Daniel v. City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 18 December 2017
• Docket Number: A17-0141
• Parties: Keith Daniel, Respondent, v. City of Minneapolis, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Keith Daniel, Respondent, v. City of Minneapolis, Appellant.

A17-0141

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

December 18, 2017

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Reversed and remanded

Bratvold, Judge

Concurring specially, Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CV-16-700

Joshua R. Williams, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Sarah C.S. McLaren, Assistant City Attorney, George H. Norris, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

The City of Minneapolis (the city) appeals the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The city argues that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a former employee's claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) precludes subject-matter jurisdiction over MHRA claims arising from a WCA-compensable injury, we reverse the district court's decision to deny the city's motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on respondent's remaining claims.

FACTS

Respondent Keith Daniel worked as a firefighter with the Minneapolis Fire Department (the fire department). From 2007 until the end of his tenure with the fire department in July 2015, Daniel suffered numerous work-related injuries, including several ankle injuries for which he filed a WCA claim. Following an independent medical examination in 2014, the doctor concluded that Daniel's ankle was "aggravated by numerous events at work, such as walking on uneven surfaces, as well as wearing heeled shoes." Daniel's own doctor prescribed that he wear "tennis shoes with arch support + high rescue boot high ankle" to avoid future injuries.

The prescription to wear tennis shoes led to prolonged discussions between Daniel and the fire department. Daniel asked to wear tennis shoes while in the station house, but the fire department denied his request, citing its dress code. Despite numerous meetings between 2014 and 2016, Daniel and the fire department never agreed on a shoe that satisfied both parties. In January 2015, Daniel began to receive workers' compensation payments.

In December 2015, Daniel sued the city alleging two primary theories of recovery.¹ First, Daniel claimed that the fire department violated the MHRA by discriminating against him based on his disability, failing to accommodate his disability, and retaliating against him for engaging in MHRA-protected conduct. Second, Daniel alleged that the fire department violated the WCA by retaliating against him for seeking workers' compensation benefits and failing to provide continued employment when it was available.

In March 2016, the city applied on Daniel's behalf for him to receive early retirement benefits because he was unable to perform firefighter duties as a result of the injuries he had suffered in the course of his employment with the city. The application was approved and Daniel retired shortly thereafter. Daniel settled his workers' compensation claim in June 2016. The agreement was a "full, final, and complete settlement now and forever of any and all of [Daniel's] claims related to his work-related injury, that [Daniel had] made, or could make under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act" in exchange for $125,000, plus costs.

In August 2016, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Daniel's MHRA claims due to theexclusivity provision in the WCA. The district court disagreed and denied the city's motion. The city appeals.²

DECISION

I. Appellate jurisdiction and standard of review

Usually, a party may not appeal a decision denying summary judgment. Advanced Delivery Sys., Inc. v. Jaime, 774 N.W.2d 176, 177 (Minn. App. 2009). An order denying summary judgment based on subject-matter jurisdiction, however, is immediately appealable. Id. The exclusivity provision of the WCA limits subject-matter jurisdiction. See McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832-34 (Minn. 1995) (stating that a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provision of the WCA was "a motion based on subject-matter jurisdiction"). This court reviews issues of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. State ex rel. Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass'n v. Nicollet Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 711 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).

II. The WCA provides Daniel's exclusive remedy and thus precludes his MHRA disability claim arising from the same workplace injury.

The WCA reflects a series of compromises between workers and their employers. Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. 2005). Under the WCA, workers streamlined their ability to obtain compensation from their employers for injuries suffered in the workplace, for example, by not requiring proof of fault. Karstv. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 183-84 (Minn. 1989). In exchange, employers are no longer subject to civil suits for claims arising out of workplace injuries if a worker may recover workers' compensation benefits. Id.³ Minn. Stat. § 176.031 (2016) provides, "The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death." The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted Minn. Stat. § 176.031 to require that "[i]f an employee suffers a personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of her employment, the [WCA] provides the employee's exclusive remedy," and that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims outside the WCA. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 833.

The legislature has adopted explicit exceptions to the WCA's exclusivity provision. For example, the WCA provides that an employee may bring a civil action if an employer retaliates against an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits, obstructs the employee from seeking benefits, or refuses to offer continued employment within an injured employee's physical limitations. Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (2016). Another statutory exception to WCA exclusivity allows an employee to file a civil suit if an employee's injuries are caused by the gross negligence of a coemployee or an employer's intentional conduct. Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5(e) (2016); Meintsma v. Loram Maintenance ofWay, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Minn. 2004). And, finally, the WCA exclusivity provision does not bar an employee's injury claim if an employer is uninsured. Minn. Stat. § 176.031.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that the WCA exclusivity provision bars an employee's MHRA claim against his former employee for disability discrimination. Karst, 447 N.W.2d at 183, 186-87. Karst worked as a warehouseman, suffered a shoulder injury, was released to return to work with restrictions, but his employer refused to rehire him. Id. at 182-83. Relying on the WCA exclusivity provision, the supreme court affirmed summary judgment against the employee and rejected his MHRA claims. Id. at 186-87.

Similarly, this court held that a former employee's disability discrimination claim was barred in Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 530, 540-41 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997). Benson had suffered a workplace injury, received a transfer due to medical restrictions, and continued working for over five months before his employer discharged him. Id. at 533-34. Relying on Karst, we held that the WCA's exclusivity provision precluded Benson's MHRA disability discrimination claim. Id. at 540-41. Because Benson's injuries "formed the basis for both his discrimination claim and his workers' compensation claims," we affirmed the district court's decision rejecting his MHRA claim. Id.

Like the MHRA claims considered in Karst and Benson, Daniel's MHRA claims are based on a workplace injury that is compensable under the WCA. As a result, weconclude that the district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Daniel's MHRA claims.⁴

III. Daniel's arguments are unavailing.

Daniel advances three contentions in support of the district court's decision. First, Daniel contends that intervening changes in the law mean that Karst no longer binds this court. Second, Daniel claims that his MHRA claims arise from an injury that is legally distinct from his workplace injury. Third, Daniel asserts that we should distinguish his MHRA claims from similar claims raised in Karst and Benson because Daniel had an "on-going" employment relationship with the city. We will address each contention in turn.

A. Karst remains binding precedent.

Daniel argues that that subsequent amendments to the MHRA have "abrogated" Karst. Like the WCA, the MHRA has an exclusivity provision. The MHRA provides that, "as to acts declared unfair by [the MHRA], the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Minn. Stat. § 363A.04 (2016). In Karst, the supreme court considered the exclusivity provisions of the MHRA and the WCA and deemed them to be in conflict. Karst, 447 N.W.2d at 186. The court noted that, when two statutes conflict, the court will usually give effect to the statute passed most recently. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 4 (1988)). At the time Karst was decided, the MHRA exclusivity provision had been more recently enacted. Id. But Karst held that this "rule of construction" "offeredlittle guidance" because both the WCA and the MHRA were "substantially amended in the same 1983 legislative session." Id.

Daniel contends that the MHRA has been "substantially amended" since Karst...