Daniels v. Board of Review of Monona County, 47979

Decision Date04 March 1952
Docket NumberNo. 47979,47979
Citation243 Iowa 405,52 N.W.2d 1
PartiesDANIELS v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF MONONA COUNTY et al. (and 9 other cases).
CourtIowa Supreme Court

John D. Beardsley and Robt. M. Underhill, of Onawa, for appellants and cross-appellees.

Prichard & Prichard, of Onawa, for Herbert S. Daniels, L. E. Ewing and Grace T. Ewing, A. R. Roe and C. L. Roe, George E. Stanislav and Agnes Stanislav, L. C. Stokely, St., and Ola Stokely, McKenney, Seabury Farms, a corporation, Geo. E. Olson, E. Grace Prichard, E. M. Prichard, L. A. Prichard, Charlotte B. Prichard and Geo. W. Prichard, and Glenn L. Cavanaugh and Mary Evalyn Cavanaugh, appellees and cross-appellants.

MULRONEY, Justice.

Ten appeals from the 1949 tax assessments in Monona County resulted in the county board of review confirming the assessments of the assessor in each case. The taxpayers appealed to the district court and the ten separate appeals were consolidated for trial. The district court reduced the assessments in nine cases and the board of review appeals in those cases and the taxpayers in those cases cross appeal asserting some legal defenses but in the main claiming the reductions were insufficient. In the remaining case the appeal is by the taxpayer.

The record shows that in the year 1948 the board of supervisors hired an appraisal firm, Wilkins & Associates, to make an appraisal of the property in the county. The appraisers used a card system and after the appraisers entered their data and 100% appraisal on the card they gave it to the assessor. The assessor took 60% of the appraisal as it appeared on the cards in making up the assessment. The assessor worked along with Wilkins & Associates in starting off the appraisement in Monona County. He discussed with them the manner and method of making the appraisals. He looked over buildings and farms with them and observed the methods they were using in making their valuations, and talked with them at various times and discussed the valuations they were making on buildings and farms at the time they were making them.

The appraisal firm did not complete its work until the month of July, 1949. The County board of review met for the purpose of considering objections after the assessor completed the assessments in August and the board completed its work on September 2, 1949.

I. The taxpayers contend the assessments were void because: (1) the assessor did not personally fix the values to any of the properties, (2) the assessor failed to affix his oath to the assessment rolls, and (3) the assessments were not completed until midsummer of 1949 and the board of review continued in session beyond June 1st.

The trial court rightly held against the taxpayers on these contentions. Chapter 240, Sec. 20, Acts of the 52nd G.A., I.C.A. § 405A.6, specifically authorizes the county board of supervisors 'to employ appraisers or other technical or expert help to assist in the valuation of property'. The record shows the assessor accepted the appraisal firm's valuation in the cases here involved. Acceptance of the appraiser's valuation by the assessor would not mean the assessor violated Sec. 441.10, Code 1950, I.C.A., providing he must 'personally affix values to all property assessed by him.' The requirement that the assessor affix his oath to the assessment roll is directory only where the assessment is appealed to the board of review. First National Bank of Council Bluffs v. City of Council Bluffs, 182 Iowa 107, 161 N.W. 706. The delay in the assessment past May 1st and in the work of the board of review past June 1st was because the appraisal firm did not complete the appraisals on time. The statutes fixing the dates on which the assessor and board shall complete their work, Secs. 441.24 and 442.1, Code 1950, I.C.A., are directory. The delay was not such as to invalidate the assessments.

II. The taxpayers argue there is no presumption in favor of the assessment because the assessor merely accepted the valuations fixed by a professional appraiser, citing such cases as Iowa Building Corp. v. Zirbel, 237 Iowa 242, 21 N.W.2d 576, In re Appeal of Bankers Life Company v. Zirbel, 239 Iowa 275, 31 N.W.2d 368, Clark v. Lucas County Board of Review, Iowa, 44 N.W.2d 748 and Haubrich v. Johnson, Iowa, 50 N.W.2d 19.

