Daughtery v. State, 94-00257
| Decision Date | 28 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-00257,94-00257 |
| Citation | 654 So.2d 1209 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1046 James DAUGHTERY, Jr., a/k/a James Dawson Andrews, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joseph Hwan-Yul Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
The appellant, James Daughtery, Jr., a/k/a James Dawson Andrews, challenges the trial court's judgments and sentences. We affirm the appellant's convictions, however, one of the appellant's points on appeal regarding probation conditions merits discussion.
The appellant pled nolo contendere to sale of cocaine (count I), trafficking in cocaine (count II), aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (counts III and IV), and resisting an officer with violence (count V), in violation of sections 893.13(1), 893.135, 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (1991). The appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to concurrent terms of five and one-half years in prison for counts I, III, and IV, to be followed by nine years probation, and to five and one-half years in prison for count II, to run concurrently with the above counts, and followed by ten years probation. Count V was dismissed and this timely appeal followed.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing four conditions of probation. We agree as to three of those conditions.
The appellant first challenges probation condition (3) which states: "You will not possess, carry or own any weapons, firearms, or destructive devices." We affirm that portion of condition (3) prohibiting possessing, carrying or owning firearms since it is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed. Fitts v. State, 649 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We, however, strike the general prohibition of weapons and destructive devices in condition (3) because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing.
The appellant also challenges probation condition (5) which states: That portion of condition (5) providing that appellant is not to use intoxicants to excess is a special condition of probation that must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Williams v. State, 653 So.2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since it was not orally pronounced, that portion of condition (5) is stricken. However, the remaining portion of that condition is affirmed since it is valid as a more precise definition of a general prohibition and, as such, need not be orally pronounced. Chitty v. State, 20 Fla.L.Weekly D76, --- So.2d ---- (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 28, 1994).
Next, the appellant challenges probation condition (8) which states: "You will...
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Wines v. State, 96-834
...Wines of the costs. Fernandez v. State, 677 So.2d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 683 So.2d 485 (Fla.1996); Daughtery v. State, 654 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The trial court erred by failing to cite to statutory authority for the imposition of other costs and fees. Madison v. State......
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Shell v. State, 94-04573
...we strike the unannounced portion of the condition requiring appellant to pay for any prescribed treatment. Daughtery v. State, 654 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also must strike the $2.00 discretionary cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), because the tr......
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Miller v. State, 94-04184
...random testing; and strike conditions twelve and fifteen. See Roberson v. State, 654 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Daughtery v. State, 654 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Luby v. State, 648 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also strike condition eighteen because it is vague and impermissibly......