Daley v. Town of Swampscott

• Decision Date: 13 May 1981
• Citation: 11 Mass.App.Ct. 822,421 N.E.2d 78
• Parties: Thomas E. DALEY et al. 1 v. TOWN OF SWAMPSCOTT et al. 2
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 78

421 N.E.2d 78

11 Mass.App.Ct. 822

Thomas E. DALEY et al. ¹ v. TOWN OF SWAMPSCOTT et al. ²

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued April 8, 1981.

Decided May 13, 1981.

John M. Crean, Peabody, for Thomas E. Daley and another.

Howard R. Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth (Harvey F. Rowe, Jr., Town Counsel, Boston, with him).

Israel Bloch, Sp. Asst. Town Counsel, Swampscott, for the town of Swampscott.

Before HALE, C. J., and GRANT and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

A Land Court judge ordered title to the petitioners' land which is situated on the waterfront in Swampscott registered and confirmed subject to "the rights of the Town of Swampscott, its inhabitants and (twenty-three) named individual respondents to use so much of said land as lies seaward of the retaining wall ... for all usual purposes for which a beach is used." The petitioners have appealed, claiming error in the judge's determination that the town of Swampscott had acquired an easement by prescription over the beach area for the benefit of the town and its inhabitants. ³ They also dispute the judge's rulings with respect to two pieces of evidence. We affirm the decision.

The trial consumed four days in the Land Court. The evidence included a view of the locus, a Land Court examiner's title abstract, thirty-five exhibits, and testimony from twenty-eight witnesses who were conversant with the locus and its use. The judge predicated her decision on "all the evidence," most of which has been included in the record. ⁴ In view of the standards that govern review of a case of this nature (see Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 375, 113 N.E.2d 861 (1953); Otis Power Co. v. Wolin, 340 Mass. 391, 395-396, 164 N.E.2d 306 (1960); Norton v. West, 8 Mass.App. ---, ---, --- - ---, ^a 394 N.E.2d 1125 (1979)), we summarize the evidence which supports the judge's decision.

The parcel claimed by the petitioners (see lot 37 on the accompanying sketch plan) is bounded southeasterly by the Atlantic Ocean (Nahant Bay) and northerly by Puritan Road and is located approximately seventy-seven feet easterly of a town way running southeasterly from Puritan Road to the ocean. Between the easterly sideline of the town way and the locus is a parcel of land (lot 38) which is owned by the town. A second way leading to the ocean (not shown on the sketch) is situated approximately 1,200 feet easterly of the depicted town way and a shoreline of about that distance runs in a roughly crescent shape between the two passageways. There is a retaining wall which extends at least from the easterly line of the locus in a westerly direction to the town way. The beach area in dispute is situated between this retaining wall and mean high water. The locus is near the former site of a well-known summer hotel, the New Ocean House, which was destroyed by fire in 1969. Also situated nearby is a monument known locally as the "Great Rock." The beach located to the west of the Great Rock (including the beach in front of the petitioners' land) is accessible from the westerly town way and was described in the testimony as Whales Beach, while the beach lying to the east of the rock is reached from the easterly way and was referred to in the testimony as Eiseman's or "Iceman's" Beach. The judge determined that earlier title instruments concerning the beach did not establish public rights of record to the petitioners' beach as the town contends. We do perceive, however, that one such conveyance (the so-called Phillips grant in 1873) could (as will be discussed later) have some significance on the question of adverse possession. ⁵

At least sixteen witnesses testified from experience and memory that Whales Beach, including the portion in front of the petitioners' retaining wall, always had been considered a public beach, that families and other members of the public used the beach, that the number of people on the beach varied according to the time of year and the weather but ranged, in-season, from about twenty-four persons on week-days upwards to 150 or 200 people on weekends, and that these people engaged in activities such as "lying on blankets, sitting in chairs, sitting on the sand ... kicking beach balls around ... (and) general beach activity." Public use of the beach was described by various witnesses as having occurred for "30 odd years"; "continually" for about twenty-eight years; every year "since 1931"; "practically for the whole (of) 40 years"; and since 1927 through the war years and thereafter. There was testimony from one Huston, the town superintendent of public works and town engineer, that the public works department maintained all the beaches in town including the beach in question, that crews from that department generally cleaned the beach seven days a week from June 1 to September 15, depending on the weather, since at least 1956, and before that year according to department records, that the department placed trash barrels on the beach and emptied them daily into a dump truck, that a public works front end loader with a rake attached was used to rake the beach, that lifeguard stands were erected on the beach at or near the petitioners' home, and that lifeguards employed by the town's recreation commission guarded the area.