Sec. 441.13, Code 1950, I.C.A., specifically provides that 'the burden of proof shall be upon any complainant attacking such valuation (of the assessor) as excessive, inadequate, or inequitable.' In all of the cases cited above where the assessors merely accepted the professional appraisers' valuations we held the appealing taxpayers had the statutory burden of proof to establish their contentions that the valuations were excessive or inequitable. There is but little difference in saying the assessment is presumptively correct and saying the taxpayer has the burden of proving it is not. This is especially true because in the cited cases we have adhered to the rule that the appealing taxpayer's burden is to establish that the assessment as made by the assessor and confirmed by the board was so wholly out of line as to give rise to an inference that the assessing officers did not properly discharge their duties. Clark v. Lucas County Board of Review, Iowa, 44 N.W.2d 748. Any possible procedural advantage which the taxpayers here might gain by reason of the fact the assessor accepted the professional appraiser's valuations vanishes entirely when the assessments were all confirmed by the board of review. The record here shows the board did not merely accept the professional appraiser's valuation. The chairman and two other members of the board testified they checked each protest; that they had personal knowledge of the property or if they did not they made a personal examination of the property; they compared the protested assessments with the surrounding farm land and they all testified the assessments were equitable and not in excess of actual value.

The taxpayers make some point of the fact that their attorney was not accorded a full hearing before all of the members of the board on each protest. The record shows the board had about 30,000 separate assessments before it. Evidently there were many appeals to the board. Plaintiffs' counsel filed in all 89 written appeals. In order to complete its work individual members would hear an objecting taxpayer or his attorney. But the members testified all objections were considered by all members of the board. The procedure before the board of review is quite informal. As we said in Ferguson & Son v. Board of Review of Incorporated Town of Rolfe, 119 Iowa 338, 93 N.W. 352, 353, 'the statute (Sec. 442.6, Code 1950, I.C.A.,) does not require that the board of review shall proceed as a court * * *.' The complaint can be oral or written. Sec. 442.5 Code 1950, I.C.A.; Haubrich v. Johnson, supra.

The confirmation of the assessments by the board of review, under the record here presented, means the assessments did arrive in the district court with a presumption of correctness. In the recent case of Clark v. Lucas County Board of Review, Iowa, 44 N.W.2d 748, 758, where the valuation was also made by Wilkins & Associates, we held: 'The board of review having confirmed the assessment, the presumption is that the value so fixed by the board, is correct, just, and equitable, and, until the contrary appears, that it performed its duties as required by law.' (Citing cases.)

III. As a basis for what we will presently discuss we quote a portion of the statement of facts in the taxpayers' brief: 'The record shows that the eastern part of Monona County is hill land while the western part is flat bottom land. The eastern portion of this bottom land is quite low, subject to overflow and floods, and is bisected by many drainage ditches and the Little Sioux River. Most of the farm lands involved in these appeals are located in this low area, although two of the appeals involve sand bar, or 'accretion' land, lying along the Missouri River, which is the western boundary of the county. The balance of the bottom land, being roughly the western one-sixth of the land in the county, is free from floods and overflows, has no ditches, and has an excellent soil. The court found that a portion of this better land, constituting at least five per cent of the land in the county, was admittedly assessed at too low a figure. The top assessment placed against the best land in the county was $90 per acre, while most of the land involved in these appeals was assessed at $60, $70, $80, or $90 an acre. The record shows the actual value of the lands involved in the appeals was only one-third to one-half of the actual value of the top five per cent.'

The trial court correctly stated the issues in each appeal were whether the assessments were based on a valuation above actual value or inequitable in comparison with like properties. Before taking up the individual cases we can dispose of some general questions that are common to all. The taxpayers' claim for reduction, especially as to inequality, was based on a theory which was challenged by the board in the trial court and is challenged here. All of their evidence was pointed to establish that the bottom land, or 95% farm land area, where their land was located was assessed at a higher proportion of its value than the bench land or 5% farm land area which in most instances was several miles away. The taxpayers sought to establish this by the testimony of three witnesses who are called general witnesses who testified in all but two of the cases. These witnesses were Mr. Gray, a former county auditor and a former appraiser for the Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Mr. Benson, a real estate man in Onawa and an appraiser for the State Inheritance Tax Commission, and Mr. J. A. Johnson who was once an appraiser for a life insurance company and at the time of trial secretary for another insurance association in Monona County. These three men visited all of...

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12 cases
  • Deere Mfg. Co. v. Zeiner
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 18, 1956
    ...were reached in much the same way employed by the assessor here. Of such method of computing value of buildings Daniels v. Board of Review, 243 Iowa 405, 416-417, 52 N.W.2d 1, 8, says: 'It fairly appears from the record that the system employed for building appraisals upon which the buildin......
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  • Maytag Co. v. Partridge, 55481
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    • September 19, 1973
    ...plant. There must be some substantial similarity before a basis for comparison is presented.' See also Daniels v. Board of Review of Monona County, 243 Iowa 405, 413, 52 N.W.2d 1, 6 ('A taxpayer does not make out a case for reduction of assessment as inequitable until he shows assessments o......
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