Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC09–1045.,SC09–1045.
• Parties: Christopher JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

78 So.3d 1305

Christopher JOHNSON, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC09–1045.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 5, 2012.

Philip Massa, Director, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Fourth District, and Melanie L. Casper, Assistant Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, and Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 6 So.3d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The district court's decision expressly affects a class of constitutional or state officers. Additionally, the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC) alleges the Fourth District's decision expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Third District in State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So.3d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“ Public Defender ”), review granted, 34 So.3d 2 (Fla.2010), on the same question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve in part and quash in part the decision of the Fourth District.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case began when codefendants Christopher Johnson and James Mayfield were charged for a robbery with a firearm and carjacking in Broward County. Due to a conflict of interest, Johnson was appointed private counsel, paid for by the State. After being found guilty, both defendants appealed their convictions to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

The appellate public defender filed a motion for leave to withdraw as Johnson's counsel on the basis of conflict because the public defender was already representing codefendant Mayfield in an appeal stemming from his conviction in the same case. The Office of the Attorney General did not object to the public defender's withdrawal. However, RCC objected to the withdrawal. The public defender argued that RCC lacked standing to challenge the public defender's motion to withdraw and that conflicts inherent in representing codefendants eliminated the necessity for fact-finding in the trial court. RCC responded that conflict at the trial level does not automatically apply at the appellate level and there must be a showing of an actual conflict in order for RCC to be appointed for representation.

After hearing argument from the parties, the Fourth District granted the public defender's motion to withdraw and appointed RCC to represent Johnson in his appeal. The Fourth District concluded that the plain language of section 27.511(8), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that the public defender's certification of conflict alone is sufficient to shift representation of the defendant to RCC. Johnson, 6 So.3d at 1266. The Fourth District explained that this statute “places the determination of the existence of a conflict in the hands of the [public defender]— without any inquiry by an appellate court.” Id. Under the Fourth District's interpretation of the statute, if the public defender “certifies conflict then RCC shall handle the appeal.” Id. The Fourth District further concluded that section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), only authorizes factual inquiries into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding conflict by trial courts, not when the appellate public defender certifies conflict. Id. at 1266–67. The Fourth District also noted that a trial court's finding of conflict in representing codefendants will be deemed valid for the codefendants' appeals as well. Id. at 1267. Finally, the district court concluded that RCC has no standing to object to a public defender's motion to withdraw. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the fact that section 27.5303(1)(a), which gave the Justice Administrative Commission standing to challenge a public defender's motions, was repealed in 2007 and no other statute gave RCC standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw. Id. at 1268. Furthermore, the district court stated it would no longer relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for an inquiry in such cases. Id. Instead, if the public defender certifies conflict, then RCC will represent the client unless RCC certifies its own conflict. Id.

RCC sought review in this Court based on express and direct conflict with the decision of the Third District in Public Defender and because the Fourth District's decision affects a class of constitutional or state officers, i.e., all RCC offices in the state. In Public Defender, the Third District held that the state attorneys had standing to challenge public defender motions to withdraw based on the state attorney's status as a party in the case and the state attorney's statutory obligations. RCC argues that Public Defender also implied that RCC has standing to oppose such motions when the court stated that RCC's motion to intervene was properly denied because it was untimely. Id. at 800 n. 2.

RCC also asserts that this Court has jurisdiction to review the Fourth District's decision because the court's ruling that RCC lacks standing to oppose the public defender's motion to withdraw, Johnson, 6 So.3d at 1267, affects a class of state officers. We agree. The Fourth District's decision as to standing will affect RCC's power to oppose motions to withdraw filed by public defenders. Because the district court based its decision on statutory interpretation, the decision is applicable to all RCC offices around the state, thus affecting the entire class of state officers.

While RCC did not make this argument in its petition for review, we also conclude that the decision below expressly affects the powers of public defenders to withdraw from cases. The district court decision effectively expands the powers of public defenders to withdraw from cases by finding that when a public defender certifies a conflict at the appellate level the case will automatically be transferred to RCC without a determination from a district court of appeal. Id. at 1266.

ANALYSIS

The underlying case involves a judicial interpretation of the application of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a) and whether RCC has standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw. In order to address these issues, we must discuss the underlying right to counsel and the general principles of statutory interpretation.

I. Right to Counsel

Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. In addition, this Court has acknowledged that “the right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to representation free from actual conflict.” Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786, 791 (Fla.2002). Conflict-of-interest cases usually arise at the trial level, but can arise at any level of the judicial process where one attorney represents two or more clients. Barclay v. Wainwright, 444 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1984) (granting habeas relief based on appellate counsel's conflict of interest in representing two codefendants). Generally, an attorney has an ethical obligation to avoid conflicts of interest and should advise the court when one arises. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). An actual conflict of interest that adversely affects a lawyer's performance violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708. A conflict occurs “whenever one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to the cause of a codefendant whom counsel is also representing.” Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1076 (5th Cir.1975).

In an effort to meet its responsibility to provide counsel to indigent defendants, as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment and applied to the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Florida Legislature first established the Office of the Public Defender in 1963. See ch. 63–409, § 1, Laws of Fla. (enacting section 27.50, Florida Statutes (1963), which created the Office of the Public Defender). The Legislature subsequently approved a proposal to amend the Florida Constitution and elevate the Office of the Public Defender to the level of a constitutional officer, which was approved by the electorate and adopted in 1972. See art. V, § 18, Fla. Const.; see also Summary of Amendment Revising Florida Court Structure, Senate Joint Res. No. 52D (noting that “[t]he position of public defender gains constitutional status” in article V in the 1972 amendment).

The public defender in each circuit is primarily responsible for representing indigent defendants who have been charged or arrested for an enumerated list of criminal offenses and in a limited number of civil proceedings. See § 27.51(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). However, in those cases where the public defender has a conflict of interest, the Legislature provided for the appointment of RCC. See § 27.511(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). As this Court previously explained, “The Legislature's primary intent [in establishing RCC] was to create a backup system to handle those cases in which a public defender has a conflict and to do so in a fiscally sound manner in accordance with constitutional principles of due process.” Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 978 So.2d 134, 148 (Fla.2008). If RCC has a conflict, the court appoints private counsel from the registry. § 27.40(2), Fla. Stat. (2008).¹

Section 27.5303, which addresses conflicts of interest by the public defender and RCC, provides that in...