Daniels v. State
| Docket Number | 04-21-00471-CR |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Parties | Caleb Patrick DANIELS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Frio County, Texas Trial Court No. 18-10-00155-CRF Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Caleb Patrick Daniels challenges his murder conviction. We affirm the judgment.
On July 14, 2018, Caleb and his father, Dennis Eldon Daniels, met in Frio County for a previously planned afternoon of target practice. During that outing, Caleb shot and killed Dennis. Caleb contended he acted in self-defense. After considering the evidence, the jury found Caleb guilty of murder and assessed punishment of fifty years' incarceration. The trial court signed a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict. Caleb now appeals.
Caleb argues the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) admitting three of the State's trial exhibits; (2) denying his objection to hypotheticals the State presented during its voir dire of the jury panel; and (3) denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with law enforcement.
In his first three issues, Caleb challenges the trial court's admission of State's Exhibits 38, 32, and 37A-R. We review the trial court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if its decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
In his first issue, Caleb challenges the admission of State's Exhibit 38, which consisted of an e-mail and attachments to the e-mail that Caleb sent to one of his friends before the shooting. The e-mail included the usernames and passwords for Caleb's social media accounts, as well as a message he wanted to be posted to his Facebook page in the event of his death. That message stated, "[I]f you're reading this, I am gone" and noted that the people reading it would likely be "shocked or surprised." It then explained that he believed his July 14, 2018 meeting with Dennis "could be the last thing I ever do" but was necessary "to end an ever-reaching cause of pain and fear for so many people." The message opined that "the Daniels family was, is, and will never be even close to okay," requested "space" for Caleb's mother, and stated that Caleb would "finally be at peace after living a life of running from unspeakable trauma."
The attachments contained similar, but shorter, messages that Caleb wanted his friend to disseminate through Snapchat and Instagram. The messages in the attachments did not mention Caleb's family or his July 14, 2018 meeting with Dennis. However, like the draft Facebook message in the e-mail, the messages in the attachments: stated that if they had been posted to Caleb's accounts, then he had died; recognized his death would shock the reader; and expressed that he was "at peace." The attachments did not contain any information that was substantively different from the message in the e-mail.
It is undisputed that the State timely disclosed the e-mail to Caleb. It is similarly undisputed that the State itself did not receive the attachments until September 8, 2021 approximately three weeks before trial. The State then disclosed the attachments to Caleb on September 20, 2021, seven days before trial began.
Caleb argues the attachments were not timely disclosed to him and their admission therefore violated both the due process requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Texas's statutory disclosure requirements under article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14. He also argues that both the e-mail and the attachments contained inadmissible hearsay.
Under Brady, "the State has a constitutional duty to disclose to a defendant material, exculpatory evidence." Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. "[A] Brady claim requires that the defendant show by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence was withheld, that it was favorable to the defense, and that the evidence was material." Keeter v. State, 175 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "When favorable evidence is not concealed but disclosed untimely, a defendant bears the burden to show that the delay resulted in prejudice"-i.e., that "the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed earlier." Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd).
Caleb has never argued that the attachments were favorable to his defense; to the contrary, at trial he described the attachments as evidence that fell under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). See Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at 760; see also Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Nor has he argued that the result of his trial would have been different if the State had disclosed the attachments earlier. See Kulow, 524 S.W.3d at 388. On this record, Caleb has not established a Brady violation. See Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at 760.
Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in part:
[A]s soon as practicable after receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce and permit the inspection and the electronic duplication, copying, and photographing, by or on behalf of the defendant, of any offense reports, any designated documents, papers, written or recorded statements of the defendant or a witness, including witness statements of law enforcement officers but not including the work product of counsel for the state in the case and their investigators and their notes or report, or any designated books, accounts, letters, photographs, or objects or other tangible things not otherwise privileged that constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(a). The State's statutory obligation to disclose evidence under article 39.14 "is much broader" than the constitutional obligations imposed by Brady. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 702 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2018, pet. ref'd).
We will assume, without deciding, that the disclosure of the attachments one week before trial violated article 39.14. Statutory violations are non-constitutional error subject to a harm analysis. See Gray v. State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 97-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Consequently, Caleb is not entitled to a reversal of the judgment unless the admission of the attachments affected his substantial rights. See Sopko v. State, 637 S.W.3d 252, 256-57 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). "A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
As explained above, the timely disclosed e-mail and the challenged attachments contained essentially the same information. We therefore cannot say the trial court's admission of the attachments had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Id. at 271.
Caleb also argues that the e-mail and the attachments contained inadmissible hearsay. It is undisputed, however, that he authored both the e-mail and the attachments. When a party's own statements are offered against him, those "statements are not hearsay and they are admissible on the logic that a party is estopped from challenging the fundamental reliability or trustworthiness of his own statements." Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(A). Because the e-mail and attachments were Caleb's own statements, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling his hearsay objection to those exhibits. See Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853.
We overrule Caleb's first issue.
In his second issue, Caleb challenges the admission of State's Exhibit 32, which was one of nineteen postmortem photographs of Dennis's body that were admitted at trial.
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 permits a trial court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]" Tex. R. Evid. 403. In the trial court, Caleb argued State's Exhibit 32 should be excluded because "the cumulative nature of [the] photos is extremely and unfairly prejudicial." On appeal, he argues State's Exhibit 32 was unfairly prejudicial because it was "gruesome," "graphic," and "inflammatory." Because both Caleb's trial objection and his appellate complaint assert that the probative value of State's Exhibit 32 was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we will assume for the purposes of this opinion that Caleb preserved this issue for our review. See id.; see also Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at 760 ().
"The admissibility of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If verbal testimony about the matter depicted in the photograph is admissible, the photograph itself will generally also be admissible. Id. ...
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