Dallas Waste Mills v. Texas Cake & Linter Co.
| Decision Date | 01 June 1918 |
| Docket Number | (No. 7948.) |
| Citation | 204 S.W. 868 |
| Parties | DALLAS WASTE MILLS v. TEXAS CAKE & LINTER CO. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; E. B. Muse, Judge.
Action by the Dallas Waste Mills against the Texas Cake & Linter Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Spence, Haven & Smithdeal, of Dallas, for appellant. Marshall & Young, of Dallas, for appellee.
Appellant sued appellee in the court below for damages, alleging in substance that appellee sold appellant 600 bales of cotton linters of an agreed quality to be delivered during the months of May and June, 1915, at the price of 3 cents per pound f. o. b. cars at mills, 257 bales of which appellee failed to deliver, and which were on the final day for delivery of the market value of 4 cents per pound f. o. b. cars at mills, by reason of which appellant was damaged $1,285, being the difference in the contract price and the market value of said linters when the time for delivery expired. Appellee answered by general denial, and specially that it tendered to appellant for delivery 600 bales of linters of the quality called for by the contract, of which number appellant rejected 257 bales without cause. The case was submitted to the jury upon issues of fact in the form of interrogatories for special verdict, who, in substance, found that each bale of linters tendered to appellant was equal to the quality agreed on. Upon the verdict of the jury judgment was for appellee, from which this appeal is taken.
The contract out of which the controversy arose was in writing and in the form of letters addressed by both parties to the other, and provided, among other matters, compositely in substance that the appellee had sold appellant 600 bales of clean mill run linters, made from sound seed, and equal to sample exhibited, a portion of which was retained by each party, at 3 cents per pound f. o. b. mills, to be shipped in 25-bale lots from mills during May and June of the current year, accompanied by sight draft with bill of lading attached, without right of cancellation, save by mutual agreement, and that appellant had agreed to purchase same on such terms. Each car was to constitute a separate contract. On June 11, 1915, appellee tendered to appellant for delivery 220 bales of linters, of which 71 were accepted and 144 rejected. On June 23, 1915, 219 bales were tendered for delivery, of which 111 were accepted and 108 rejected. On June 30, 1915, 100 bales were tendered and accepted. On July 23, 1915, 61 bales were tendered and accepted. The evidence adduced by appellant tended to show that the linters rejected were not of the quality purchased and agreed to be delivered, while the evidence adduced by appellee tended to show that they were. The foregoing is a sufficient specification of the facts in view of the issues presented on appeal, save such other facts as may be related in discussing the issues.
Error is assigned because of the refusal of the court to permit Stenger, witness for appellant, and who inspected the linters when tendered, to testify that some of the linters actually accepted were not equal in quality to the sample agreed upon. The contention is that the testimony was admissible as tending to show the good faith of appellant in making rejections. We conclude the evidence was properly excluded. The issue on which the case turned was whether the linters rejected by appellant were of the quality agreed upon by the parties. The evidence excluded amounted to no more nor less than that some of the linters actually accepted by appellant and about which there was no controversy were not of the quality agreed upon. Obviously such evidence did not tend to prove that those rejected were not of the agreed quality. Appellant argues, however, that since appellee's witnesses testified that at the time the rejections were made the market price was below the contract price, thereby raising the issue of appellant's good faith in rejecting the linters, as a consequence the evidence was admissible on that issue. Good faith, aside from any peculiar significance it may have in relation to property rights, denotes honesty of purpose, and is said to be a state of the mind. It might be conceded that the witness who testified as an expert acted in good faith, both in accepting and in rejecting the linters, and yet it would in no sense follow that his rejection was justified, since his sincerity in arriving at a conclusion upon a given state of facts is not, it appears to us, a standard for proving a given fact. The result would be to corroborate his conclusion by his sincerity of purpose concerning another transaction.
Error is assigned to the action of the court in admitting in evidence what purported to be samples taken from the bales of linters rejected by ...
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...of damages due to the delay. In one case, the damages for late delivery were held to be waived. Dallas Waste Mills v. Texas Cake & Linter Co., 204 S.W. 868, 870 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 228 S.W. 118 (Tex.Com.App.1921, holding approved). Other cases held that damag......
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Dallas Waste Mills v. Texas Cake & Linter Co.
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