Miami-Dade Cnty. v. City of Miami
| Decision Date | 23 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D20-1195,3D20-1195 |
| Parties | MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and James Edwin Kirtley, Jr. and Dennis A. Kerbel, Assistant County Attorneys, for petitioner.
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Kerri L. McNulty, Senior Appellate Counsel, for respondent.
Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ, and HENDON, JJ.
Petitioner Miami-Dade County seeks second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court appellate decision which dismissed the County's petition for writ of certiorari finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the County's petition. For the reasons that follow, we grant the second-tier certiorari petition and quash the circuit court's opinion.
In 2005, the Coconut Grove Playhouse was designated a historic site, as defined by City of Miami Code, section 23-2. The Miami-Dade County and Florida International University (FIU) are co-tenants of the Playhouse property located at 3500 Main Highway in the City of Miami, Florida 33133. The County and FIU entered into a lease agreement with the State, the owner of the property, in October 2013.
The County was developing a conceptual master plan to rehabilitate the Playhouse, and due to the Playhouse's historic site status, the County was required to apply for an historic preservation permit, known as a certificate of appropriateness, from the City's Historic and Environmental Preservation Board (HEPB). Section 23-6.2(a) of the City of Miami Code addresses certificates of appropriateness for historic sites and when they are required. Section 23-6.2(b) addresses the procedures for issuing certificates of appropriateness. Specifically, section 23-6.2(b)(4) addresses "Special certificates of appropriateness" such as the one sought by the County in the underlying case, due to it involving "a major addition, alteration, relocation, or demolition." The process requires a public hearing, with notice to the applicant and to any other individual or organization requesting notice, before a decision of the HEPB is made. See City of Miami Code, § 23-6.2(b)(4)a.-b. The County's proposed plan included demolishing the theater, building various new elements, and building a completely new, smaller theater, while retaining the building's historic façade.
On April 4, 2017, the HEPB held a public hearing and conditionally approved the County's application for the certificate of appropriateness. As part of the master plan approval, the County was required to go back to the HEPB when the County had its plans completed to obtain the HEPB's final approval before the County could proceed with the rehabilitation of the Playhouse and before a demolition permit could be issued.
Thereafter, two City of Miami residents objected and appealed the HEPB's decision to the Miami City Commission. The City Commission heard the appeal on December 14, 2017, and after finding that the residents had standing to appeal, the City Commission reversed the HEPB's approval in part, affirmed it in part, and imposed some new conditions on the County's plan. The County filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit's Appellate Division (the circuit court) in case number 18-000032-AP-01 contesting the City Commission's decision. On December 3, 2018, the circuit court granted the County's petition. See Miami-Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 800b (11th Jud. Cir. App. Div. Dec. 3, 2018) (the Playhouse I decision). The circuit court reversed and remanded the case with instructions that the City Commission's decision denying the certificate of appropriateness be quashed. Thus, the HEPB's approval of the County's application for the certificate of appropriateness was reinstated. No party appealed that decision.
Afterwards, the County again submitted its application for a certificate of appropriateness, including an application for a demolition permit, for the final plans to rehabilitate the Playhouse, in order to conform with the HEPB's prior approval in April 2017. The HEPB heard the merits of the County's application at its March 5, 2019 meeting. At the end of the hearing, the HEPB denied the County's application. The County then timely appealed the HEPB's denial to the City Commission. After a public hearing was held on May 8, 2019, the City Commission granted the County's appeal and reversed the HEPB's decision to deny the County's application. The City Commission thus approved the County's final rehabilitation plans for the Playhouse.
On May 17, 2019, the City of Miami Mayor vetoed the City Commission's approval, pursuant to the authority given to him by the City of Miami Charter and Code. The Mayor issued a "veto message" explaining his veto decision. The veto decision was placed on the agenda for the next City Commission meeting on May 23, 2019. At the May 23, 2019 public hearing, one of the Mayor's staff members, "counsel for the mayor," stated, "it is crucial that this [veto] decision has to be guided by quasi-judicial factors." At the end of the hearing, the Commission voted, but the vote did not override the veto, thus leaving the Mayor's veto in place as the final decision on the County's application.
The County then filed its petition for first-tier certiorari review with the circuit court appellate division in case number 2019-167-AP-01, challenging the Mayor's veto. The three-judge panel heard oral argument, and on July 22, 2020, the circuit court issued its opinion. Miami-Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 458a, 2020 WL 4218217 (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. App. Div. July 22, 2020) (the Playhouse II decision). In the first paragraph of the opinion, the circuit court asked, "Does the circuit court have certiorari jurisdiction to review a municipal mayor's veto?" The circuit court answered "no" to its question and found that the Mayor's veto was not a quasi-judicial act. The circuit court found that the HEPB proceedings were quasi-judicial, as section 23-6.2 of the City's Code "required notice, the opportunity to be heard, a public hearing, and the right to appeal." Id. It similarly found that the City Commission's decision was quasi-judicial under section 23-6.2(e) of the City Code because the process also required notice, opportunity to be heard, a public hearing, and the right to appeal. Id. However, when addressing the Mayor's veto, the circuit court stated, "Unlike the HEPB decision and the City Commission appeal, a mayoral veto contains no hallmarks of a quasi-judicial act." Id. This was because under the City's Code and Charter, a mayoral veto did not require notice, opportunity to be heard, or an appeal process. Id. The circuit court declined to classify the mayor's veto as executive or quasi-legislative, however it stated that the veto "negates the power of the Commission." Id. at n. 7. Thus, the circuit court stated, "But no matter how veto power is described, it is not quasi-judicial and therefore, not properly reviewable by certiorari." Id. Accordingly, it dismissed the County's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The County then filed this second-tier petition for writ of certiorari for this Court to review the circuit court's decision in Playhouse II.
The County asserts that the circuit court violated the essential requirements of the law by: 1) holding that the Mayor's veto was not a quasi-judicial action, 2) wrongly analogizing the facts of this case to the Florida governor's vetoes of legislative actions at the State level to decide that the Mayor's veto of a quasi-judicial application at the local government level was separate from the quasi-judicial process that the veto overturned, and 3) ignoring the due process implications of how the circuit court interpreted the City's Charter and Code.2 We agree with the County's positions.
Both the County and the City agree that the circuit court's opinion is subject to "second-tier" certiorari review by this Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2)(B) and 9.100(c)(1). In addition, review on second-tier certiorari is limited, as an appellate court can only determine whether the circuit court afforded the petitioner procedural due process and applied the correct law. See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995) ) ("[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law ...."); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) ; Dusseau v. Metro. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001) ; Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 774 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Furthermore, a departure from the essential requirements of law is more than a legal error; it is one that results in a "gross miscarriage of justice." Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 527. Moreover, as stated in Terry v. Board of Trustees of City Pension Fund, 854 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), when a circuit court errs by dismissing a first-tier certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction, second-tier certiorari relief is justified.
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c), quasi-judicial decisions of municipal "agencies, boards, and commissions," are reviewable by petitions for writ of certiorari to the appellate division of the circuit court. Teston v. City of Tampa, 143 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1962)....
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City of Miami v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
...and, therefore, departed from the essential requirements of the law by dismissing the petition. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. City of Miami, 315 So. 3d 115, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). The Court quashed the opinion of the circuit court and remanded for the circuit court to address the County's petiti......
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