Schwob Co. of Florida v. Florida Industrial Commission

• Citation: 11 So.2d 782,152 Fla. 203
• Parties: SCHWOB CO. OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
• Decision Date: 04 August 1942
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

11 So.2d 782

152 Fla. 203

SCHWOB CO. OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.

Florida Supreme Court

August 4, 1942

Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; W. May Walker, Judge.

William Blount Myers, of Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Burnis T Coleman and John P. Mack, both of Tallahassee, and S. Sherman Weiss, of St. Petersburg, for respondent.

TERRELL, Justice.

Schwob Company of Florida filed its petition in the Circuit Court praying for a review and reversal with instructions of that certain order of the Florida Industrial Commission dated April 17, 1942 wherein it denied petitioner's application for re-determination of its rate of contribution under the Unemployment Compensation Act. Acts 1937, c. 18402. Respondent filed its motion to dismiss challenging the legal sufficiency of the petition to show any ground for the relief sought. The question of law presented by the petition and motion to dismiss was not adjudicated by the circuit court but was on joint motion of the parties certified to this court under Rule 38 for adjudication.

The petition must be denied because it attempts to transfer the jurisdiction of the circuit court to this court, which cannot be done. Sections 5 and 11 of Article 5 of the Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and this court, and no rule of court or statute will be construed as affecting that jurisdiction. This is not a case in which this court and the circuit court have coordinate jurisdiction.

The appellate jurisdiction of this court cannot be invoked and a cause transferred bodily to it except from a determination of the inferior court. Transfer of a cause to this court without such determination amounts to transferring original jurisdiction to it. The legislature nor this court has power to extend the jurisdiction of a court beyond that defined in the Constitution. If the case is one in which this court and the circuit court have coordinate jurisdiction, a different rule may apply.

Rule 38 of the rules of this court was adopted and became effective April 1 1942. Its purpose was to enable the circuit court to apply to this court for instruction as to questions of law that arise in the litigation of causes before it. Questions of fact will not be certified under the rule but distinct questions of law only will be considered and they must be without controlling precedent, must arise out of the main litigation, and must facilitate its disposition. On such questions, the court may give binding instructions or if appropriate it may require the whole record sent up and dispose of the case as if on appeal.

Typical of the questions that may be certified to this court under Rule 38 are those affecting jurisdiction of the circuit court procedural questions, what statute of limitations governs, who are proper parties to the cause, scope of a statute as affecting power of the circuit court. These and others present questions ancillary to the main issue that sometimes bring a half dozen or more appeals to this court before the merits of the case are reached and disposed of. Rule 38 should remedy this impediment to the dispatch of causes. It may also be employed to transfer cases in which this court and the circuit court have coordinate jurisdiction.

From this analysis, it will be seen that when cases in which this court and the circuit courts have coordinate jurisdiction are eliminated a large percentage of the cases brought up under Rule 38 will involve nothing more than questions of nomenclature. That is to say, procedural and jurisdictional questions and questions that will dispose of the whole case at the outset. Litigants should not be burdened with repeated appeals to settle such questions. If the rule did nothing more than relieve this, it would serve a good purpose.

The certificate is denied because the question certified is not within the contemplation of the rule.

WHITFIELD, BUFORD, CHAPMAN, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, J., dissenting in part, but concurring in the order made.

BROWN, Chief Justice (dissenting in part, but concurring in the order made).

I concur in the holding that the two questions here sought to be certified are not such as are contemplated by Rule 38. They are too long and complicated in their statement for one thing, and in effect ask us to decide the case pending in the Circuit Court, by postulating or hypothesizing a list of facts, and then asking, in effect, if the Circuit Court should not grant the relief prayed for. The questions as stated present mixed questions of law and facts.

In 3 Am.Jur. pages 757 to 761, it is said:

'1268 Generally.--The practice of certifying questions to a higher court for decision, pending the hearing in the lower court, without taking up the whole case for review, seems to have originated in the statutes governing such practice in the Federal courts and has been more or less adopted in several of the states. These statutes usually specify the questions whihc may be certified, the proceedings from which they may be certified, what courts may certify them, and the time or at what stage of the proceedings the certification may be made. Statutes authorizing the certification of questions to an appellate court are not intended to extend its jurisdiction to any question which would not be reviewable therein on appeal or a writ of error.

'1269. Limitation upon Amount in Controversy.--Although the legislature has limited the right of review to cases involving more than a stated amount, questions may be certified without regard to the amount in controversy.

'1270. What Questions May be Certified.--In General,--As a general rule only single, definite, and distinct questions or propositions of law which actually arise in the case, which are material, and which will aid the court in determining the case before it,...