Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States
Decision Date | 02 March 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 04-106 C,04-106 C |
Parties | DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
On December 14, 2011, concurrent with its brief regarding Plaintiff's claim on remand for damages relating to Private Fuel Storage ("PFS") in this Spent Nuclear Fuel ("SNF") case, Defendant filed a Motion to Re-Open the Evidentiary Record ("Def.'s Mot. to Re-Open"). In its motion, Defendant seeks admission into the record of 16 previously unadmitted documents1 and 11 lines of deposition testimony. It also seeks to take limited discovery (depositions and document requests) into whether Plaintiff has contributed capital to PFS since 2005. Briefing on this evidentiary motion concluded on January 20, 2012.
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendant's motion.2
The issue whether Plaintiff should recover mitigation damages for its investment in PFS is back before the court upon remand by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In its trial decision, this court had, inter alia, awarded Plaintiff $11,999,125 in damages (inclusive of overhead and general and administrative costs) for PFS. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 615, 651 (2009) ("Dairyland I").
On remand, the Federal Circuit vacated the award of damages for PFS and directed this court to apply a more detailed inquiry to its causation analysis. The Circuit explained thatdamages for "the cost of actions taken in mitigation" are available "only to the extent the nonbreaching party can show that the damages were actually caused by the breach." Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Dairyland II'). Specifically, in response to the Government's argument that "Dairyland's investment in PFS was more profit speculation than mitigation," id. at 1375, the Circuit emphasized that the burden was on Plaintiff to prove "how much, if any, of its PFS investment was speculative as opposed to mitigation-oriented." Id. at 1376.
"Whether to re-open the record is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court." Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Defendant appropriately cites authority that "liberality in favor of reopening is to be encouraged to afford the fullest possible hearing (particularly in nonjury cases)." Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 611:5 (6th Ed. 2009). Nevertheless, there are three factors a trial court must consider: 1) the probative value of the evidence proffered, 2) why the evidence was not offered earlier, and 3) the likelihood of undue prejudice to the opposing party. Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 833-34. In keeping with the third factor above, "[a]n important criterion for properly reopening a case is taking care that reopening does not 'preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered.'" United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71, 74 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 1982) overruled on other grounds, United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 164 n.27 (5th Cir. 1994)).
It is not uncommon for a trial court to re-open the evidentiary record where a higher court has remanded a case for further consideration. E.g., In re Grimm, 168 B.R. 102, 106-10 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1994); Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 947 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Harker, 357 F.3d 846, 849-50 (8th Cir. 2004). A change in legal standards on remand weighs in favor of reopening the record. Grimm, 168 B.R. at 107; In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc., 930 F.2d 458, 464 (6th Cir. 1991).
With respect to the three factors, first, a trial court considers whether "the evidence sought to be introduced is especially important and probative." Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742, 746 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 844. "The evidence proffered should be relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the [factfinder] in ascertaining [the facts at issue]." Thetford, 676 F.2d at 182. Trial courts act within their discretion in refusing to reopen a case where proffered evidence is of little probative value or is cumulative. Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 746 (citing Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F. 3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir.1994); Thomas v. SS Santa Mercedes, 572 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir.1978)); Kelly v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 709 F.2d 973, 980 (5th Cir. 1983).
Second, a trial court considers whether "the moving party's explanation for failing to introduce the evidence earlier is bona fide." Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 746; see also Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 844. In other words, "the party moving to reopen should provide a reasonable explanation for failure to present the evidence in its case-in-chief." Thetford, 676 F.2d at 182. The moving party may be justified if it can show "reasonably genuine surprise." See, e.g.,Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 114 (1st Cir. 2008) ( ). A change in legal standards on appeal may also justify reopening to the extent that the issue "emerged after the original record was made." Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 1978). However, "inadvertence is not a compelling explanation" for failing to offer available evidence in the first instance. Love v. Scribner, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
Third, the court must consider whether reopening would cause "undue prejudice to the nonmoving party." Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 746; see also Precision Pine 596 F.3d at 844. An important consideration is whether the evidence sought to be admitted is immediately available or portends a significant delay in the trial. Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, 81 F.3d 1148, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, "reopening proof on the motion of one party long after trial has been completed can put the opposite party at a distinct disadvantage." Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 481 F.2d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 1973). Reopening of the record "should not imbue the [new] evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered." Thetford, 676 F.2d at 182 (citations omitted). In particular, the non-moving party is prejudiced if it lacks the opportunity to cross-examine the proponent of the new evidence. See, e.g., Greater Dallas Home Care Alliance v. United States, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9656, *4-5 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 1998) ( ); c.f. Harker, 357 F.3d at 849 ( ).
As to the first factor, "[t]he evidence proffered should be relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the [factfinder] in ascertaining [the facts at issue]." Thetford, 676 F.2d at 182. It appears to the court that the documents in question are, to varying degrees, probative of underlying issues of causation and the reasonableness of Dairyland's expenditures for private, off-site fuel storage. The parties disagree, however, on the admissibility of the documents and whether some of them are cumulative of evidence already in the record.
Defendant's Post-Tr. Br. 49-50 (citations omitted).
In addition, the admission of these documents, even those that were listed on either Plaintiff's or Defendant's pre-trial list of proposed exhibits but never offered at trial, may nevertheless be prejudicial to Plaintiff at this point. Defendant proposes to admit the bare documents without the opportunity for Plaintiff to provide relevant context or conduct cross-examination. By...
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