Danson v. State

• Decision Date: 14 November 1911
• Citation: 56 So. 677,62 Fla. 29
• Parties: DANSON v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

56 So. 677

62 Fla. 29

DANSON v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

November 14, 1911

Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1911.

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; R. M. Call, Judge.

Harry Danson was convicted of murder in the second decree, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

General objections to evidence proposed, without stating the precise grounds of objection, are vague and nugatory, and are without weight before an appellate court, unless the evidence objected to is palpably prejudicial, improper, and inadmissible for any purpose or under any circumstances.

The trial court is authorized to regulate the order of the introduction of evidence, and its discretion in such a matter, either in receiving or rejecting evidence, will not be interfered with by an appellate court, unless an abuse of such discretion is clearly made to appear.

The mere fact that proffered evidence is not full and complete within itself, but forms only one link in the chain, so that it would have to be supplemented by other evidence in order to avail the party offering it, may not render such evidence incompetent or inadmissible.

Where documentary evidence has been offered by the plaintiff in a trial and admitted over the objection of the defendant, if by reason of what subsequently occurred in the trial, the defendant conceived that such documentary evidence had not been sufficiently connected by other evidence to make it admissible or that for any other reason it was incompetent or improper, the proper way to have removed it from the consideration of the jury was by a motion to strike it out.

Upon a writ of error, the respective parties litigant are presumed to have had their day in court, and to have had the points at issue between them fairly and impartially tried and determined in accordance with the law of the land. The final judgment is presumed to be correct, and this presumption must be met in the appellate court and overcome by the plaintiff in error.

Upon a writ of error the plaintiff in error becomes the actor in the appellate court, whether he occupied the position of plaintiff or defendant in the court below, and upon him rests the burden. It is incumbent upon him to show that the different rulings of the trial court of which he complains or some of them, are so infected with error as to call for and compel a reversal of the judgment. The mere fact that technical error was committed by the trial court in some of its rulings may not be sufficient. The errors must have been harmful or prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff in error.

Upon the trial of a defendant for the murder of a member of the police force of the city of J., it is not error for the court in its charge to instruct the jury generally as to the power and authority of such police force to make arrests without warrant, even though, technically speaking, the evidence may not show that an arrest was actually made. After having so charged the jury, it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to what constituted a legal arrest; there being no question before the jury as to an actual arrest by the deceased policeman, lawful or unlawful.

Evidence examined, and found sufficient to support the verdict.

COUNSEL

John E. & Julian Hartridge, for plaintiff in error.

Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

SHACKLEFORD J.

Harry Danson was indicted for murder in the first degree, tried and convicted of murder in the second degree, and seeks relief here by writ of error.

The first three assignments, which are argued together, are severally based upon the introduction in evidence, over the objection of the defendant, of section 65 of the 'Acts of incorporation of the city of Jacksonville,' as it is designated in the transcript, and of sections 351 and 354 of the ordinances of such city. These sections relate to the duties and powers of the police force, designate certain crimes, and provide for the punishment of those convicted thereof. We find that the sole grounds of objection urged against the introduction of these respective sections were that 'the same were irrelevant, and not pertinent to the issues in the case.' We have held again and again that general objections to evidence proposed, without stating the precise grounds of objection, are vague and nugatory, and are without weight before an appellate court, unless the evidence objected to is palpably prejudicial, improper, and inadmissible for any purpose or under any circumstances. See Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, 47 So. 864, and McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 So. 910. We have also repeatedly held that the trial court is authorized to regulate the order of the introduction of evidence, and its discretion in this matter will be interfered with by an appellate court only when a clear abuse thereof is made to appear. Putnal v. State, supra, and McMillan v. Reese, 61 Fla. 360, 55 So. 388. We might well declare that, applying these two principles, these assignments have not been sustained; but, in view of some of the other assignments which have to be treated and in order to make this opinion more readily understood, we will give a brief statement of what the evidence had developed at the stage of the trial when this documentary evidence was proffered. Hesekiah Hires, with whose murder the defendant stood charged, was a member of the police force of the city of Jacksonville, and was in the discharge of his duty as such at the time that he was killed. Dan Danson, the father of the defendant, was engaged in the saloon business in the city of Jacksonville, and on the night the tragedy occurred Lieut. James P. Morgan, of the police force, in passing by such saloon, about 2 o'clock, noticed that some people were in it, rapped at the door, had Dan Danson come and unlock it, and informed him that he must not have people in there so late, but must get them out. After some discussion had taken place between Danson and the officer, during which the officer informed him that he must get the people out of the saloon and close it up, else he, the officer, would 'go get the wagon and arrest all of you,' Danson agreed to do what the officer had demanded, and the officer waited there until Danson had put the people out and locked the door, when the officer passed on. Very shortly thereafter, the officer met Hires, the deceased, and informed him that he had made Danson put some negroes out of his saloon and closed it up. Hires then asked the officer if he wished him to go up there, to which he replied: 'No; no use to go down there now. I stood there and seen them all out, seen it closed up.' Charles R. Ammons had testified that he was a member of the police force, and on the night of the tragedy a man came to him in a hack and told him that he had been assaulted at Danson's saloon, and requested such policeman to go up there with him. As such saloon was on the beat of Policeman Hires, the deceased, and was about two blocks away from the beat of Policeman Ammons, he telephoned to police headquarters for instructions, and was told to go up to Danson's saloon and see about the matter, which he proceeded to do. When he reached the saloon, he found it open, and found Dan Danson and two or three others there. Upon the policemen asking Danson what the trouble was there, explaining to him that he had been telephoned from police headquarters to come there and make an investigation, Danson talked boisterously and insolently refused to give any information, also refused to let the policeman go into his saloon, and use his telephone to report the situation to police headquarters. Thereupon Ammons asked Danson to go with him to another telephone, so that he could make his report, but Danson also refused to do this, when Ammons took hold of his arm and started off with him. Prior to this he had begun to abuse Ammons, which he continued, swearing at him, calling him opprobrious names, indulging in the grossest profanity, and making threats against Ammons. Finally he began striking at Ammons, who defended himself and struck Danson on the shoulder or arm with a light summer club, which the policemen were then carrying. Just about the time Danson was making his third pass at Ammons, some one fired a shot, which struck Ammons in the head. About that time Hires, the deceased, came up and asked: 'Here, what's all this about?' Another shot followed the first in almost immediate succession, which struck and killed Hires. Ammons drew his pistol after the second shot was fired and discharged it six times, killing Dan Danson. The testimony had further developed that Dan Danson was considerably under the influence of liquor at the time, that Harry Danson, the defendant, who was the son of Dan Danson, was employed in his father's saloon, and shortly after officer Morgan had been to the saloon and ordered it closed the defendant took a pistol out of a drawer in the saloon and put it in his pocket. The testimony had further developed the fact that the defendant was standing in front of the saloon with a pistol in his hand just before the first shot was fired and at the time Ammons was talking to Dan Danson, and, finally, that the defendant fired the first two shots, the first one of which struck Ammons and the second struck and killed Hires. Much other testimony had also been introduced, the greater portion of which was of little material consequence, and threw but little light on the tragedy. We have set forth what we conceive to be the most important portions, though necessarily in a very condensed form.

At this stage of the trial, the documentary evidence was offered and admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant. Section 65 of the charter of the city of Jacksonville, the first of...