Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | E054472 |
| Citation | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 273,212 Cal.App.4th 674 |
| Parties | Norma DANIELS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John W. Vineyard, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. (Super.Ct.No.RIC10024652)
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, San Diego, Bryan R. Reid, San Bernardino, Brittany H. Bartold, and Lisa W. Cooney, San Diego for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Michael F. Moran, Michael F. Moran, Tustin, and Alex H. Feldman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KING J.
Plaintiff Norma Daniels sued Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. and other defendants,1 the owners and operators of a residential care facility for the elderly (RCFE) 2 known as Sunrise of Hemet (Sunrise), for elder abuse and related claims (the survivor claims) as the successor in interest of her late mother, Margaret Barcenas. ( Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.20, 377.31.) 3 Daniels alleged that Barcenas, who was elderly and suffered from “dementia with psychosis,” died as a result of receiving inadequate care at Sunrise. In her personal capacity, Daniels alleged an additional cause of action against defendants for the wrongful death of Barcenas. (§ 377.60.)
Defendants petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration of all of the claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in a “residency agreement” Daniels entered into with Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. as Barcenas's attorney in fact, but not in her personal capacity. Under the arbitration clause, all claims related to the care Barcenas received at Sunrise are subject to binding arbitration, and the clause is binding on Barcenas's heirs and representatives. The court denied the petition and refused to order any of the claims to arbitration on the grounds Daniels was a third party to the agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate her wrongful death claim, and there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of fact and law if the survivor claims were arbitrated but the wrongful death claim was not. (§ 1281.2, subd. (c) (herein § 1281.2(c)).) Defendants appeal. (§ 1294, subd. (a).)
We find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the order refusing to compel arbitration of any of the claims. We disagree that Daniels should have been compelled to arbitrate her personal wrongful death claim along with the survivor claims pursuant to the rationale articulated in Herbert v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 718, 215 Cal.Rptr. 477 ( Herbert ) and Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 263, 237 P.3d 584 ( Ruiz ) []. As we explain, Herbert and Ruiz have no bearing on third party wrongful death claims outside the context of section 1295. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common questions of law and fact if the survivor claims but not the wrongful death claim were ordered to arbitration. (§ 1281.2(c).)
At the age of 92 in December 2009, Barcenas became a resident of Sunrise with a diagnosis of “dementia with psychosis.” She was assigned to a “non-ambulatory” suite and enrolled in a program designed for residents with dementia. Her individualized service plan required Sunrise to assess her for skin breakdown and notify a health care consultant if skin tears or redness were noted. Sunrise staff was also responsible for washing Barcenas's lower legs, feet, and bottom.
While living at Sunrise during early 2010, Barcenas developed pressure sores on both of her heels and ankles, and her health deteriorated. The pressure sores went unnoticed and untreated until April 2010, when Daniels brought them to the attention of Sunrise staff. In May 2010, Barcenas was taken to a hospital emergency room where tests revealed she had septic shock, pneumonia, dehydration, and a staph infection. She was hospitalized for two months, and was transferred to a skilled nursing facility in July 2010. She never fully recovered from her injuries and died at the skilled nursing facility in February 2011 at the age of 93.
Daniels filed suit against defendants in her representative capacity as Barcenas's successor in interest (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.11, 377.20), alleging claims for elder abuse in violation of the Elder and Dependent Care Adult Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15600 et seq.), negligence, breach of contract, and willful misconduct (the survivor claims). In her personal capacity as Barcenas's heir, Daniels alleged an additional cause of action for the wrongful death of Barcenas. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (a).)
Upon Barcenas's admission to Sunrise, Daniels signed a residency agreement with defendant Sunrise Senior Living Services, Inc. as Barcenas's attorney in fact, pursuant to a durable general power of attorney and a durable power of attorney for health care. The residency agreement includes an arbitration clause (the arbitration clause), which states that: 4
Daniels refused defendants' request to submit the survivor and wrongful death claims to arbitration. (§ 1281.2(c).) Defendants then petitioned the trial court to compel Daniels to arbitrate all of the claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the residency agreement. Defendants argued that by signing the agreement, Daniels effectively agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of Barcenas's residency at Sunrise, including her personal wrongful death claim.
As indicated, the trial court refused to order any of the claims to arbitration. The court concluded that Daniel's wrongful death claim was not arbitrable because she did not sign the residency agreement in her personal capacity and was therefore a third party to the agreement. (§ 1281.2(c).) The court also determined that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common questions of law and fact if the survivor claims were ordered to arbitration but the wrongful death claim was not. ( Ibid.) This appeal followed. (§ 1294, subd. (a).)
Defendants claim the trial court erroneously determined that Daniels could not be compelled to arbitrate her wrongful death claim because she is a third party to the residency agreement and its arbitration clause. (§ 1281.2(c).) They also claim the court abused its discretion in concluding there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common questions of law and fact if the survivor claims but not the wrongful death claim were ordered to arbitration. ( Ibid.) We find no merit in these claims.
Under section 1281.2(c), a court may stay or refuse to compel arbitration of all or part of an arbitrable controversy when: (1) “[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action ... with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions,” and (2) “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (§ 1281.2(c).) 5 For purpose of the statute, a third party is one who is neither bound by nor entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement. ( Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 612, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 114.) Section 1281.2(c) “ ‘addresses the peculiar situation that arises when a controversy also affects claims by or against other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.’ ” ( Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 393, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 540, 107 P.3d 217.)
Whether an arbitration agreement is binding on a third party (e.g., a nonsignatory) is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1512, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 585.) But the ultimate determination whether to stay or deny arbitration based on the possibility of conflicting rulings on common questions of law or fact is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1406, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 ( Laswell). ) “The court's discretion under section 1281.2, subdivision (c) does not come into play until it is ascertained that the subdivision applies, which requires the threshold determination of whether there are nonarbitrable claims against at least one of the parties to the litigation (e.g., a nonsignatory).” (Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1288, fn. 6, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 787; Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 709, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 876.)
Daniels's wrongful death claim is personal to her and lies independent of the survivor claims. ...
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