Dahl v. Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc., 2D02-1382.

• Decision Date: 16 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2D02-1382.,2D02-1382.
• Citation: 843 So.2d 956
• Parties: Elaine DAHL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ECKERD FAMILY YOUTH ALTERNATIVES, INC., a Florida Corporation d/b/a Eckerd Youth Development Center, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

843 So.2d 956

Elaine DAHL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ECKERD FAMILY YOUTH ALTERNATIVES, INC., a Florida Corporation d/b/a Eckerd Youth Development Center, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 2D02-1382.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 16, 2003.

Karen Coolman Amlong and Jennifer Daley of Amlong & Amlong, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Steven G. Burton, David W. Adams, and Lisa Griffin Hodgdon of Broad & Cassel, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Frederick W. Ford, West Palm Beach, for Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, Florida Chapter.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Elaine Dahl, a psychologist who worked for Eckerd Youth Development Center (Eckerd), a private rehabilitative school for juvenile offenders, sued her employer in federal court, asserting violations of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, pursuant to the federal district court's supplemental jurisdiction, violations of Florida's private-sector whistleblower act, sections 448.101-105, Florida Statutes (1999). Ultimately the federal district court dismissed her complaint but clarified that the dismissal of the whistleblower claim was without prejudice, so Ms. Dahl refiled her lawsuit in state court. Upon a motion by Eckerd the circuit court dismissed her amended complaint, finding that Dahl's exclusive remedy was Florida's public-sector whistleblower act, sections 112.3187-.31895, Florida Statutes (1999). Because any action under the public-sector act was barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court dismissed Ms. Dahl's complaint with prejudice. Ms. Dahl now appeals from the dismissal of her complaint. Eckerd cross-appeals from that aspect of the circuit court's order that failed to consider Eckerd's defenses of sovereign immunity and statute of limitations. We hold that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that Ms. Dahl could bring a complaint only under the public-sector act; accordingly, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of her complaint, and we affirm the cross-appeal.

According to the allegations of her amended complaint, Ms. Dahl worked as a clinical psychologist for Eckerd, a "level 8" juvenile treatment facility for minors adjudicated of committing felonies, including a substantial number who had committed sex offenses. The center is located in Okeechobee and is operated by Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc., pursuant to a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice (originally the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services). In her complaint Ms. Dahl alleged that, in the course of her employment, she witnessed or received reports from the children she treated of actions by her coworkers and supervisors that violated laws, rules, and regulations applicable to Eckerd. These included allegations that staff members were physically abusive to children, that they filed unfounded criminal charges against the juveniles as a means of discipline or punishment, that they failed to provide adequate treatment for the children, and that they allowed or encouraged the use of alcohol and illegal drugs by the youth at the facility.

Ms. Dahl refused to participate in these alleged wrongdoings and discussed her concerns with an investigator from the Florida Inspector General's office, an agency charged with investigating allegations of abuses and mismanagement by state agencies and independent contractors with state agencies. Ms. Dahl also complained to her supervisors and coworkers. Eckerd suspended Ms. Dahl and fired her one week later, on November 28, 1997, alleging violations of confidentiality rules. Ms. Dahl, however, maintained that those reasons were simply pretextual and that Eckerd was retaliating for her whistleblowing activities.

Ms. Dahl's federal court complaint was filed within the two-year limitations period for the private-sector whistleblower statute, § 448.103(1)(a), but it would have been untimely under the public-sector act's period of 180 days from the time the prohibited action (i.e., termination) was taken, § 112.3187(8)(c). When the federal district court dismissed her complaint, the two-year statute of limitations period under the private-sector act did not lapse because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) operated to toll the matter for thirty days so that she could timely file in state court.

The public-sector act specifically prevents independent contractors as well as agencies from taking retaliatory action against employees who report violations of law on the part of the agency or independent contractors of the agency. See § 112.3187(2). The private-sector act, however, prevents employers from taking retaliatory action against an employee who threatens to disclose or who discloses to an appropriate governmental agency any practices of the employer that are in violation of a law, rule, or regulation. See § 448.102(1). "Employer," for the purposes of the private-sector act, "means any private individual, firm, partnership, institution, corporation, or association that employs ten or more persons." § 448.101(3).

On its face Ms. Dahl's complaint without question states a cause of action under the private-sector act. She was an employee—as that term is defined in section 448.101(2)—of Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc., a private company that employed more than ten persons. She complained to her supervisors and to state agencies investigating activities at the center about alleged violations of applicable rules, regulations, and laws on the part of her coworkers. After she reported her concerns, she was fired.

The only reason for finding that Ms. Dahl's complaint does not state a cause of action under the private-sector act is that Eckerd was an independent contractor of a state agency and thus fell within the public-sector act. Nowhere, however, does the public-sector act provide that it is the exclusive remedy for employees of independent contractors of state agencies who are retaliated against for their whistleblowing activities. To the contrary, both of these statutes are remedial and should be broadly construed. The most important relationship they speak to is that between the employer and the employee; the fact that...