Daker v. McLaughlin

• Decision Date: 25 October 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:18-cv-00171-MTT-CHW
• Parties: WASEEM DAKER, Petitioner, v. WARDEN GREGORY MCLAUGHLIN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

WASEEM DAKER, Petitioner, v. WARDEN GREGORY MCLAUGHLIN, Respondent.

Case No. 5:18-cv-00171-MTT-CHW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

October 25, 2018

ORDER

Petitioner Waseem Daker, an inmate confined at Macon State Prison, filed a pro se action using the Court's standard habeas form for use by prisoners proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the body of his pleading, Petitioner raises multiple claims challenging the conditions of his confinement attendant to his placement in administrative segregation and seeks to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After reviewing his claims, the Court found that they are not cognizable in an application for writ of habeas corpus and are properly brought in a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner, however, is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and failed to pay the Court's filing fee. Consequently, on July 18, 2018, the Court dismissed this action without prejudice. Order of Dismissal, ECF No. 3. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for access to case authorities (ECF No. 5), a motion to vacate (ECF No. 6), and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (ECF No. 11). Petitioner's motions are DENIED as follows.

I. Motion to Vacate

In Petitioner's motion to vacate brought under Rule 59(e), he argues that (1) the Court erred by finding that his claims for relief are not cognizable in a habeas action, (2) the Court erred by failing to provide Petitioner notice prior to dismissing this action, and (3) Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability. Under the local rules, motions for reconsideration "shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice." M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. "The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact." Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original).

Petitioner primarily argues that his claims for relief are cognizable in a habeas action, and the Court erred by determining his claims were properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court construed this same argument from the many references to Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) in the Petition and rejected it. Motions for reconsideration "cannot be used to 'relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.'" Wilchombe v. Teevee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, Petitioner's attempt to bolster the arguments the Court construed from his Petition, rehash arguments, or refine or improve his reasoning is not a valid basis for reconsideration.

Furthermore, Petitioner's argument is without merit. As the Court discussed in the order of dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished challenges to prisondisciplinary proceedings affecting the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, which are properly brought under § 1983, from challenges to prison proceedings which may impact the duration of a prisoner's confinement and are thus properly brought through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). In doing so, the Supreme "Court has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). "[C]onstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside [the core of habeas] and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance." Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (citing Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).¹

Of course, some cases implicate both § 1983 relief and the core of habeas. Such cases concern claims for damages which also affect the duration of a prisoner's confinement or challenge the validity of a prisoner's conviction. When a prisoner bringsa claim that falls within the literal terms of § 1983, "§ 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence." Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489). This is not one of those cases. Rather, it is a prisoner's challenge to administrative proceedings that cannot "be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence," and it has raised "no claim on which habeas relief could [be] granted on any recognized theory." Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754. "[H]abeas remedies do not displace § 1983 actions where success in the civil rights suit would not necessarily vitiate the legality of (not previously invalidated) state confinement" or the duration of confinement. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81; see also Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F. App'x 867, 869 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (discussing Muhammad and holding that claims which do not contest "the validity of [a plaintiff's] underlying conviction" and do not "affect the time [a plaintiff] would serve related to his conviction," are not Heck-barred).

Petitioner attempts to distinguish Muhammad, Hill, Nelson, and other cases relied on by this Court in the order of dismissal based on the factual contexts in which they arose. Petitioner also relies on Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987) and several cases from the former Fifth Circuit that considered conditions of confinement claims in the context of an appeal from denial of a habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit has since determined that habeas relief is not the appropriate vehicle for raising claims whichchallenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement. Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App'x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Moreover, since the cases relied on by Petitioner were decided, the Supreme Court has "declared [] in no uncertain terms, that when a prisoner's claim would not 'necessarily spell speedier release,' that claim does not lie at the 'core of habeas corpus,' and may be brought, if at all, under § 1983." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011).

In this Circuit, a lawsuit which does not contest the underlying conviction or the "State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence" does not "implicate a claim that [is] cognizable in a habeas action."² Roberts v. Wilson, 259 F. App'x 226, 228 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Section 1983 and habeas relief are "mutually exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights actions." Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643); Thomas v. McDonough, 228 F. App'x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The Court in Wilkinson held that claims like [Petitioner's] are cognizable under § 1983. Because § 1983 and § 2254 are mutually exclusive, [Petitioner's] claims cannot be brought under § 2254."); Miller v. Nix, 346 F.App'x 422, 423 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Because habeas and civil rights actions are mutually exclusive, the district court did not err by determining that Miller's claims cannot be brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus." (internal citations omitted)). Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit characterize a due process challenge to a prisoner's placement in administrative segregation as a "conditions of confinement" claim. See e.g. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App'x 738 (11th Cir. 2018); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App'x 733 (11th Cir. 2006); Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 F. App'x 944 (11th Cir. 2017); Turner v. Warden, GDCP, 650 F. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2016). Indeed, in Quintanilla, a case cited by Petitioner, the Eleventh Circuit addressed under § 1983 a due process claims challenging a prisoner's placement in the Georgia Department of Corrections tier program.

Similar to Quintanilla, Petitioner also raises a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim under Sandin, challenging his confinement in the Georgia Department of Corrections tier program. He additionally raises a First Amendment free speech claim, First Amendment religious exercise claims, a claim arising under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims. As observed in the order of dismissal, Petitioner explicitly states that he is not challenging his underlying conviction or the duration of his sentence, and his claims implicate neither. Petitioner could receive all the relief he seeks and the duration of his sentence would not be altered by one day and the validity of his conviction would not be implicated. Petitioner's civil rights claims are not cognizable ina habeas action. See Goodman v. Warden, 687 F. App'x 788, 788-89 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement, including claim that prisoner was entitled to less restrictive confinement, "are raised properly in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action not in a habeas proceeding" (citing McNabb v. Comm'r Ala. Dep't of Corr., 727 F.3d 1334, 1344 (11th Cir. 2013))); Chamblee v. Florida, 2018 WL 4654712, at *3 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)) (stating that "[u]nder the federal habeas statute . . . a state...