Dade County v. Baker
Citation | 362 So.2d 151 |
Decision Date | 12 September 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 78-765,78-765 |
Parties | DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. The Honorable H. Paul BAKER, Circuit Judge in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, and the Honorable Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Respondents. The STATE of Florida, Plaintiff, v. Hernando AHUMADA, Defendant. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Stuart L. Simon, County Atty., for petitioner.
Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Mallory H. Horton, Miami, Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, for respondents.
Before HAVERFIELD, C. J., and PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ.
Dade County, as petitioner, seeks certiorari review of an order of the circuit court (1) granting a motion of the Public Defender for leave to withdraw as the legal representative of a named indigent defendant (Hernando Ahumada) in all appellate proceedings and (2) appointing a special assistant public defender to represent the defendant. We issued an order to show cause pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(f); response was filed and argument heard. We hold that the granting of the motion upon the facts presented to the court by the Public Defender was a departure from the essential requirements of law and quash the order.
In order to clarify the issue presented so that the appeal of Hernando Ahumada may not be thwarted, the County has agreed to pay the costs and the fees of the special assistant public defender for the Ahumada appeal, pending disposition of this cause. This stipulation by the County is approved by this court and is accepted as in the interests of justice. The stipulation shall be without prejudice to the position of the County on its petition.
It is important to recognize that the trial judge has statutory authority to appoint a special assistant public defender. Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides:
Although not raised by the respondents in their response, the first question that occurs is whether the County has standing to bring this petition. We hold that such standing does exist because it is clear that the County will be required to pay the fees of the special assistant public defender. The Constitution of the State of Florida and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto provide for a state-controlled and a state-financed judicial system. See Article V, Section 1, Florida Constitution; and Section 27.54, Florida Statutes (1977). Especially noted is Section 27.54(2), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides:
"No county or municipality shall appropriate or contribute funds to the operation of the offices of the various public defenders."
The County has appropriated money to pay for special assistant public defenders when appointed pursuant to Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides:
If the substantial costs of furnishing special assistant public defenders in other cases is to be transferred to the County, then the County has standing to bring a petition for writ of certiorari to review the order effecting the transfer. Cf. Dade County v. Strauss, 246 So.2d 137 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); and Dade County v. Carr, 231 So.2d 844 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). 1
The gist of the present petition is that although the circuit court judges have authority to appoint special assistant public defenders in those cases where exceptional circumstances are involved, see Dade County v. Strauss, supra; and Gant v. State, 216 So.2d 44 (Fla.1st DCA 1968), they do not have authority to appoint special assistant public defenders upon the motion of a public defender that he is overworked and, therefore, not able to do his job. The ground of the Public Defender's motion which was granted by the order under review is set out in the following paragraphs of the motion:
The County's position is that the Public Defender's motion did not set forth a permitted ground for his withdrawal. It is asserted by the County in its petition, and not denied by the Public Defender's response, that the Public Defender has filed a substantial number of similar motions upon the same asserted ground and intends to file other motions upon the same ground as a part of a plan to reduce his office's caseload. It is pointed out that the Public Defender is an elected public official charged with the statutory duty to represent, without additional compensation, any person who is determined to be insolvent and who is under arrest for, or is charged with, a felony. See Section 27.51(1), Florida Statutes (1977).
The Public Defender responds that:
"The motion to withdraw alleged that the excessive caseloads of the assistant public defenders of the Appellate Division of the Office of the Public Defender precluded effective representation of the defendant, Hernando Ahumada, on appeal."
Thereupon, it is argued that because the excessive caseload would leave an individual defendant without effective representation, the circuit court had a duty to appoint a special assistant public defender. Respondents rely upon two orders of the Supreme Court of Florida in Palmes v. State, case no. 52,045 (Fla.1978), and the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in State ex rel. Escambia County v. Behr, 354 So.2d 974 (Fla.1st DCA 1978).
The respondents have furnished us with a conformed copy of a motion and two orders 2 of the Supreme Court of Florida filed in Palmes v. State, supra. These orders have not been published. We doubt that the Supreme Court intended them as a determination of the issue involved in the present petition and response. We have examined the exhibits and find that they are not determinative in this proceeding.
The cited opinion in State ex rel. Escambia County v. Behr, supra, is on point. The case holds that where the record before the court reveals that the caseload of the Public Defender's office far exceeds the workloads recommended, it is proper for the trial court to allow the Public Defender to withdraw. However, in our present case, we decline to follow the holding of our sister court in its broad application of the law.
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