Danielson v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 17 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 53229-0,53229-0
• Citation: 108 Wn.2d 788,742 P.2d 717
• Parties: Craig R. DANIELSON, Petitioner, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 788

108 Wn.2d 788

742 P.2d 717

Craig R. DANIELSON, Petitioner, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

No. 53229-0.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Sept. 17, 1987.

Kennedy, Schuck, Harris & Miller, P.S., John P. Harris, Seattle, for petitioner.

Douglas Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Rodney S. Eng, Asst. Seattle City Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

Under the facts of this case, is a Seattle police officer entitled to a pretermination hearing where felony charges are filed against that officer for the incidents leading to his dismissal? The superior court answered yes. The Court of Appeals reversed. Danielson v. Seattle, 45 Wash.App. 235, 724 P.2d 1115 (1986). We affirm the Court of Appeals.

This case involves interpretation of the Seattle Police Department Manual and the Seattle Police Officers' Guild collective bargaining agreement, and application of federal due process. Petitioner also argues for reinstatement after his discharge from his probation sentence for his felony conviction.

On March 15, 1982, Seattle police officer Danielson, while on duty, obtained a bank card from an itinerant "street person", used the card to make four cash withdrawals, spent the money, and destroyed the card. On April 12, 1982, a bank official contacted the Police Department about certain withdrawals made with a bank card reported missing by a customer in 1981. The bank official gave the Department four photographs taken automatically during the withdrawals showing a uniformed Seattle police officer, Danielson, withdrawing money. The Department's Internal Investigations Section (IIS) began an investigation into the incident.

On April 15, 1982, two IIS officers interviewed Danielson about the theft. The officers gave Danielson his Miranda warnings, explained the allegations they were investigating, and described the evidence supporting them. The officers also told Danielson that criminal charges might be filed. The officers then asked Danielson if he desired to make a statement regarding the allegations. In response, Danielson admitted withdrawing the money and described the circumstances of the incident. Danielson explained that he had been overextended financially because of high mortgage payments and child support obligations. Pending completion of the IIS investigation, the Department suspended Danielson for 30 days without pay.

On April 19, 1982, the Department forwarded Danielson's case to the King County prosecutor. The prosecutor agreed to file an "expedited felony charge" based on the bank card incident, with the understanding that Danielson would be allowed to plead guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges in Seattle District Court and receive a 1-year deferred sentence. The charge was filed April 28, 1982.

On May 7, 1982, the police chief dismissed Danielson for seven violations of provisions of the Seattle Police Department Manual, all occurring during the bank card incident. Danielson received notice of his dismissal by mail on May 12, 1982. That same day, Danielson was caught shoplifting. The shoplifting incident prompted the prosecutor to refile the original bank card charge as a felony in King County Superior Court. On June 10, 1982, Danielson pleaded guilty to the charge and received a 3-year deferred sentence with probation for second degree possession of stolen property. ¹

On June 11, 1982 the Department held a formal disciplinary hearing on Danielson's dismissal. At the hearing Danielson argued that he had suffered from diminished capacity during the bank card incident. Two psychiatrists testified on Danielson's behalf. The hearing board rejected Danielson's defense and affirmed his dismissal. Danielson appealed to the Public Safety Civil Service Commission (Commission), which unanimously upheld his dismissal. Danielson challenged the Commission's ruling by writ of certiorari to the superior court. The superior court reversed the Commission's ruling, reasoning that Danielson should have been afforded a full evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal. The court awarded Danielson back pay and benefits, but refused to order his reinstatement.

Danielson appealed the court's refusal to reinstate him. Respondent City of Seattle, cross-appealed the court's judgment that Danielson had been wrongfully dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, holding that Danielson was not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal, and that the Department's procedures did not violate his due process rights. See Danielson v. Seattle, at 247, 724 P.2d 1115. We granted discretionary review.

I

Initially, Danielson contends that the Seattle Police Department Manual (Manual) and the Seattle Police Officers' Guild Agreement (Guild Agreement) provide for pretermination hearings in cases involving officers charged with felonies. We disagree.

Pursuant to article 5, section 4 of the Seattle City Charter, the Police Department promulgated its "Manual of Rules and Procedures". The Manual, by its own provisions, is a "Department Policy and Procedure." Manual §§ 1.0-4.0. The Seattle Municipal Code defines a "policy and procedure" as describing internal department policies, procedures, responsibilities and instructions. Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 3.96.010. Statements concerning an agency's internal management do not rise to the level of administrative rules. SMC 3.02.020(E)(4).

