Danielson v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 02 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 14595-9-I,14595-9-I
• Citation: 724 P.2d 1115,45 Wn.App. 235
• Parties: Craig R. DANIELSON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation; and the Public Safety Civil Service Commission of the City of Seattle, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 235

45 Wn.App. 235

724 P.2d 1115

Craig R. DANIELSON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation; and the Public Safety Civil Service Commission of the City of Seattle, Respondents.

No. 14595-9-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

Sept. 2, 1986.

John P. Harris, Kennedy, Schuck, Harris & Miller, P.S., Seattle, for Craig R. Danielson.

Rodney Eng, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for City of Seattle.

UTTER, Judge. ^*

Craig R. Danielson and the City of Seattle appeal from the trial court's ruling that the Seattle Police Department discharged Danielson without procedural due process. We conclude that the police department afforded Danielson adequate due process, and reverse the trial court's award of backpay and benefits.

Danielson joined the Seattle Police Department in 1971. From 1978 through 1980 he received psychiatric treatment for depression. His first marriage broke up during that period. In 1981 Danielson's psychiatric problems began to recur in conjunction with financial problems.

While on duty on March 15, 1982, Danielson obtained a bank card from an itinerant "street person". While still on duty and in uniform Danielson used the card to make four withdrawals from two bank card machines. He obtained a total of $225.00, spent it, and then destroyed the card.

On April 12, 1982, a bank official contacted the Seattle Police Department about the withdrawals. The bank provided the Department with four photographs taken automatically by the cash machine that showed a man in a police uniform withdrawing money. On the same day the police department's Internal Investigations Section (IIS) began an investigation into the incident.

On April 15, 1982, two IIS officers interviewed Danielson about the theft. The officers explained the charges that they were investigating and that criminal charges might be filed. The officers also gave Danielson his Miranda rights and described the evidence supporting the charges. The officers asked Danielson if he would like to make a statement. After being told of the evidence available, Danielson admitted withdrawing the money and described the events surrounding the withdrawals. He further explained that he had been overextended financially because of high mortgage payments and child support responsibilities.

On April 16, 1982, the Department suspended Danielson for 30 days without pay pending completion of the IIS investigation. On April 19 the Department forwarded the case to the King County Prosecutor. Initially the prosecutor's office intended to allow Danielson to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. When the office learned that Danielson had been caught shoplifting on May 12, 1982, however, it filed felony charges in superior court.

On May 7, the police chief dismissed Danielson for six violations of Seattle Police Manual provisions. ¹ All of the violations alleged stemmed from the bank card incidents but not from the filing of felony charges. On June 11, 1982, Danielson received a formal disciplinary board hearing before a board of police officers. At the hearing Danielson's attorney argued that Danielson's situation should be treated as a medical, not a disciplinary, problem. He also argued that Danielson was suffering from diminished mental capacity when he used the bank card. Danielson presented two psychiatrists as witnesses whose testimony generally supported his arguments. The board rejected Danielson's defense and unanimously affirmed his dismissal.

Danielson appealed his discharge to the Public Safety Civil Service Commission. The sole object of a Commission hearing is to determine whether a discharge is for good cause. RCW 41.12.090. At a hearing on July 14, 1982, Danielson again presented evidence of diminished mental capacity. The Commission unanimously upheld Danielson's discharge.

On June 21, 1982, Danielson pleaded guilty to the felony charge. On August 20, 1982, he was given a 3-year deferred sentence. His probation was concluded on January 27, 1984. At that time the court allowed Danielson to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, dismissed the charge against him, and ordered that Danielson be discharged from all penalties and disabilities caused by the filing of the charge.

Meanwhile Danielson challenged the Commission's ruling by writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of King County. At hearings in June, 1983, Danielson argued that the Seattle Police Department had unconstitutionally failed to give him a pretermination hearing. Judge Kraft reviewed the proceedings of the Commission as well as additional evidence submitted by the parties. The trial court agreed with Danielson and awarded him back pay and benefits for the period between his discharge and August 20, 1982, the date of his sentencing. The court refused, however, to order Danielson's reinstatement. The court repeated this refusal in July 1983, in response to Danielson's motion for reconsideration, and again in March 1984, in response to Danielson's motion for a new trial in light of the dismissal of his charges.

