Dacanay v. Mendoza

• Decision Date: 21 February 1978
• Docket Number: A,No. 76-3136,No. 1,1,76-3136
• Citation: 573 F.2d 1075
• Parties: Dionisio V. DACANAY and Reynaldo C. Dacanay, by his father and next friend, Appellants, v. Saturnina MENDOZA, Victor P. Mendoza, and Doe Insurance Co.ppellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1075

573 F.2d 1075

Dionisio V. DACANAY and Reynaldo C. Dacanay, by his father and next friend, Appellants, v. Saturnina MENDOZA, Victor P. Mendoza, and Doe Insurance Co No. 1, Appellees.

No. 76-3136.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 21, 1978.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 26, 1978.

David M. Shapiro, Jr., Agana, Guam, for appellants.

Crain & Shoecraft, Klemn & Dear, Agana, Guam, for appellees.

Appeal from the District Court of Guam.

Before CHAMBERS, ELY and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

Reynaldo Dacanay, a minor, appeals from an order of the District Court approving a settlement agreement made on his behalf by his father, as his next friend, ¹ in respect to claims against the defendants arising from a collision between the minor's bicycle and an automobile driven by Saturnina Mendoza. The gravamen of the appeal is that the settlement agreement was repudiated by the next friend prior to its submission by the defendants for court approval and that the court incorrectly considered the minor to be bound by the agreement unless and until the court exercised its power to undo it. Within the boundary hereinafter defined, we agree that the next friend was entitled to repudiate the tentative compromise prior to court approval thereof. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

The accident occurred in early January, 1973. In late December of the same year, the minor initiated suit in the District Court of Guam by his father, Mr. Dacanay, as next friend. Mr. Dacanay secured counsel to prosecute the litigation. Initial investigations suggested that the negligence of Mrs. Mendoza was doubtful and that the minor's injuries were not grave and could be surgically corrected. Therefore, Mr. Dacanay agreed to settle the litigation for $5000, the limit of the Mendozas' indemnity insurance coverage.

The pending litigation was consequently taken off calendar. Thereafter, Mr. Dacanay moved ex parte in the Guam Superior Court for approval of the settlement agreement. ² The Superior Court, however, refused to approve the compromise, apparently because counsel had not divulged sufficient facts to enable it to evaluate properly whether or not the implementation of the settlement agreement would best serve the interests of the minor. Neither party presented the proposed compromise to the Superior Court for reconsideration.

Mr. Dacanay decided not to petition the Superior Court to reconsider the settlement agreement because of a recent discovery that the minor's injuries were much more serious than initially diagnosed. It was learned that one of the boy's legs would be permanently shorter than the other. Moreover, subsequent investigations revealed that the Mendoza automobile had been travelling at a greater speed than originally thought. Convinced that the agreement was improvidently made, Mr. Dacanay notified the clerk of the federal court to restore the case to the trial calendar, correctly reciting that the Superior Court had previously "refused to approve the settlement."

The parties proceeded to prepare for trial. The Mendozas, who theretofore had been content to rely on counsel for the defendant indemnity carrier, became concerned that their liability might exceed the limits of their coverage. They therefore retained separate counsel.

The pretrial statement of the defendants did not allude to the settlement agreement, nor did the pretrial order, which was signed by all counsel. It thus appears that at that time, all recognized that the settlement of the minor's claim was not effective and "approved by the appropriate court." But a few days prior to the date set for trial, the Mendozas moved the District Court to approve the compromise agreement that the Superior Court had previously rejected. ³

At oral argument on the motion, plaintiffs unequivocally repudiated the settlement agreement. The District Court, however, ruled that the agreement could not be repudiated. It subsequently granted the motion to approve the earlier compromise, reciting that it had examined the record and concluded that enforcement of the agreement was in the best interests of the minor. ⁴

If this controversy did not involve a minor litigant, there would be no serious issue concerning the ability of a party unilaterally to rescind a contract in settlement of litigation. Assuming both the power of the attorney to bind his client and the validity of the agreement struck, a litigant can no more repudiate a compromise agreement than he could disown any other binding contractual relationship. Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 220, 419 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.17 (1969) (dictum) & cases cited id. at 1200 n.9; Cia Anon Venezolana De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967) & cases cited id. at 35 n.1. Moreover, it is equally well settled in the usual litigation context that courts have inherent power summarily to enforce a settlement agreement with respect to an action pending before it; the actual merits of the controversy become inconsequential. Meetings & Expositions, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir. 1974); Kukla v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973); Autera v. Robinson, supra; see Pope & Talbot v. Matson Navigation Co., 347 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1965). The authority of a trial court to enter a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement has as its foundation the policy favoring the amicable adjustment of disputes and the concomitant avoidance of costly and time consuming litigation. Kukla v. National Distillers Prods. Co., supra.

