D.R. Horton, Inc. — Jacksonville v. Peyton

• Decision Date: 18 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1D05-5585.,1D05-5585.
• Citation: 959 So.2d 390
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: D.R. HORTON, INC.— JACKSONVILLE, Appellant, v. John PEYTON, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Jacksonville, a Florida municipal corporation; and Michael Saylor, in his official capacity as Director of Planning and Development for the City of Jacksonville, a Florida municipal corporation, Appellees.

959 So.2d 390

D.R. HORTON, INC.— JACKSONVILLE, Appellant, v. John PEYTON, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Jacksonville, a Florida municipal corporation; and Michael Saylor, in his official capacity as Director of Planning and Development for the City of Jacksonville, a Florida municipal corporation, Appellees.

No. 1D05-5585.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 18, 2007.

Fred D. Franklin, Jr., William D. Brinton, T.R. Hainline, Jr., Cristine M. Russell, and Christopher J. Hand of Rogers Towers, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Cindy A. Laquidara, General Counsel and Tracey I. Arpen, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellees.

Deborah J. Andrews, Ponte Vedra Beach, for Amicus Curiae Baymeadows Community Council, Inc.

VAN NORTWICK, J.

D.R. Horton, Inc.—Jacksonville (Horton) appeals an order granting final summary judgment in favor of John Peyton, in his capacity as the mayor of the City of Jacksonville (the City), and Michael Saylor, in his capacity as director of planning and development for the City, appellees. Horton brought an action challenging the mayor's veto of a resolution of the Jacksonville City Council (Council) which had approved a so-called "fair share assessment contract" by which Horton was authorized to undertake a proposed development in the Baymeadows area of the City. Under section 6.05 of the City's Charter, the mayor does not possess the authority to veto, among other actions of the Council, "quasi-judicial decisions made by the council." Thus, the issue before us is whether the Council's decision approving the Horton resolution was quasi-judicial in nature. Because Horton's proposed development necessitated such substantial transportation infrastructure improvements, as provided in Horton's fair share contract with the City, that it would require an amendment to the capital improvement element of the City's comprehensive plan, we conclude that the Council's decision was legislative, not quasi-judicial in nature. Accordingly, we affirm the order upholding the mayor's veto, although for reasons different than those relied upon by the trial court.

Background

In 2004, Horton planned a multi-use development of the golf course within the Baymeadows community in the southeastern area of Jacksonville. The proposed development involved approximately 150 acres of real property and included approximately 1,400 residential dwellings, 150,000 square feet of office space, and 60,000 square feet of retail space. Horton sought a determination from the planning and development department of the City as to whether the proposed development of the subject property met local development requirements. More particularly, Horton sought a "concurrency certificate" showing that his proposed development fell within the development guidelines in the City's comprehensive plan. The City's planning and development department denied Horton's application for a concurrency certificate on the ground that the existing roads in the area of the development would be unable to handle the increased traffic resulting from the development, as determined by a traffic study. Under the authority of the fair share contract provisions of the City's ordinance code, Part 3, Chapter 655, Jacksonville Ordinance Code (Code), the department advised Horton of his available options, one of which was to submit a "fair share assessment" application to enter into a contract with the City by which Horton would pay for the cost of the infrastructure improvements made necessary by the proposed development. Horton submitted a fair share application that provided for a fair share payment of $4,894,875 and a proposed contract. Exhibit B to Horton's fair share application specified in detail the various roads which would be improved pursuant to the funds provided under the fair share contract. Exhibit E to the fair share application provided that these roadway improvements "shall be added to the Capital Improvements Plan of the City, designating the Developer as the source of funding."

The resolution approving the Horton contract was assigned to the Transportation, Environment and Energy Committee of the Council. This committee held a public meeting and thereafter recommended to the Council that Horton's fair share contribution be increased to $7,142,403. The committee's recommendation was submitted to the Council and scheduled on the Council's agenda with other resolutions described in the agenda as "Action on 3rd Reading Resolution(s), Committee Recommendations." The agenda also contained a separate category of "quasi-judicial" actions to be heard by the Council.