Before this court Danielson appeals the court's refusal to order his reinstatement. The City appeals the court's interpretation of the Seattle Police Manual and collective bargaining agreement, its conclusion that Danielson's discharge violated procedural due process requirements, and its award of back pay and benefits to Danielson.

A. Trial Court's Findings of Fact

The first issue is whether this court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact. The trial court reviewed this case pursuant to a writ of certiorari. Afterwards the court issued several findings of fact and conclusions of law. Danielson argues that the City must lose certain arguments on appeal for failing to assign error to key findings of fact. The City argues that this court's review of the record is de novo, and that this court is not bound by the Superior Court's findings of fact.

A Court of Appeals is not bound by a superior court's findings of fact when an administrative agency has conducted all of the evidentiary hearings. In such a situation the administrative agency is the exclusive factfinding body. King Cy. Water Dist. 54 v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wash.2d 536, 543-44, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976). In addition, a court of appeals is not bound by a superior court's findings of fact that are based on documentary, nontestimonial evidence. In such a situation the Court of Appeals is as competent as the Superior Court to weigh and consider the evidence. In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wash.2d 623, 654, 479 P.2d 1 (1970).

In this case the trial court did not receive any testimony from witnesses. The court based its findings of fact on a transcript of the Commission's hearing and on additional affidavits and documentary evidence. This court is as competent as the Superior Court to evaluate the evidence that supports the findings of fact, and this court is not bound by those findings.

B. Interpretation of Police Manual and Collective Bargaining Agreement

The trial court interpreted the Seattle Police Manual to provide officers charged with a felony a right to a pretermination hearing. The court found that the police chief violated both the manual and the Seattle Police Guild collective bargaining agreement when he discharged Danielson without a pretermination hearing. The court also ruled that both the manual and the collective bargaining agreement provide officers a right to a pretermination hearing that cannot be abrogated by the police chief at his discretion. The City challenges each conclusion.

The Seattle Police Manual provides that when the Internal Investigations Section concludes that complaints about an officer should be "sustained", the officer will be notified and Except in those cases where felony charges will be requested, the accused has 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays, from the time of notification in which to waive or exercise his right to a disciplinary hearing.

(Italics ours.) Seattle Police Manual 1.09.040-4(c)(3)(a), Supplemental Clerk's Papers, at 7. ² The manual does not specify the rights of an accused when felony charges will be requested. The City argues that when felony charges will be requested an accused officer has no substantive right to a pretermination hearing, and therefore no procedural right to request a hearing within 48 hours. Danielson argues--and the trial court ruled--that an accused officer has a substantive right to a pretermination hearing that is not affected by this procedural provision. The trial court concluded that in such situations an accused officer has a "reasonable" time--but more than 48 hours--to request a disciplinary hearing.

Neither the manual nor the collective bargaining agreement appears to contemplate that a right to a pretermination hearing will exist in every case. In the manual, for example, the first sentence of provision 1.09.040-4(c)(3)(a) provides that the accused will be notified "of his right to a disciplinary hearing if such exists " (italics ours). Supplemental Clerks Papers, at 7. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement expressly provides the police chief discretion to deny an accused the right to a pretermination hearing "if deemed appropriate by the Chief". Agreement By and Between City of Seattle and Seattle Police Officers' Guild (1982), Appendix A. Respondents' Exhibit 1. ³ The role of a court asked to construe a contract is to give effect to the recorded intent of the parties; a court cannot "create a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves, nor can the court impose obligations which never before existed." Farmers Ins. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9 (1976). In this case the trial court ignored and essentially rewrote both the manual and the collective bargaining agreement when it concluded that the police chief must allow every individual accused of a felony a "reasonable time" to request a pretermination hearing.

Moreove...