Other witnesses who had been employed by, or associated with, various town departments and agencies testified that the park commission placed and maintained signs on which rules and regulations for the proper use of the beach were posted, that signs containing such rules had always been in front of or near the locus, that children involved in a town recreation program had been brought to the beach and that the police occasionally patrolled the area. This testimony referred to activities on the entire length of Whales Beach but also included use of the beach in front of the petitioners' seawall. A tenant of a former owner of the petitioners' property testified that he had rented the property in the summer of 1951 and that its then owner had informed him that the beach in front of the house was a public beach, frequently used by the public. There was evidence that despite the words "private beach" having been painted on the petitioners' seawall sometime in 1975 or 1976 people still continued to use the beach. A member of the town's board of assessors testified from "very old (assessors') records" that since at least 1924 owners of the petitioners' property had been assessed for only 9,060 square feet of upland, and that the land seaward from the retaining wall had never been assessed as the petitioners' land or included in their tax bill. A member of the town's board of selectmen testified that the board had ordered fences erected on or near the beach by littoral proprietors removed. Thomas E. Daley, the male petitioner, testified that in June, 1968, he had erected a fence along the beach portion of his property (perpendicular to the seawall), and that the fence had been removed by an employee of "the Town" who had said that he "was ordered to do this." The petitioners recorded a notice to prevent acquisition of an easement under G.L. c. 187, § 3, ⁶ on June 19, 1974. Finally, the judge stated in her decision that: "(t)here are numerous photographs in evidence which show the use of the beach in front of the petitioners' property by multitudinous persons who obviously are not merely guests of the abutting owners. It is apparent from the nature of the bathing suits and other clothing worn by these individuals and also by the evidence at the trial that use of the beach dates back to a period well over twenty years before the petition was filed or the notice to prevent the acquisition of easements pursuant to G.L. c. 187, § 3 recorded .... Although there is no way of ascertaining from the pictorial evidence whether those using the beach are members of the general public in Swampscott or guests or employees of the New Ocean House, it is, however, corroborative of the other evidence that this beach has been open to others than those claiming under the abutters for a good part of this century."

There is no doubt that a municipality may acquire an easement by prescription to use land located within its limits for a specific public purpose. Commonwealth v. Low, 3 Pick. 408, 412 (1826). Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351, 371-372 (1870). Murphy v. Commonwealth, 187 Mass. 361, 366-375, 73 N.E. 524 (1905). Attorney Gen. v. Ellis, 198 Mass. 91, 98, 84 N.E. 430 (1908). Enfield v. Woods, 212 Mass. 547, 554, 99 N.E. 331 (1912). Cerel v. Framingham, 342 Mass. 17, 20, 171 N.E.2d 840 (1961). The test by which a municipality acquires a prescriptive easement is basically the same as that for an individual any unexplained use for more than twenty years which is open, continuous, and notorious is presumed to be adverse and conducted under a claim of right. Fortier v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 307 Mass. 292, 298, 30 N.E.2d 253 (1940). Tucker v. Poch, 321 Mass. 321, 323, 324, 73 N.E.2d 595 (1947). Lever v. Cook, 355 Mass. 634, 636-637, 246 N.E.2d 657 (1969). See G.L. c. 187, § 2. Once the presumption arises, the landowner has the burden of rebutting it by showing that the use was permissive. Truc v. Field, 269 Mass. 524, 528-529, 169 N.E. 428 (1930). Tucker v. Poch, supra, 321 Mass., at 324, 73 N.E.2d 595.

In addition to these requirements, it is also necessary for a municipality to establish that its acts of disseisin constitute "corporate action" (Cerel v. Framingham, supra 342 Mass., at 21, 171 N.E.2d 840) because " 'persons of the local community' and the 'general public' are too broad a group to acquire by prescription an easement to use private beaches for bathing and for recreational purposes." Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 347 Mass. 760, 761-762, 200 N.E.2d 282 (1964), and cases cited. What constitutes the requisite corporate action has never been precisely defined, although the concept has been discussed or alluded to in several cases....