In the public hearing before the Council, Horton introduced the results of a traffic study prepared by its consultant which supported the roadway improvements set forth in the proposed fair share contract. Opponents of the project presented testimony by a traffic engineer that Baymeadows Road, the only public road directly accessing the proposed development, is a "constrained facility," meaning it could not be expanded to provide transportation service beyond its current level of service; and that the transportation improvements proposed by Horton's fair share contract were not adequate to support the proposed development. Further, the opponents testified that proposed transportation improvements were not contained in the City's capital improvement program that is a part of the City's comprehensive plan and that most of the improvements which were in the capital improvement program were not within a two-mile radius of Horton's traffic study.

After extensive debate, by a vote of 11 to 8 the Council approved the amended Horton resolution which the mayor timely vetoed. In his veto letter, the mayor set forth the policy reasons supporting his action. He found that the proposed roadway improvements were inadequate to address the traffic impacts that would be created by the proposed development. As the mayor explained:

In this case, the proposed development will generate traffic impacting Baymeadows Road, as well as other roadway links. Specifically, the development is projected to add 1,182 PM Peak Hour trips to the three affected links of Baymeadows Road, as well as adding additional trips to other roadway links.

Baymeadows Road is a constrained facility, as defined by the Florida Department of Transportation, meaning that it cannot be widened further to add traffic capacity. While other constrained roadways exist within the city, few are failing to the same extent as Baymeadows Road, and few have the potential for the type of large-scale development that is proposed for Baymeadows Golf Course. Furthermore, due to the existing roadway configuration from past development, Baymeadows Road is the only public road directly accessing the property and the point of ingress and egress is from the most negatively-impacted links on Baymeadows Road.

Roadway improvements that add capacity to a roadway (other than road widening) are authorized by state and local law. However, those improvements must offset the impacts of the proposed development on the affected roadway links identified in the particular Fair Share Assessment Contract. For this particular project, the developer proposed a list of roadway improvements other than widening Baymeadows Road to offset the impacts on Baymeadows Road and the other affected roadway links.

I have reviewed the evidence in the record regarding the proposed roadway improvements and their suggested impact on the affected roadway links. My review has led me to conclude that the proposed list of improvements is inadequate to address the traffic impacts which would be created by the proposed development. . . .

The Council considered overriding the veto, but failed to do so by a vote of 2 to 16.

Horton filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the circuit court for Duval County, asserting that in vetoing the resolution the mayor exceeded his authority under section 6.05 of the City's Charter. Alternatively, Horton sought a writ of mandamus to compel the execution and the implementation of the fair share contract. The mayor and the director of the City's planning department were named as respondents. The Baymeadows Community Council (BCC), comprised of residents in the Baymeadows community, was permitted to appear in the proceeding in opposition to the development.

The parties eventually moved for final summary judgment and submitted written argument in support of the respective positions; BCC also submitted argument. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a thoughtful and detailed order granting the City's motion for summary judgment. The trial court explained its ruling, in pertinent part, as follows:

The ultimate issue before the Court appears on the surface to be simple and discrete: Did the Mayor have the legal authority to veto the Council Resolution approving the Fair Share Assessment Agreement between Horton and the City? Any veto power the Mayor has is derived from Section 6.05, Jacksonville Municipal Code. The parties agree that thereunder, the Mayor does not have the authority to veto "Quasi-judicial decisions made by the council." On the other hand, under the Code, the Mayor does have the right to veto legislative type actions of the Council. The parties disagree here as to the character of the Resolution at bar.

A legislative action by a local governing body is one that results in the formulation of a general rule of policy. On the other hand, a quasi-judicial action results in the application of a general rule of policy. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.1993). Quasi-judicial hearings require that certain due process rights be granted to the affected parties. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Polk County, 524 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Brown v. Walton County, 667 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). . . . In order to decide whether the...