Daniel v. Paul

• Decision Date: 10 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 18824.,18824.
• Citation: 395 F.2d 118
• Parties: Mrs. Doris DANIEL and Mrs. Rosalyn Kyles, Appellants, v. Euell PAUL, Jr., Individually and as Owner, Operator or Manager of Lake Nixon Club, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

395 F.2d 118 (1968)

Mrs. Doris DANIEL and Mrs. Rosalyn Kyles, Appellants, v. Euell PAUL, Jr., Individually and as Owner, Operator or Manager of Lake Nixon Club, Appellee.

No. 18824.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

May 3, 1968.

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1968.

Norman C. Amaker, New York City, for appellants; John W. Walker, Little Rock, Ark., and Jack Greenberg and Michael Meltsner and Gabrielle A. Kirk, New York City, were on the brief.

Sam Robinson, of Robinson, Thornton, McCloy & Young, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge, and MEHAFFY and HEANEY, Circuit Judges.

MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge.

Doris Daniel and Rosalyn Kyles, plaintiffs-appellants, Negro citizens and residents of Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas, were refused admission to the Lake Nixon Club, a recreational facility located in a rural area of Pulaski County and owned and operated by the defendant-appellee Euell Paul, Jr. and his wife, Oneta Irene Paul. Plaintiffs brought this suit seeking injunctive relief from an alleged discriminatory policy followed by defendant denying Negroes the use and enjoyment of the services and facilities of the Lake Nixon Club.¹ This suit was brought as a class action under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, § 201 et seq., 78 Stat. 243 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., alleging that the Lake Nixon Club is a "public accommodation" as the term is defined in the Act, and that, therefore, it is subject to the Act's provisions.

For the purpose of trial this case was consolidated with a similar suit brought by plaintiffs against Spring Lake Club, Inc. The trial was to Chief District Judge Henley who held that neither Lake Nixon Club nor Spring Lake, Inc. was a "public accommodation" as defined in and covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and ordered dismissal of the complaints. We are concerned solely with the court's decision with regard to Lake Nixon Club, since there was no appeal from the portion of the decision regarding Spring Lake, Inc. Chief Judge Henley's memorandum opinion is published at 263 F.Supp. 412. We affirm.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Lake Nixon Club is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq; that it serves and offers to serve interstate travelers; that a substantial portion of the food and other items which it serves and uses moves in interstate commerce; that its operations affect travel, trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among, between and through the several states and the District of Columbia; that the Lake Nixon Club is operated under the guise of being a private club solely for the purpose of being able to exclude plaintiffs and all other Negro persons; and that the jurisdiction of the court is invoked to secure protection of plaintiffs' civil rights and to redress them for the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Section 1; the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States; 42 U.S.C. § 1981, providing for the equal rights of citizens and all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., under which they allege that they are entitled to an injunction restraining defendant from denying them and others similarly situated admission to and full use and enjoyment of the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations" of the Lake Nixon Club.

The defendant denied that Lake Nixon is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the Act; denied that Lake Nixon serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or that a substantial portion of the food and other items which it serves and uses moves in interstate commerce; denied that its operations affect travel, trade, commerce, transportation or communication between and through the several states and the District of Columbia within the meaning of the Act; and, further answering, averred that defendant operates Lake Nixon Club as a place to swim; that he has a large amount of money invested in the facility; that if he is compelled to admit Negroes to the lake, he will lose the business of white people and will be compelled to close his business; that the value of his property will be destroyed; and that he will be deprived of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which define "a place of public accommodation" as covered by the Act, and which plaintiffs contend bring the Lake Nixon Club within its coverage, are contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), and provide as follows:

"(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

"(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

"(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

"(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment." (Emphasis added.)

It will be noted that an establishment falling in any of the four categories outlined above is covered by the Act only "if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action," which is not contended here, or "if its operations affect commerce." The criteria for determining whether an establishment affects commerce within the meaning of the Act are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (c), as follows:

"(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this subchapter if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this section; (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of this section, it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, `commerce\' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points in the same State but through any other State or the District of Columbia or a foreign country."

The facts in the case are relatively simple and not in material dispute. The Lake Nixon property, consisting of 232 acres, is located on a country road several miles from the City of Little Rock and is not close to any state or federal highway. In 1962 Paul and his wife purchased this property, and since that time they have made their home there and operated the facility for recreational purposes. In 1964 they adopted a club plan in order to prevent undesirables from using the facility, with no thought of simply excluding Negroes, as no Negro had ever sought admission.² A membership fee of 25 ¢ per person per season was charged. The only Negroes who ever sought admission were the two plaintiffs and a young Negro man who accompanied them to Lake Nixon on July 10, 1966. When they sought to use the facilities, Mrs. Paul told them that the membership was filled, but candidly testified at the trial that their admission was denied because of their race. In response to written interrogatories propounded to Mr. Paul in a discovery deposition, he replied that he and his wife exercised their own judgment in accepting applicants for membership and refused those whom they did not want. Referring to the plaintiffs, Mr. Paul stated:

"At that time, we refused admission to them because white people in our community would not patronize us if we admitted Negroes to the swimming pool. Our business would be ruined and we have our entire life savings in it."

Mr. and Mrs. Paul invested $100,000.00 in the property, and, although it is operated only during the swimming season — from some time in May until early September depending upon the weather — it has earned a substantial and comfortable livelihood for them, producing net profits in excess of $17,000.00 annually.

Plaintiff Mrs. Doris Daniel, who lived in Little Rock some twelve miles from Lake Nixon, was the only witness who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. The other evidence is incorporated in pretrial answers to interrogatories and the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Paul. Mrs. Daniel...