Dade County v. Little, 58-685

• Decision Date: 19 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 58-685,58-685
• Parties: DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Willie LITTLE et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 19

115 So.2d 19

DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Willie LITTLE et al., Appellees.

No. 58-685.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 19, 1959.

Darrey A. Davis, County Atty., and William W. Gibbs, Asst. County Atty., Miami, for appellant.

Brigham, Wright & Rearick, Miami, for appellees.

HORTON, Chief Judge.

As a result of a condemnation proceeding, an order was entered by the trial court determining that the appellees, Abraham Gouz and wife, were entitled to an award of compensation for certain real property taken by the appellant for highway purposes.

The facts are undisputed and, briefly, are as follows. In May, 1942, the City of Hialeah, as a result of a certain tax lien foreclosure against the property in question, deeded the land to J. W. James and his wife. Subsequent thereto, and as a result of the delinquency in payment of taxes assessed against said property by the Board of Commissioners of the Everglades Drainage District (hereinafter referred to as the District), fee simple title to the property reverted to said District by virtue of the provision of Ch. 298 App. § 1530(113)(i) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The District, on June 3, 1944, conveyed the property to J. W. James and wife. The deed contained inter alia, the following reservation:

'And also saving and reserving unto the State of Florida easement for State Road Right-of-Way two hundred feet (200') wide lying equally on each side of the center line of any State Road existing on the date of this deed through so much of any parcel herein described as is within one hundred feet (100') of said center line, * * *.'

It is conceded by both parties that at the time of the aforesaid conveyance to James and wife, there existed a state road over the lands in question. On August 20, 1946, J. W. James and wife deeded the property to the appellees, Abraham Gouz and wife.

Both parties to this appeal assert in their briefs that should the reservation be held valid, the appellees will take nothing as damages since the entire parcel is included within the reservation; while on the other hand, if the reservation be held void, the appellees would be entitled to the full award made by the jury.

The trial judge declared the reservation to be void and unenforceable. In view of the ruling of the trial judge and the facts as recited hereinabove, the main question on this appeal is whether or not the reservation in question is valid.

The appellant contends the reservation is valid and that the appellees are estopped to attack the validity of the reservation under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. On the other hand, the appellees contend that the District had no lawful authority to make such reservation for road right of way purposes in a drainage deed; that such reservation was not to the grantor in the deed but in favor of a stranger to the deed; and lastly, that the county should be equitably estopped, by reason of time and the erection by the appellees of improvements on the property, to enforce the reservation.

In describing the status of the District, the Supreme Court of our state, in Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So. 449, 464, said:

'The Everglades drainage district is a statutory subdivision of the state for special governmental purposes.'

Again in that case, the court said:

'While the Everglades drainage district is a state agency, it is utilized not for general governmental purposes. * * *'

Such powers as were possessed by the District are contained in the provisions of Chapter 298, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Among these powers delegated by the legislature of the state was the power to levy and collect taxes upon properties lying within a defined area. To enforce the collection of the taxes levied, the District was vested with fee simple title to all land upon the non-payment of taxes for a specified period of time, and authority to sell said land for the best price obtainable and for cash or upon terms and security to be approved by the District.

In the instant case, the District sold the property to the former owners--James and wife--at a time when it was vested with fee simple title. While the District has been recognized as a governmental agency of the state for certain defined purposes, it is in no less sense, however, an arm or instrumentality of the sovereign state. See Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., supra, and City of Miami v. Lewis, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 70, 72. The appellees contend that since the easement or reservation sought to be created by the deed in question was in favor of a stranger to the deed, such reservation would be void. This contention, we think, would be tenable if it were premised upon a conclusion that the District was not an agency or instrumentality of...