State v. Knaffla
| Decision Date | 25 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 46111,46111 |
| Citation | 243 N.W.2d 737,309 Minn. 246 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Leslie KNAFFLA, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A convicted defendant is entitled to at least one state corrective process designed to afford review of a claimed violation of the United States or the Minnesota Constitutions or of state law. This review may be accomplished by either direct appeal or postconviction proceedings pursuant to Minn.St. c. 590.
2. Where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, or all claims known but not raised will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.
3. However, upon expiration of the time for direct appeal, matters not previously raised in any postconviction process may properly be considered by the court upon a petition for postconviction relief.
4. Upon the instant petition, the postconviction court's conclusion that the defendant had been denied a fair trial in the manner of the presentation of certain evidence to the jury is sufficient to warrant the granting of postconviction relief.
John D. Furuseth, International Falls, for appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Asst. Sol. Gen., Kent G. Harbison and Craig H. Forsman, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, and Helen Hill Blanz, County Atty., Grand Rapids, for respondent.
Heard before PETERSON, TODD and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
This is an appeal from an order of the Itasca County District Court denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief. On June 7, 1974, appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime of simple robbery. He was sentenced on July 1, 1974, to an indeterminate term at the State Prison. On January 7, 1975, after the time for taking a direct appeal had expired, 1 he petitioned for postconviction relief. Although the postconviction court concluded that appellant had been denied a fair trial, the petition was denied due to appellant's failure to seek direct review of the conviction. 2 The sole issue presented is whether postconviction relief 3 should have been granted. We reverse.
On December 1, 1973, appellant and his two nephews, Noel Friend and Ricky Knaffla, began to drive from Finland, Minnesota, to Effie, Minnesota, to retrieve a motor belonging to Friend. While they were traveling west on Highway No. 1, a hitchhiker, Merlyn E. Mattson, known to appellant, was offered a ride. The group continued toward Effie, consuming beer and liquor over a period of several hours.
Throughout the course of the trip, Mattson harassed Ricky Knaffla regarding the length of his hair, threatening to cut it with his knife. As the party approached the intersection of Highway No. 6 and County Road No. 14, the automobile was stopped. As a result of Mattson's continued derogation and threats to Ricky Knaffla, appellant struck Mattson several times in the face, knocking him to the ground. Appellant then proceeded to kick him several times. Noel Friend stripped Mattson of his boots, trousers, and underclothing. Mattson's wallet containing $40 and the clothing were later found strewn nearby. Appellant and his nephews drove away, leaving Mattson lying in the road. Mattson died shortly after December 1, 1973, from causes unrelated to this incident.
Upon the petition for relief, the postconviction court considered the events of the trial. Included was the attempt by the state to impeach its witness, Noel Friend, through the use of a prior inconsistent statement. The statement, contained in a transcript of a taped interview between Friend and Itasca County Deputy Sheriff Wendal Gilbert conducted on December 10, 1973, and later signed and verified by Friend, read as follows:
'So we got outside there and Les (appellant) hauled off and hit him, started kicking on him, and I stopped him from that, and then he said to take his money from him.'
At the trial, Friend repudiated this portion of the interview relating to the alleged robbery. Since the state claimed surprise at the denial in order to impeach the witness through the use of the prior inconsistent statement, evidence was introduced that one day prior to trial, in a conversation with the county attorney, the witness had denied stating that he had 'seen him take that money.' Although the state acknowledged the occurrence of this denial prior to trial, it was, upon proper foundation, permitted to impeach Friend by means of the prior inconsistent statement set forth above and disclaimed at the trial.
The trial court then directed the witness to leave the witness stand, position himself before the jury box, and read loudly that portion of the written statement which he had denied. After this reading, since the noise of the air conditioner had apparently made it difficult to hear the statements of several prior witnesses, the court inquired whether all the jury members had been able to hear the statement. 4
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to return one of six verdicts: a finding of guilty of one of three degrees of assault; a finding of guilty of one of two degrees of robbery; or acquittal. The trial court also instructed the jury as to the elements of robbery, and, in particular, as to 'taking,' as follows:
The postconviction court concluded that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in its treatment of the prior inconsistent statement of the witness Friend, and in its instruction relative to the element of 'taking' required to establish the crime of robbery. The court found that the manner of presentation of the statement overemphasized evidence which, if at all admissible, is only admissible for a limited purpose.
It is well established that proper impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements. Zuber v. N.P. Ry. Co., 246 Minn. 157, 74 N.W.2d 641 (1956). However, the use of such evidence to impeach one's own witness requires that counsel establish surprise at the witness' statement contradicting his former statement. State v. Armstrong, 257 Minn. 295, 101 N.W.2d 398 (1960). In the instant appeal, some question is raised as to the state's claim of surprise in light of the witness' denial to the county attorney on the previous day. As this is a preliminary determination to be made by the trial court, we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Guy, 259 Minn. 67, 105 N.W.2d 892 (1960).
Upon review, the postconviction court concluded that there existed a sufficient basis for the state to claim a lack of actual knowledge that Friend would deny that defendant had said to take Mattson's money, rather than to claim surprise. The court stated, however, that although the mere admission of this evidence was not so prejudicial as to deny appellant a fair trial, the manner of its presentation to the jury was sufficiently prejudicial to have that effect.
The state contends that the trial court required that particular presentation to assure the jury's complete review of all evidence in light of the distraction created by the faulty air conditioner. It asserts that even if the manner of presentation was prejudicial, this did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence to test the credibility of the witness. In support of this conclusion, the state emphasizes the court's instruction that the statement was to be considered 'only for the purpose of testing the believability and weight of that witness's testimony, and for no other purpose.'
Clearly placed at issue is whether the trial court's action with regard to the prior inconsistent statement was sufficiently prejudicial to require postconviction relief pursuant to Minn.St. c. 590. Resolution of this focal question depends on whether the postconviction court correctly determined that,...
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...to the Magna Carta). The postconviction statute was passed, in part, to replace these common law writs. See State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251–52, 243 N.W.2d 737, 740–41 (1976). Indeed, Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, states that the remedy provided by the postconviction act “takes the plac......
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...§ 590.01, subd. 4 (a); and (3) the juror misconduct and the cumulative error claims are procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976). We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abu......
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...a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief.'" Zenanko v. State, 587 N.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Minn.1998), quoting State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). If the petitioner has failed to exhaust his State Court remedies, and if the Court to which he should have presented......
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