Daniels v. Celeste

Citation303 Mass. 148,21 N.E.2d 1
PartiesALEXANDER M. DANIELS v. J. IRVING CELESTE.
Decision Date08 May 1939
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

December 6, 1938.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.

Damages, For tort. Husband and Wife. Joint Tortfeasors. Covenant, Not to sue.

A husband cannot recover as a part of damages resulting from a personal injury the value of nursing services rendered him by his wife, a registered nurse, to bring about his recovery.

If the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries against one of two joint tortfeasors is found to have received full compensation for his injuries through a sum paid him by the other joint tortfeasor in return for a covenant not to sue, he cannot recover even nominal damages from the defendant.

TORT. Writ in the First District Court of Eastern Middlesex dated October 18 1935.

On removal to the Superior Court, the action was tried before Greenhalge, J. J W. Killam, Jr., for the plaintiff.

J. F. A.

Daly, for the defendant.

DOLAN, J. On January 17, 1935, the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in an automobile which collided with a motor truck operated by the defendant. The plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a result of the collision and was taken to a hospital where he received medical and surgical treatment. On February 19 1935, he was discharged from the hospital and was taken in an ambulance to his home where he was confined to his bed for some weeks. Later he was "around the house" first with the aid of crutches and afterwards with that of a cane. He was unable to perform any work until the middle of August, 1935, and until 1936 could not do more than part time work. While at home the plaintiff was cared for by his wife, who was a registered nurse. The care included "back rubs," "alcohol sponges," and administering medication, massages and "lamp treatments" under the directions of a physician.

In April, 1936, the plaintiff gave a covenant not to sue to the representative of the operator of the automobile in which he was riding when injured, receiving as consideration $1,300. There was evidence which would warrant a finding that the plaintiff's loss of income, hospital, doctors' and dentist's bills arising out of the injuries exceeded that sum.

The case was tried to a jury. In the course of the trial the plaintiff excepted to the exclusion of the following question, propounded to his wife: "Now what is the fair value of a registered nurse's services for twelve hours' duty?" He also excepted to the denial of his request for an instruction that the "Fair value of nursing care rendered to the plaintiff by the plaintiff's wife is a proper element of damage to be considered by the jury."

In support of his contention that he may recover for such an element of damages, the plaintiff relies, in part, on the case of Copithorne v. Hardy, 173 Mass. 400 , in which it was held that the mother of the plaintiff was properly allowed to testify what was a fair charge for services rendered by her to her adult daughter in consequence of the injuries involved; he also cites cases where recovery has been allowed for impairment of earning capacity, although the injured person's pay has been continued by his employer as a gratuity or as compensation for disability; and he relies upon cases in other jurisdictions in which a plaintiff has been permitted to recover the value of his wife's services in nursing him, the necessity for which was a result of the injuries sustained by him. See Lake Erie & Western Railroad v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 484, 485; Strand v. Grinnell Automobile Garage Co.

136 Iowa, 68, 70; Kaiser v. St. Louis Transit Co. 108 Mo.App. 708, 712; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Holman, 15 Texas Civ. App. 16, 18; Crouse v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 102 Wis. 196, 205; Beckert v. Doble, 105 Conn. 88, 91. The reasonable value of such gratuitous services by a person not the husband or wife of the plaintiff was held recoverable in the cases of Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo. 552, 554, Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 104 Ind. 239, 244, Brosnan v. Sweetser, 127 Ind. 1, 8, 9, and Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa, 698, 699. The reasoning upon which, in the cases just cited, it was held that a plaintiff could recover the reasonable value of such services rendered by his wife, or for the value of such services rendered gratuitously by others, is that the gratuity is to the plaintiff and that the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of it, that he should not be allowed to profit by reason of the loving care of a wife, or that while such gratuitous service is a gift for the plaintiff's benefit, it is one of the elements of his injury and that he is entitled to the benefit of the gift. While we accord those decisions respect, for reasons hereinafter stated we do not follow them.

In Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Railway, 197 Mass. 512 , 516, it is said: "The rule of damages is a practical instrumentality for the administration of justice. The principle on which it is founded is compensation. Its object is to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of another. Recurrence to this fundamental conception tests the soundness of claims for the inclusion of new elements of damage.

" It is settled that in an action for personal injuries the reasonable value of necessary medical and surgical care and of nursing is an element of damage, but recovery may be had only if the plaintiff has paid for such service, or has incurred a liability to pay therefor, or, in the case of necessary future services, will incur such a liability. The recovery is purely compensatory. Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co. 212 Mass. 99 , 100. Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125 , 131. Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102 , 108. Cochran v. Boston, 211 Mass. 171 ,

172, 173. Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 177 Penn. St. 1, 14. Jones &amp Adams Co. v. George, 227 Ill. 64, 69. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway v. Johns, 43 Ill.App. 83, 87. This principle has been recognized in several cases where the injured person was...

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  • Daniels v. Celeste
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • 8 Mayo 1939
    ...303 Mass. 14821 N.E.2d 1DANIELSv.CELESTE.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.May 8, Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Greenhalge, Judge. Action by Alexander M. Daniels against J. Irving Celeste for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Verdict was for......

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