palmer, now closed due to insolvency, did not pay for Dr. Schmidt's services.

In June 2015, Joseph's counsel notified the Department of Palmer's failure to pay. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Counsel requested that the Department, pursuant to its responsibilities under IDEA to ensure that all children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education, pay the $4,000 for Santino's evaluation and the accrued attorneys' fees of $6,322.55. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) The Department agreed to pay for Santino's evaluation but refused to pay the attorneys' fees. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29.)

III.

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Emp. Health & Welfare Plan, 298 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the...