Daniel v. Dallas Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1961
• Docket Number: No. 5459,5459
• Citation: 351 S.W.2d 356
• Parties: Walter DANIEL et al., Appellants, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 356

351 S.W.2d 356

Walter DANIEL et al., Appellants, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.

No. 5459.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

Oct. 11, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1961.

Mullinax, Wells, Morris & Mauzy, Dallas, for appellants.

Malone, Lipscomb, Seay & Gwinn, George E. Seay, Dallas, for appellees.

FRASER, Justice.

This is a suit for damages and injunction, brought by plaintiff Daniel, described as a custodial employee of the School District of Dallas. The Union, of which he is a member joins in the lawsuit. Plaintiffs, in their petition, allege that plaintiff Daniel was wrongfully discharged as school janitor because of his membership in plaintiff Union, because of Daniel's 'presentation of grievances' and lastly, because of Daniel's testimony in earlier litigation. The relief sought was a permanent injunction requiring reinstatement of plaintiff Daniel, restoration of pay and privileges, etc. A temporary injunction was granted, but was later vacated by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, 323 S.W.2d 639. When the case was again tried in another Dallas district court, the appellee-defendants interposed a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court and maintenance of suit, by way of pleas to the jurisdiction and plea in abatement. Their position was that plaintiffs did not go through the proper channels which, in this case, were State school authorities, so as to entitle them to bring this action in the State courts. Appellants urged that appellees were estopped to urge their pleas to the jurisdiction and abatement. The trial court held that the pleas should in all things be sustained, and the cause dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and specifically stated that the court found that there has been a failure of plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies in this matter; that such was mandatory and a condition procedent to conferring jurisdiction in the district court.

First of all, it must be noted and kept in mind that the record here reveals that the parties were in controversy as to whether Daniel had been discharged because of the three matters alleged in plaintiffs' petition, or because his work and conduct was unsatisfactory. This, of course, creates a fact issue, and we cannot here pass on whether or not he was rightfully discharged because it has not been adjudicated by the lower court. We have no decision or finding relative to his discharge that we can review.

The record shows that plaintiff Daniel and his attorney appealed to W. T. White, Dallas School Superintendent, and then to the Dallas School Board. Plaintiffs do not contend that they presented any appeal to any State agencies; in fact, they admitted that no such appeal had been taken.

Sections 101, 107 and 201 of the 'Procedures on Hearings and Appeals', adopted by the State Board of Education of Texas, provide, among other things, that in grievances or controversies involving administrative actions or problems of local school districts, aggrieved parties should be afforded a full hearing provided request in writing has been timely filed. Also set forth are the rules governing the manner and conduct of the hearings and providing that after such hearing by the local trustees, any party to such hearing may appeal from the decisions as follows: (a) from a district board of trustees to the Commissioner of Education; (b) from the Commissioner of Education to the State Board of Education; (c) from the State Board of Education to a court of competent jurisdiction. Also, it appears that appeals may be taken from the State Board of Education as provided by Article 2922-18, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. Then Articles 2656, 2654-5 to 2654-7, and 2654-1, V.A.C.S., also describe the manner in which these appeals shall be taken. Article 2656 charges the State Superintendent with the administration of the school laws and a general superintendency of the business relating to the public schools of the State, and further, that he shall hear and determine all appeals from the rulings and decisions of subordinate school officers, and also this article provides that 'appeal shall always be from his rulings to the State Board. * * *' Articles 2564 and 2654-5 set up the position of State Commissioner of Education, vesting in him the powers heretofore vested in the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Article 2654-1 deals with the Central Education Agency, which exercises general control of the system of public education at the State level. Article 2654-7, section 1, provides as follows: 'Parties having any manner of dispute among them arising under provisions of the school laws of Texas, or any person or parties aggrieved by the actions or decisions of any Board of Trustees of Board of Education, may appeal in writing to the Commissioner of Education who, after due notice to the parties interested, shall examine in a hearing and render a judgment without cost to the parties involved. However, nothing contained in this Section shall deprive any party of a legal remedy.' Article 2780, entitled 'Power of trustees', grants them the exclusive power 'to manage and govern said schools.'

The record shows considerable dispute as to why plaintiff Daniel was discharged. Briefly, the Dallas school superintendent said he was discharged for inefficiency and personality conflict, which statements, of course, are denied by Daniel, who alleged it was because of the three matters plead in his petition.

We believe that the trial court was correct in sustaining the pleas. There are several cases that have passed on this point. Hinojosa v. San Isidro Independent School...