Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 44299
| Decision Date | 15 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 44299,44299 |
| Citation | 257 Ga. 71,354 S.E.2d 828 |
| Parties | DAOPOULOS v. DAOPOULOS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Glenda L. Sullivan, Brent & Valianos, Atlanta, for James Anastos daopoulos.
Rhonda A. Brofman, Davis, Brofman, Zipperman & Kirschenbaum, Atlanta, for Karen Ann Daopoulos.
We granted the husband's application to appeal. He was held to be in arrears in payment of permanent periodic alimony to the wife awarded in their divorce decree. The trial court relied on Wiley v. Wiley, 243 Ga. 271, 253 S.E.2d 750 (1979), and held the divorce decree provided that remarriage of the wife did not terminate the obligation to pay alimony. We affirm but lay down a new rule for prospective application.
The issue before us is whether the provision in the divorce decree requiring payment of permanent periodic alimony until the children reach the age of 18 avoids application of the usual rule that obligations for permanent alimony, the time for performance of which has not arrived, terminate upon remarriage of the one to whom the obligations are owed.
The February 5, 1985 divorce decree incorporated the parties' earlier separation agreement. It required husband to pay wife a total of $300 per month child support for their two children, and $500 per month alimony for wife. It provided, "the husband shall continue said child support payments and alimony until the children reach the age of eighteen (18) years." Pro rata reduction in child support and 50 per cent reduction in alimony for wife was to occur upon the oldest child reaching 18. Wife remarried before either child reached 18. Husband stopped paying alimony to wife on account of her remarriage. She brought this contempt action. While the trial judge did not find contempt because of the lack of willfulness, husband was held to owe alimony payments which accrued since wife's remarriage. That is, it was held remarriage did not terminate alimony because the decree provided otherwise.
The statute we apply is OCGA § 19-6-5(b): "All obligations for permanent alimony, however created, the time for performance of which has not arrived, shall terminate upon remarriage of the party to whom the obligations are owed unless otherwise provided." (Emphasis supplied) A few years back this court considered the same issue we now face. Wiley, supra. There it was concluded that a decree similar to the one at hand, provided otherwise so that remarriage did not terminate the alimony obligation. We think that was a correct determination. The facts before us now are thinner. We have less to aid us in gauging whether it has been otherwise provided. But we do not distinguish Wiley. The trial court correctly applied its rationale to the language of this decree. However, because we view the rationale of Wiley as likely to miss the mark in many instances of finding the true meaning of instruments awarding permanent alimony we lay down a new rule.
Had the drafter of the agreement squarely faced the issue undoubtedly there would have been an expression clearly conveying to the reader whether remarriage would terminate the alimony obligation. It might have been provided that remarriage of wife would terminate the alimony obligation notwithstanding reference to age 18 of the...
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Findley v. Findley
...(Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978); Tolbert v. Duckworth, 262 Ga. 622, 423 S.E.2d 229 (1992); Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 257 Ga. 71, 354 S.E.2d 828 (1987)); or because prospective effect served the interests of justice when an issue of first impression not clearly foreshadowed w......
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In re Ackley, Bankruptcy No. G92-20423-REB. Adv. No. 93-2035.
...be subject to the remarriage of the Defendant. Transcript of October 2, 1992 at 12; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(b); Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 257 Ga. 71, 354 S.E.2d 828 (1987). The verdict had no such language which would seem to indicate that the jury wanted the award to be subject to remarri......
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Burrell v. Burrell
...The Georgia Supreme Court has specifically addressed the "otherwise provided" language of the statute. In Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 257 Ga. 71, 73, 354 S.E.2d 828 (1987), it held that, in order to avoid the general rule of termination of support on remarriage, the agreement must expressly ref......
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Marriage of Williams, Matter of
...Supreme Court recently adopted a clarity standard similar to the one we have had in Washington for some time. Daopoulos v. Daopoulos, 257 Ga. 71, 354 S.E.2d 828 (1987). The court Had the drafter of the agreement squarely faced the issue undoubtedly there would have been an expression clearl......