Griswold v. State
| Decision Date | 23 April 1919 |
| Citation | 82 So. 44,77 Fla. 505 |
| Parties | GRISWOLD v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, St. Lucie County; E. B. Donnell, Judge.
D. E Griswold was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses his petition for writ of habeas corpus for discharge from sheriff's custody was quashed, and he was remanded, and he brings error. Affirmed.
See also, 80 So. 575.
Syllabus by the Court
A person held in custody under a warrant, issued on an indictment which does not wholly fail to charge an offense is not entitled to his discharge from custody, although the indictment may contain defects which render it amenable to objections which could have been presented by a motion to amend or by demurrer.
Section 3319 of the General Statutes of Florida 1906, denouncing the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses, is not concerned with the motive with which the victim parts with his money or property, but the means which the offender uses to obtain it.
An indictment which charges that the defendant, by his own activities and those of his agents, won the confidence of another in the former's representation that he had established, by means of telegraph wires and a telegraph instrument, communication with a race track, and was receiving information as to the results of the races, and by such means induced the other to wage money upon the races and such representations were false, in that there were no such telegraphic communications with such race track, and that defendant exhibited packages of what he falsely said was money, which he offered to bet with the other on such races, and by such means, consisting of false tokens and false words used in connection therewith, induced the other to part with his money upon a wager that a certain horse would win in the race, which money the defendant received and retained pursuant to his original intention and design, by announcing that the telegraphic information received showed that the particular horse had lost the race, charges the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses.
One who is deprived of his liberty upon a criminal charge, and by an arbitrary order of the court is denied a speedy trial, and his cause is continued, may obtain his discharge upon habeas corpus proceedings.
In this state one charged with a criminal offense is entitled, under the Constitution, to a speedy and public trial; but the presumption does not obtain that a continuance of the case by the court upon application of the state, over the defendant's objection, is a denial of that right.
One who is in custody charged with a criminal offense, and seeks his discharge upon habeas corpus, upon the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial because the court, over his objection, continued the case upon insufficient grounds, must make such error affirmatively to appear.
When a motion by the state for a continuance of a criminal case is granted over the defendant's objection, and such order of continuance is attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding for the discharge of the defendant upon the ground that he is denied a speedy trial, the motion for continuance, and affidavits in support thereof, should be evidenced to this court by bill of exceptions.
The granting of a motion for continuance in a criminal case over the defendant's objection is no ground for the reversal of a judgment of conviction, when the order of continuance was not attacked at the time in an appropriate manner, and the record does not disclose that the defendant's rights were jeopardized at the trial by the continuance.
If an indictment in one count charges two distinct or separate offenses, the count is demurrable. If the indictment contains two counts, which are inconsistent or charge inconsistent offenses, a motion to elect upon which count the defendant shall be tried is appropriate.
An objection to the admission of evidence, because of remoteness of the fact sought to be proved, is without merit, if its admission has any logical tendency to assist the court in determining the contested issues.
A witness may testify whether a contract existed between certain parties, although he may not be permitted to testify as to the terms of the contract, if it had any existence in fact and was in writing.
The admission of evidence, which may be irrelevant because the fact sought to be proved is remote, does not per se render such admission reversible error; it must be shown that it was misleading or confusing.
Objections to evidence for irrelevancy and immateriality are too general to contain merit, and will not be considered if the evidence was admissible for any purpose, or was harmless.
Evidence examined, and found sufficient to support the verdict.
COUNSEL C. D. Abbott and S. C. Kearley, both of West Palm Beach, and Otis R. Parker, of Ft. Pierce, for plaintiff in error.
Van C. Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and C. O. Andrews, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was convicted in the circuit court for St. Lucie county of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses and seeks to have the judgment reversed.
The indictment was presented at the spring term, 1918, and upon motion of the state the case was continued for the term upon the ground that a material witness for the state was absent.
Griswold then applied by petition to the court for a writ of habeas corpus, and asked for his discharge from the custody of the sheriff upon the ground that the indictment 'wholly fails to allege or charge any offense known to or against any laws of the state of Florida'; and, second, that the granting of the state's motion for a continuance over the petitioner's objection amounted to a denial to the petitioner of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The petition and return of the sheriff each had attached to it a copy of the indictment. The case was submitted on brief, and the court entered an order quashing the writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner.
There were involved in the case on habeas corpus two questions: First, whether the indictment wholly failed to charge the defendant with any offense against the laws of Florida; and, second, whether the continuance of the case against the defendant at the spring term of the court was a denial of his right under the Constitution to a 'speedy and public trial.' Both of these questions were decided against the petitioner.
As to the first question, the indictment, in substance, charged the defendant, Griswold, with operating a bogus information booth concerning the result of certain pretended horse races and by that means obtained money from one David P. Valley, who placed a large sum of money with the defendant on a wager as to certain horse races, the results of which the defendant pretended were communicated to him by telegraph at the place or booth named in the indictment; that the money of Valley was retained by the defendant, who pretended that Valley had lost the wager on the race, when in fact the defendant had no telegraphic communication from any such horse races, and received no information concerning them, and there were no telegraphic connections between the defendant's place and any such race track or place where horse races were occurring.
In remanding the petitioner this court held that the indictment did not wholly fail to charge the defendant with an offense against the laws of Florida. If it did not wholly fail to charge an offense, then the petitioner was not entitled to be discharged from custody upon that ground, although the indictment may have been defectively drawn and amenable to objections that could have been presented by motions to amend or demurrer. Ex parte Davidson, 79 So. 727; Crooke v. Van Pelt, 79 So. 166; In re Robinson, 73 Fla. 1068, 75 So. 604, L. R. A. 1918B, 1148; Ex parte Prince, 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659, 26 Am. St. Rep. 67; Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552; Mooneyham v. Bowles, 72 Fla. 259, 72 So. 931; Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27.
The indictment in this case was very lengthy, perhaps unnecessarily so. It contained a great deal of matter that could properly be classed as inducement. It set out much of the evidence upon which the state relied to sustain the charge. It set out in detail the transactions from the meeting of Valley and Gray and Bonnell to the actual placing of the money by Valley into the hands of the defendant, and his retention of the same upon the pretense that he had received a communication from the race track that the horse upon which Valley had wagered the money had lost the race. Although the indictment may be subject to the criticism of pleading evidence rather than the ultimate facts, it did not for that reason fail to charge an offense, nor was it for that reason subject to a motion to quash. It is clear from the allegations of the indictment that the false pretenses consisted in the use of a telegraph instrument and packages of paper cut in the shape of bank notes or treasury notes, and arranged in packages with a treasury note at the top and bottom of each package so as to resemble packages of money, and falsely pretending and representing that the telegraph instrument was connected by wires with some point from which the defendant received over the said wires and by means of the instrument information as to the result of certain horse races, and that the paper cut in the shape of bank notes or treasury notes, and arranged in packages as stated, was money of the United States of equal value to that wagered by Valley.
The statute of this state dealing with the offense of obtaining property under false pretenses (section 3319, General Statutes 1906, Florida Compiled Laws 1914) is not concerned with the motive with...
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