Kyles v. Paul

• Decision Date: 01 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. LR-66-C-149,LR-66-C-150.,LR-66-C-149
• Citation: 263 F. Supp. 412
• Parties: Rosalyn KYLES and Doris Daniel, Plaintiffs, v. Euell PAUL, Jr., Individually and as Owner, Manager or Operator of the Lake Nixon Club, Defendant. Rosalyn KYLES and Doris Daniel, Plaintiffs, v. J. A. CULBERSON, Individually and as Owner, Manager or Operator of Spring Lake, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

263 F. Supp. 412

Rosalyn KYLES and Doris Daniel, Plaintiffs, v. Euell PAUL, Jr., Individually and as Owner, Manager or Operator of the Lake Nixon Club, Defendant.

Rosalyn KYLES and Doris Daniel, Plaintiffs, v. J. A. CULBERSON, Individually and as Owner, Manager or Operator of Spring Lake, Inc., Defendant.

Nos. LR-66-C-149, LR-66-C-150.

United States District Court E. D. Arkansas, W. D.

February 1, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John W. Walker, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiffs.

Sam Robinson, Little Rock, Ark., for defendant Euell Paul, Jr.

Phillip Carroll, Little Rock, Ark., for defendant Culberson and Spring Lake, Inc.

Memorandum Opinion

HENLEY, Chief Judge.

These two suits in equity, brought under the provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, § 201 et seq., 78 Stat. 243 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a and 2000a-1 through 2000a-6, have been consolidated for trial and have been tried to the Court without a jury. Federal jurisdiction is not questioned and is established adequately by reference to section 207 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-6.

Plaintiffs are Negro citizens of Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas. The defendants in No. 149, Mr. and Mrs. Euell Paul, Jr., own and operate a recreational facility known as Lake Nixon. The corporate defendant in No. 150, Spring Lake Club, Inc., owns and operates a similar facility known as Spring Lake. All of the stock in Spring Lake Club, Inc., except one qualifying share, is owned by the defendant, J. A. Culberson, and his wife.

The two establishments are not far from each other. Both are located in Pulaski County some miles west of the City of Little Rock. In July 1966 the two plaintiffs presented themselves at both establishments and sought admission thereto. They were turned away in both instances on the representation that the establishments were "private clubs."

On July 19 plaintiffs commenced these actions on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The complaints allege in substance that both Lake Nixon and Spring Lake are "Public Accommodations" within the meaning of Title II of the Act, and that under the provisions of section 201(a) they, and others similarly situated, are "entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the facilities without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." They pray for appropriate injunctive relief as provided by section 204 of the Act.

In their answers the defendants¹ deny that Lake Nixon and Spring Lake are public accommodations within the meaning of the Act; affirmatively, they plead that the two facilities are "private clubs" and are exempt from the Act by virtue of section 201(e), even if initial coverage exists.

Sections 201(a) and 201(b) of the Act prohibit racial discrimination in certain types of public accommodations if their operations "affect" interstate commerce, or if racial discrimination or segregation in their operation is "supported by State action."

Section 201(b) makes the prohibition applicable to four categories of business establishments, namely:

"(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

"(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

"(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment."

Section 201(c) sets forth criteria whereby it may be determined whether an establishment affects interstate commerce. That section is as follows:

"The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this subchapter if (1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this section; (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of this section, it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, `commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points in the same State but through any other State or the District of Columbia or a foreign country."

Section 201(d) is as follows:

"Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported by State action within the meaning of this subchapter if such discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political subdivision thereof."

The exemption invoked by defendants appears in section 201(e) which provides that the provisions of Title II of the Act do not apply to "a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section."

Federal prohibitions of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination or segregation in State and municipal facilities are based ultimately on the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 finds its constitutional sanction in the commerce clause of the Constitution itself. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3. That Title II, as written, is constitutional is now settled beyond question, at least as far as this Court is concerned at this time. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290; Willis v. The Pickrick Restaurant, N.D.Ga., 231 F.Supp. 396, appeal dismissed Maddox v. Willis, 382 U.S. 18, 86 S.Ct. 72, 15 L.Ed. 2d 13, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 922, 86 S.Ct. 286, 15 L.Ed.2d 237.

The rationale of those holdings is that Congress permissibly found that racial discrimination, including racial segregation, in certain types of business establishments adversely affects interstate commerce, and acted constitutionally to prohibit such discrimination. Those cases also establish that, even though practices on the part of an individual enterprise have no significant or even measurable impact on commerce, such practices by such enterprise are prohibited where they are of a type which Congress has found affects commerce adversely.

In coming to the latter conclusion the Court in McClung drew an analogy between an individual business man who practices racial discrimination and an individual farmer who violates a provision of the Government farm program. It was said (pp. 300-301 of 379 U.S., p. 382 of 85 S.Ct.):

"It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as our late Brother Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942):

"`That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. * * *'"

The burden in these cases is upon the plaintiffs to establish, first, that the facilities in question are establishments covered by the Act and, second, that plaintiffs have been subjected to racial discrimination prohibited by the Act. On the other hand, the burden is upon the respective defendants to show that they are entitled to the private club exemption which they invoke.

There is no serious dispute as to the facts in either case.

Lake Nixon has been a place of amusement in Pulaski County for many years. Several years ago the properties were acquired and improved by Mr. and Mrs. Paul, the present owners and operators. The Spring Lake property was acquired by Mr. Culberson in the spring of 1965 and the Spring Lake Club, Inc. was organized as an ordinary business corporation under the general corporation laws of Arkansas on April 22 of that year.² Both establishments are operated for the financial profit of the owners or owner. During 1965 and 1966 Lake Nixon earned substantial profits; Mr. Culberson is not sure whether Spring Lake has earned...