Pursuant to the Manual, when IIS concludes that complaints against a police officer should be "sustained", the officer shall be notified and:

Except in those cases where felony charges will be requested, the accused has 48 hours ... in which to waive or exercise his right to a disciplinary hearing.

(Italics ours.) Manual § 1.09.040(4)(c)(3)(a). Here, the superior court, relying on Punton v. Seattle Pub. Safety Comm'n, 32 Wash.App. 959, 650 P.2d 1138 (1982), concluded that Danielson was entitled by the Manual to a pretermination hearing.

In Punton, the court concluded that the language in the Manual granting an accused officer 48 hours to exercise "his right to a disciplinary hearing" amounted to an express declaration that a right to a hearing exists. Punton, at 966, 650 P.2d 1138. However, the officer involved in Punton had not been charged with any felony, and the court did not consider the Manual language "[e]xcept in those cases where felony charges will be requested, the accused has 48 hours ... to waive or exercise his right to a disciplinary hearing." See Manual § 1.09.040(4)(c)(3)(a). Thus, Punton is not controlling here where felony charges were filed against Danielson for the incidents leading to his discipline.

Moreover, the Seattle police chief, charged with enforcement of the Manual, has interpreted it as not providing a right to a hearing prior to discipline where felony charges will be, or have been, filed. Clerk's Papers, at 360-62. This interpretation is consistent with the Department's and the drafters' interpretation of the Manual. Clerk's Papers, at 230-46, 360, 366. The construction placed on a provision by the agency promulgating it is entitled to great weight. Yakima v. Yakima Police & Fire Civil Serv. Comm'n, 29 Wash.App. 756, 765, 631 P.2d 400 (1981); State Liquor Control Bd. v. State Personnel Bd., 88 Wash.2d 368, 379, 561 P.2d 195 (1977). We conclude that the Manual does not entitle an officer to a pretermination hearing where felony charges are to be filed against that officer. See McConnell v. Seattle, 44 Wash.App. 316, 325, 722 P.2d 121, review denied, 107 Wash.2d 1007 (1986).

On reconsideration, the superior court also interpreted the Guild Agreement to require pretermination hearings for officers discharged for felonies. The superior court felt constrained by the Punton decision. However, the Punton court relied solely on the Manual language to reach its conclusion that pretermination hearings were required. See Punton, 32 Wash.App. at 965-66, 650 P.2d 1138. The court did not consider the Guild Agreement, which gives the police chief the discretion to implement discipline immediately. See Guild Agreement, art. 3, § 1. We note that as a Seattle city ordinance, see ordinance 109570, the Guild Agreement language controls over the Manual, which is only a statement of internal departmental policy not having the force of an administrative rule. See Green River Comm'ty College v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 95 Wash.2d 108, 112, 622 P.2d 826 (1980), modified on other grounds, 95 Wash.2d 962, 963, 633 P.2d 1324 (1981).

The Guild Agreement, a collective bargaining agreement between Seattle and the Seattle Police Officers' Guild, sets forth procedures for disciplinary hearings. See Agreement By and Between City of Seattle and Seattle Police Officers' Guild, App. A (1982). The Guild Agreement specifically states "that notwithstanding the hearing procedure enumerated in Appendix 'A,' it is understood that if deemed appropriate by the Chief of the Department discipline or discharge may be implemented immediately." Guild Agreement, art. 3, § 1, at 5. The Guild Agreement is governed by established principles of contract law. See Hansen v. Seattle, 45 Wash.App. 214, 221, 724 P.2d 371, review denied, 107 Wash.2d 1004 (1986); Keeton v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 34 Wash.App. 353, 361, 661 P.2d 982 (1983). Where the intention of the parties is clear from a written contract, the courts have nothing to construe and the contract language controls. Hansen, 45 Wash.App. at 221, 724 P.2d 371. Grant Cy. Constructors v. E.V. Lane Corp., 77 Wash.2d 110, 121, 459 P.2d 947 (1969). The Court of Appeals has noted that the Guild Agreement does not require a pretermination hearing in every case. See Hansen, 45 Wash.App. at 219-20, 724 P.2d 371.

The Court of Appeals here correctly noted that the lower court essentially rewrote the clear language of the Guild Agreement to allow for a pretermination hearing. Danielson v. Seattle, supra, 45 Wash.App. at 242,...