Daniels v. State
| Decision Date | 04 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-1279 |
| Parties | Antonio Xavier Daniels, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Antonio Daniels, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Antonio Xavier Daniels appeals from the district court's denial of his second petition for postconviction relief, arguing that: (1) the district court erroneously concluded that his claims were procedurally barred and time-barred; and (2) his counsel for his first petition for postconviction relief was ineffective. Based on the merits of Daniels's claims, the record supports the district court's conclusion that Daniels is not entitled to relief. However, based on our review of the record, we must reverse and remand to correct the sentencing order which shows that Daniels was improperly convicted and sentenced on two offenses when one was a lesser-included offense of the other.
On August 26, 2013, the state charged Daniels with second-degree murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2012), following a shooting death at a Days Inn parking lot in Brooklyn Center. The matter proceeded to a ten-day jury trial. The jury found Daniels not guilty of the charged offense, but it found Daniels guilty of—and the district court convicted him of—two lesser-included offenses, second-degree felony murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2012), and second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2012).
This court provided a detailed recitation of the evidence provided at Daniels's trial in his first postconviction appeal. See Daniels v. State, No. A17-0623, 2018 WL 817286, at *1-3 (Minn. App. Feb. 12, 2018), review denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018) (Daniels II). The key facts relevant to this appeal are that the district court instructed the jury, in addition to the charged offense, on two lesser-included offenses: second-degree manslaughter which was requested by Daniels, and second-degree felony murder as requested by the state. Id. at *3. The district court also instructed the jury on self-defense based on the standard instruction for self-defense - justifiable taking of life, which was requested by Daniels. Id.The jury found Daniels not guilty of the second-degree murder charge and guilty of the second-degree felony murder and second-degree manslaughter charges. Id.
On June 30, 2015, the district court sentenced Daniels for second-degree felony murder to a 180-month prison sentence with 676 days of credit and entered a conviction on the second-degree manslaughter charge, noting "[s]entence combined with" the other count. Daniels filed a timely direct appeal from his conviction. On November 6, 2015, Daniels voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. See State v. Daniels, No. A15-1573 (Minn. App. Nov. 9, 2015) (order) (Daniels I).
In 2016, Daniels, with the assistance of counsel, filed for postconviction relief before the district court. The district court denied Daniels's petition on the merits. Daniels appealed to this court with the assistance of his counsel from the postconviction hearing. See Daniels II, 2018 WL 817286, at *3. On appeal, this court considered: (1) whether the state violated Daniels's right to a speedy trial, id. at *3-5; (2) whether Daniels received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, id. at *5-7; (3) whether the prosecutor at trial committed prosecutorial misconduct, id. at *7-9; (4) whether the jury's verdict was inconsistent, id. at *8-9; and (5) whether the state presented sufficient evidence to convict Daniels, id. at *9-11. We affirmed. Id. at *1. The supreme court denied Daniels's petition for further review. See Daniels v. State, No. A17-0623 (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018) (order).
On April 26, 2019, Daniels filed a motion in the district court "[t]o suspend the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure" to "fix an inadequate and ineffective appeal issue that was not properly addressed by this Court with post-conviction appeal and is permissible under this Court's inherent authority as described in Powell v. Anderson,660 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2003)." Specifically, Daniels's motion requested relief because (1) the appellate courts failed to follow precedent in addressing his appeal, (2) his "trial assistance and appellate counsel [made] errors," (3) his due process rights were violated by using an improper self-defense instruction, and (4) his case should have been resolved under State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. App. 2017). The district court construed Daniels's motion as a postconviction petition and found Daniels's postconviction petition barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), and time-barred from relief. This appeal follows.
Appellate courts "review a postconviction court's summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion." See Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Daniels asks us to reverse the district court and remand for a new trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel at his first postconviction hearing did not raise two specific challenges to his trial counsel's actions. The state agrees that this case should be addressed on the merits, although the district court dismissed Daniels's postconviction petition as procedurally barred and time-barred. We have considered the record and conclude that we can affirm the district court after consideringthe merits of Daniels's claim. See Hummel v. State, 617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 2000) ().
Pursuant to the Minnesota Constitution, a defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel for "one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding." Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2006). A party may present a proper "claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel that is based on counsel's alleged failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim" by "first establish[ing] that trial counsel was ineffective." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017). "Trial counsel is ineffective if her representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id.
Daniels asserts that his postconviction counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the district court's jury instructions. First, he argues that his counsel should have challenged the district court's decision to provide a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree felony murder to the jury. Second, he claims that his counsel should have challenged the district court's incorrect self-defense instruction provided to the jury.
Daniels argues that his postconviction counsel was ineffective by failing to assert an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on his trial counsel permitting the district court to instruct the jury on second-degree felony murder. Daniels's claim lacks merit both factually and legally. To present a proper ineffective-assistance-of-counselclaim, "[t]he defendant must affirmatively prove that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted).
First, Daniels's trial counsel did object to the lesser-included instruction requested by the state. Specifically, Daniels's trial attorney asserted that the state did not elicit testimony that Daniels "was intentionally committing any felony, whether that be an assault or any other felony." Daniels's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object is belied by the record, which reveals that counsel did object. Daniels accordingly fails to meet the first prong for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Second, even if his counsel had not objected, and that was unreasonable representation, that would not end the analysis because Daniels would need to show that the unreasonable representation affected the verdict. Daniels's claim on appeal is not legally supported because he cannot show purported unreasonable representation affected the verdict.
"The determination of what, if any, lesser offense to submit to the jury lies within the sound discretion of the [district] court, but where the evidence warrants an instruction, the [district] court must give it." Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Minn. 1986) (citations omitted).
[W]hen evaluating whether to give a lesser-included offense instruction, trial courts must determine whether 1) the lesser offense is included in the charged offense; 2) the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of theoffense charged; and 3) the evidence provides a rational basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser-included...
To continue reading
Request your trial