Dade County v. Philbrick

• Decision Date: 25 March 1964
• Docket Number: No. 33104,33104
• Citation: 162 So.2d 266
• Parties: DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Plaintiff, v. W. L. PHILBRICK and Philbrick Ambulance Service, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants, and Edwin L. Mason, Jerry W. Carter, and Wilbur C. King, as and constituting the Florida Public Utilities Commission, Intervening Defendants.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 266

162 So.2d 266

DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Plaintiff, v. W. L. PHILBRICK and Philbrick Ambulance Service, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants, and Edwin L. Mason, Jerry W. Carter, and Wilbur C. King, as and constituting the Florida Public Utilities Commission, Intervening Defendants.

No. 33104.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 25, 1964.

Darrey A. Davis, Miami, for petitioner.

Padgett, Teasley & Niles, Miami, for defendants.

Lewis W. Petteway and Thomas F. Woods, Tallahassee, for intervenor Florida Public Utilities Comm.

DREW, Chief Justice.

This cause, according to the certificate presenting to this Court the single question of 'whether Chapter 63-787, Laws of Florida, * * * is invalid and unconstitutional,' is pending in the trial court upon deferred ruling on defendants' motions for more definite statement and to strike the complaint seeking injunctive relief.

The sole record reference to the issue certified is the statement, contained in a petition for intervention filed by the Florida Public Utilities Commission and granted by the Court, that 'On its face Chapter 63-787 appears to be open to attack as to its constitutionality.' The cited statute simply vests in counties with population exceeding 450,000 the exclusive authority to regulate ambulances. The gist of the complaint below is that the defendants' operations under certificate from the Commission should be enjoined for failure to comply with County regulations passed pursuant to Chapter 63-787.

The criteria upon which this Court has previously considered or rejected certified questions, as to statutory validity and otherwise, are that they shall be distinct questions of law which are without controlling precedent applicable to points in controversy, that they are such as will facilitate the disposition of the litigation and, at least with respect to questions of statutory validity, that the question is of great public concern. Schwob Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So.2d 782; Bigby v. Lykes Bros., Inc., 153 Fla. 313, 14 So.2d 565; Cantwell v. St. Petersburg Port Authority, 155 Fla. 651, 21 So.2d 139; State Road Dept. v. Forehand, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 901; City of Hollywood v. Peck, Fla.1952, 57 So.2d 842.

The Court is in agreement that the instant question should be rejected on the ground last stated. We cannot agree that, in the sense used in the decisions, the question, involving, as it does, only a limited locality and a specified industry, is of great public concern. We believe, however, that use of the certification procedure may be clarified by noting additional significant reasons for declining to answer such questions, implicit in our decisions as well as the long history of similar procedures elsewhere. ¹ Primarily the question must not be one presenting a pure abstract issue. It must be one indispensable to the disposition of the litigation before the Court and, in those instances where the question certified raises constitutional issues, the record here must disclose such prerequisites for it is only when such issues have been properly raised by the parties and the case may be decided...