Dalton Brick & Tile Co. v. Huiet

• Decision Date: 15 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 38393,38393,2
• Citation: 102 Ga.App. 221,115 S.E.2d 748
• Parties: DALTON BRICK & TILE COMPANY v. Ben T. HUIET, Commissioner, etc., et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 748

115 S.E.2d 748

102 Ga.App. 221

DALTON BRICK & TILE COMPANY v. Ben T. HUIET, Commissioner, etc., et al.

No. 38393.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

July 15, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The Employment Security Acts, being remedial in character, are to be given a liberal construction.

2. Where an employee is otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under the act, and it is contended that he is disqualified because of some proviso or exception therein contained, the burden is on the employer urging the disqualification to show by a preponderance of evidence that the applicant for compensation comes within the exception.

3. The findings of fact of the board of review are conclusive where supported by any evidence. There is sufficient evidence in this record to support its finding that, although a labor dispute was in existence at the time the employer initiated the work stoppage, the fact that the employer at the time had no orders for its manufactured product was of at least equal influence in its decision to close down, for which reason the employer failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the labor dispute was the efficient proximate cause of the unemployment. It follows that the applicants were entitled to the unemployment benefits awarded.

Hoyt Whaley and 28 other employees of Dalton Brick and Tile Company filed applications for benefits under the Georgia Employment Security Law (Code, Ann. § 54-601 et seq., Ga.L.1937, p. 806; 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 356 as amended). On December 23, 1958, the examiner entered a determination in favor of the applicants, which, however, was set aside, and on January 26, 1959, an amended determination was released finding them not eligible for compensation. On April 1, 1959, on appeal to the appeals referee, this latter order was affirmed. On September 4, 1959, the board of review to which the decision was appealed, and which board has authority to enter a de novo finding either upon the record as made or after hearing additional evidence, made its finding in favor of the applicants under the provisions of Code (Ann.) § 54-615. The employer then filed its petition in the Superior Court of Whitfield County seeking to have the decision reviewed, and from the judgment of affirmance of the judge of that court this appeal is brought, naming as defendants in error the applicants and Ben T. Huiet as Commissioner of Labor.

Fisher, Phillips & Allen, Charles M. Williamson, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Otis L. Hathcock, Morgan C. Stanford, Atlanta, for defendants in error.

TOWNSEND, Judge.

Code (Ann.) § 54-619 provides: 'In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Board of Review as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.' As to the construction of the employment security acts, it was held in Young v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 63 Ga.App. 130, 10 S.E.2d 412, 415: 'The courts, as well as the administrator of the unemployment law, in construing and applying the provisions of such law must liberally construe and apply such law in the light of the public of this State, as declared in section 2 of the act. The courts shall be guided by the fact that the unemployment compensation law is intended to provide some income for persons who are, without fault of their own, temporarily out of employment.' This court is accordingly committed to rendering a liberal interpretation of the act in accordance with its announced intention so as to give it a remedial construction and application. This does not mean that courts will affirm decisions not based on evidence, or that they will give strained and unnatural constructions to the statutory provisions, but it does mean that the announced purpose and intent of the acts will be carried out where a legitimate case in favor of the employee is made by the record.

2. The employer first raises a question of law as to the construction of Code (Ann.) § 54-610(d) which provides in part as follows: 'Disqualification for benefits.--An individual shall be disqualified for benefits--* * * (d) For any week with respect to which the Commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed.' The contention is that, because the words of the statute are 'stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute' instead of 'directly' or 'exclusively' because of a labor dispute, it is necessary for the applicants to show that no other consideration than the fact of a labor dispute had any bearing upon the unemployment; in other words, that if the evidence in this case shows...