Daniel v. Berryhill, Case No. 2:14-cv-01728-JCM-PAL
| Decision Date | 25 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-01728-JCM-PAL |
| Parties | LENA J. DANIEL, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
(Mot. to Remand - ECF No. 17)
(Cross-Mot. to Affirm - ECF No. 18)
This matter involves Plaintiff Lena J. Daniel's appeal and request for judicial review of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill's final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33, and claim for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83.
Plaintiff Lena J. Daniel ("Daniel") filed a Title II application for disability benefits on May 21, 2009, at the age of 45, and also protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on June 2, 2009. AR 381-83, 386-91.2 These applications initially alleged a disability onset date of December 22, 2004. In her applications, Daniel claimed she was unable towork because of: (1) mood disorder; (2) bipolar disorder; and (3) depression. AR 406. Her work history reports indicate she previously worked in clerical and administrative roles as an office assistant and customer service representative. AR 412-19. The Social Security Administration (the "Agency") denied Daniel's application initially and on reconsideration. AR 147-50.
An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on March 3, 2011, where Ms. Daniel appeared with counsel. AR 123-46. During the hearing, counsel amended Daniel's alleged onset date to November 30, 2009, as the record contained no medical evidence prior to 2007. AR 125-26. This amendment of the alleged onset date effectively precluded her Title II application because her date last insured was September 30, 2009. Id.; see also AR 154. Daniel's counsel asserted that the theory of her case stemmed from her mental problems, not physical problems. AR 125-26. The ALJ left the record open for 30 days to allow Ms. Daniel to supplement with additional medical records and he also ordered a psychological examination with testing. AR 127, 145. The ALJ issued a decision on June 3, 2011 (the "2011 decision"), finding that Daniel was not disabled and she was capable of performing her past relevant work as an office assistant. AR 154-62. Ms. Daniel requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. AR 224.
The Appeals Council issued an order vacating the 2011 decision and remanding the case to the ALJ for further consideration. AR 225-29. The Order stated that further consideration was needed on whether Ms. Daniel could work as an office assistant because her residual functional capacity limited her to brief encounters with the public and coworkers but the mental demands of an office assistant require more than brief encounters. AR 227. Additionally, the Appeals Council found that the mental limitations included in her RFC would significantly compromise the potential occupational base for medium unskilled work. Id. However, the ALJ's decision lacked supporting evidence from a vocational expert. Id. Lastly, the Order noted that the 2011 decision did not evaluate Ms. Daniel's obesity as required by Agency regulations. Id. The Appeals counsel instructed the ALJ to address these three deficiencies on remand. AR 228.
A brief second hearing was held on February 2, 2012. AR 90-101. Because Ms. Daniel appeared at the hearing without counsel, the ALJ continued the matter to allow her to secure new legal representation. Id.
The ALJ held a third hearing on July 12, 2012. AR 102-22. Ms. Daniel appeared at this hearing with new counsel who amended her alleged onset date to September 29, 2009. AR 106. This second amendment reinstated her Title II application. Id. The ALJ suspended the third hearing to further develop the record. AR 119. The ALJ asked Daniel's counsel for medical records regarding Ms. Daniel's newly alleged physical impairments and ordered a second psychological exam, an orthopedic exam, and a vision exam. AR 113-14, 119-21.
A fourth hearing was held on February 26, 2013. The ALJ accepted testimony from Daniel, AR 70-72, 81-88, and a vocational expert, AR 73-81. The ALJ held the record open for 30 days to allow Ms. Daniel to submit all of her mental health records. AR 72, 88-89. In a decision dated April 12, 2013, the ALJ found that she was not disabled. AR 17-42. Ms. Daniel again requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, but the ALJ's decision became final when review was denied on August 19, 2014. AR 1-6.
On October 17, 2014, she filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) in federal court, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner filed her Answer (ECF No. 10) on March 9, 2015. Ms. Daniel filed a Motion to Remand (ECF No. 17), and the Commissioner filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response (ECF Nos. 18, 19). The court has considered the Motion, Cross-Motion and Response, and Reply (ECF No. 20).
Federal district courts review administrative decisions in social security benefits cases under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute provides that after the Commissioner has held a hearing and rendered a final decision, a disability claimant may seek review of that decision by filing a civil lawsuit in a federal district court in the judicial district where the disability claimant lives. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The statute also provides that the district court may enter, "upon the pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2005). But the Commissioner's findings may be set aside if they are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence. Stout v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a court "must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 'specific quantum of supporting evidence'." Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Under the substantial evidence test, a court must uphold the Commissioner's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). When the evidence will support more than one rational interpretation, a court must defer to the Commissioner's interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Consequently, the issue before a court is not whether the Commissioner could reasonably have reached a different conclusion, but whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence.
It is incumbent upon an ALJ to make specific findings so that a court does not speculate as to the basis of the findings when determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2014). Mere cursory findings of fact without explicit statements about what portions of the evidence were accepted or rejected are not sufficient. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1981). An ALJ's findings should be comprehensive, analytical, and include a statement explaining the "factual foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based." Id. See also Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) ().
A claimant has the initial burden of proving disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant must provide specific medical evidence to support his or her claim of disability. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). If a claimant establishes an inability to perform his or her prior work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) ().
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If at any step an ALJ makes a finding of disability or non-disability, no further evaluation is required. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process and issued an unfavorable decision on April 12, 2013 (the "Decision"). AR 20-34. Ms. Daniel does not challenge the ALJ's findings at any particular...
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