Damiani v. Steiner, No. 483515 (CT 7/11/2005)

• Decision Date: 11 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 483515,483515
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephanie A. Damiani v. Val Steiner et al. Opinion No.: 89463

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Unpublished Opinion

Stephanie A. Damiani v. Val Steiner et al. Opinion No.: 89463

No. 483515

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

July 11, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRUCE L. LEVIN, JUDGE.

The plaintiff sued the defendants, Val Steiner and Elrac, Inc., for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 1, 2001. In her original complaint, brought on September 15, 2003, the plaintiff alleged that Elrac was liable because Steiner "was operating the vehicle owned by the defendant Elrac, Inc., as the employee and/or agent of the defendant Elrac, Inc., and was acting within the scope of his authority to so drive said vehicle." On July 7, 2005, on the eve of trial, the plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to add an allegation that the "vehicle was leased by the defendant Elrac, Inc., who is liable for the plaintiff's injuries and damages pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §14-154a." The amended complaint, like the original complaint, seeks only compensatory damages. The defendant Elrac, Inc. (Elrac) objects to the plaintiff's request for leave to amend on the grounds that proposed amendment is barred by the statute of limitations. This memorandum, of necessity, is filed less than twenty-four hours before the commencement of jury selection.

The trial court may permit an amendment to pleadings at any time. Drew v. K-Mart Corp., 37 Conn.App. 239, 242, 655 A.2d 806 (1995). "The law is well-settled that belated amendments to the pleadings rest in the sound discretion of the trial court." Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 216, 455 A.2d 857 (1983). However, "[t]he question of whether a party's claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scalise v. American Employers Ins. Co., 67 Conn.App. 753, 756, 789 A.2d 1066 (2002).

An amendment that is offered after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations is barred by the statute of limitations unless it relates back to the filing to the last complaint preceding the expiration of the statute. Gonzalez v. University Systems of New Hampshire, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, No. 451217 (Jan. 28, 2005) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 673).

"An amended complaint, if permitted, relates back to and is treated as filed at the time of the original complaint unless it alleges a new cause of action . . . A cause of action must arise from a single group of facts . . . To relate back to the institution of the action the amendment must arise from a single group of facts . . . A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and in invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action . . . An amendment may properly expand or amplify what had originally been alleged in support of the cause of action. A change in the allegations of liability, therefore, does not necessarily amount to the introduction of a new cause of action . . . Where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, however, a new and different cause of action is stated." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jonap v. Silver, 1 Conn.App. 550, 555-56, 474 A.2d 800 (1984).

In Jonap, the court acknowledged that "[t]he test for determining whether or not a new cause of action has been alleged is somewhat nebulous." Id., 555. Seven years later, the Supreme Court, in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 590 A.2d 914 (1991), clarified the relation back test. After reiterating that our test derives from Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Gurliacci court stated: "Because rule 15 provides that an amendment relates back where the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims, is fully served." Id., 547-48.

Against this background, the court turns to the question of whether the plaintiff's amendment relates back to the original complaint. The initial complaint alleges that Elrac is liable under principles of agency law. "Under general agency law, a master is subject to liability for the torts of his or her servant committed while acting in the scope of that servants's employment. Restatement, §291(1), Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, [156 Conn. 193, 198, 239 A.2d 490 (1968)]; Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 160 (1893)." Stupak v. Lindsay, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, No. CV97-05970 (March 2, 1999, Corradino, J.) (24 Conn. L. Rptr. 8). The amended complaint adds the allegation that Elrac leased the vehicle to Steiner and asserts a statutory basis for liability, General Statutes §14-154a. At the time of the accident, General Statutes §14-154a provided: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner."

In Gionfriddo v. Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of §14-154a "cannot be regarded otherwise than as an expression of legislative judgment as to the extent — beyond the limitations of the general principles of respondeat superior and the 'family-car doctrine' — to which the owner of a motor vehicle which he entrusts to another should be liable for the acts of the latter . . . We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental . . . [B]y virtue of the express terms of the statute the owner lessor is made the alter ego of the operator so that the latter's acts with respect to the operation of the car . . . are in law the acts of the owner-lessor." Id., 284.¹

With these principles in mind, the court returns to the question of whether the amendment relates back. In the original complaint, Elrac's liability was based on its owning the offending vehicle and an agency relationship with Steiner. The amended complaint adds that Elrac was an owner-lessor. The amended complaint adds one new fact — that Elrac was a lessee. Liability as lessor is not the same basis as liability under agency principles. Cf. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 41, 138 A.2d 705 (1972). However," '[t]he purpose of the statute was to impose a liability akin in its nature to that of a principal for the acts of his agent.' Connelly v. Deconinck, 113 Conn. 237, 239, 155 A. 231 [1931]." Fisher v. Hodge, 162 Conn. 363, 370, 294 A.2d 577 (1972), overruled on other grounds, Pedevillano v. Bryon, 231 Conn. 265, 270 n.3, 648 A.2d 873 (1994). With the exception of the owner's exposure for punitive damages; Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., supra; which the plaintiff disclaimed at oral argument, liability under the statute "does not differ from one wherein an owner of a car is held liable in damages merely because of his ownership." Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Kohn Bros. Tobacco Co., 141 Conn. 539, 544, 107 A.2d 406 (1954).

In both the original and amended complaint, Elrac is given fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence—its giving a vehicle it owned to Steiner who then negligently caused the plaintiff's injuries in a motor vehicle accident on a particular date. Thus, both the original complaint and the amendment allege that Elrac owned the car and is vicariously liable for compensable damages for Steiner's negligent operation of the car. See Bodner v. United Services Automobile Assn., 222 Conn. 480, 498 n.7, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992) (§14-154a imposes vicarious liability); see also Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc., 247 Conn. 342, 346, 721 A.2d 1187 (1998) (§14-154a significantly supplements principles of common-law vicarious liability). What is added is another characterization of the relationship by which Elrac gave Steiner the vehicle, from agency to lease. Significantly, this was not a complex commercial transaction. Elrac—which is an acronym for Enterprise Leasing and Rent A Car—admits it cannot claim surprise. Thus, in the context of this case, whether Elrac was Steiner's principal or simply his lessor is not a critical issue in dispute. The court finds that Elrac was not surprised by the fact that it leased the vehicle to Steiner, as opposed to being his principal, nor surprised that liability is being asserted on the basis of the lease.

Once the word "rent" or "lease" is allowed in the complaint, the inclusion of the plaintiff's citation to §14-154a does not enhance the defendant's argument. Although Practice Book §10-3 provides that any special defense shall specifically identify by number the statute upon which a party relies, the rule is directory and not mandatory. See Steele...