A court, however, may not summarily enforce a tentative settlement agreement when a minor is a party to the litigation. This is because the actual merits of the controversy remain of consequence as the court must base its approval upon the fact that the terms of the settlement are completely fair to the minor. Thus, the policies and principles that apply when litigation involves adult parties are inapplicable. The relationship of an adult and his attorney is in no way analogous to the relationship of a guardian ad litem and an infant. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 657, 169 P.2d 442, 447 (1946).

Appellants rely upon 15A C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 8 (1967) for the proposition that when "the approval or confirmation of the court in which a case is pending is essential to a valid compromise and settlement . . . , a party may repudiate the agreement prior to such approval or confirmation." Neither of the cases cited by the treatise, Vece v. De Biase, 46 Ill.App.2d 248, 197 N.E.2d 79, appeal dismissed, 31 Ill.2d 542, 202 N.E.2d 482 (1964), and Meador v. Lewis, 293 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1956, writ ref'd, n. r. e.), concerned the settlement of a claim of a minor or incompetent party. In Vece a party was permitted to withdraw from an oral settlement in a will contest because such settlements were not considered final until a judgment was entered or releases were signed. The court in Meador allowed a party to disavow an oral settlement that provided for the transfer of land, relying upon its unenforceability in court.

The rationale for permitting the repudiation of a settlement negotiated by a guardian ad litem for a minor derives from a different source. Guam Code Civ.Proc. § 372 (1970) requires judicial approval of a settlement agreement negotiated by a guardian ad litem. Specifically, section 372, which is patterned after Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 372 (West 1973), ⁵ provides that "(t) he general guardian or guardian ad litem so appearing for any infant or insane or incompetent person in any suit shall have power to compromise the same and to agree to the judgment to be entered therein for or against his ward, subject to the approval of the court in which such suit is pending" (emphasis added). ⁶

Our research has disclosed no reported decision by a Guam court, our court, or a California court that evaluates the quoted statutory language in respect to a repudiation of a settlement agreement prior to court approval. Indeed, we have uncovered but one case that meets, even indirectly, the precise issue posed by this appeal. ⁷ Danes v. Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 159 Ind.App. 505, 307 N.E.2d 902, 906 (1974) (settlement of a minor's disputed claim not void ab initio but voidable until statutorily required court approval obtained).

We hold that a guardian ad litem may repudiate a settlement agreement prior to court approval. Our conclusion follows from an understanding of the role and powers of a guardian ad litem. It is an ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that infant and other incompetent parties are wards of any court called upon to measure and weigh their interests. The guardian ad litem is but an officer of the court. Cole v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 86, 89 (1883); Serway v. Galentine, 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 170 P.2d 32 (1940). While the infant sues or is defended by a guardian ad litem or next friend, every step in the proceeding occurs under the aegis of the court. See generally Solender, Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable Representative or an Illusory Safeguard, 7 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 619 (1976); Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 Iowa L.Rev. 376 (1960).

As an officer of the court, the guardian ad litem traditionally lacks any personal authority whatsoever to prejudice the substantial rights of the minor litigant. See Dixon v. United States, 197 F.Supp. 798, 803 (W.D.S.C.1961); Berry v. Chaplin, supra; Cloud v. Market St. Ry., 74 Cal.App.2d 92, 168 P.2d 191 (1946); Benson v. Williams, 174 Or. 404, 149 P.2d 549 (1944). California courts have not read section 372 as altering this historical relationship. E. g., Berry v. Chaplin, supra; Cloud v. Market St. Ry., supra. Thus, the guardian ad litem cannot bind an infant to admissions of fact or otherwise surrender rights by stipulation or waiver. ⁸ Cloud v. Market St. Ry., supra. Indeed, from the time of the early courts of chancery a guardian ad litem has...