Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp.
| Decision Date | 24 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1977,86-1977 |
| Citation | 827 F.2d 291 |
| Parties | Paul Edward DAUTREMONT, Appellant, v. BROADLAWNS HOSPITAL, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Chris C. Foy, student of University of Iowa College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellant.
John E. Swanson, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Barbara A. Schwartz, Iowa City, Iowa, for rebuttal.
Before ROSS *, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, Paul Dautremont, appeals from the district court's 1 order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Broadlawns Hospital and two of its employee doctors, in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Dautremont's pro se complaint was construed to contend that he was denied due process during three involuntary hospitalizations at the municipal hospital's mental ward when officials administered psychotherapeutic drugs against his will while he was hospitalized for unnecessarily extended periods of time. The district court ruled that his claims with respect to the first and second hospitalizations were time barred by Iowa's six-month statute of limitations governing actions against municipal employees. With respect to the third hospitalization, the court ruled that he was afforded all the process required by state law and that he failed to advance his argument that he was administered drugs inconsistently with the procedures set forth in the Iowa Code. On appeal, Dautremont contends that (1) the court erred in relying on documents that do not comply with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) and (e); (2) the court applied the incorrect statute of limitations; and (3) the court erred in failing to decide whether his hospitalization and treatment complied with due process. For reasons different than those stated by the district court, we affirm.
Dautremont's first involuntary hospitalization occurred on August 30, 1979 after he allegedly assaulted his father. A judicial referee found him to be seriously mentally impaired and ordered him committed for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. He was discharged September 28, 1979 and officially placed on outpatient status on October 2, 1979. Thereafter, Dautremont ran away to Oklahoma, where on December 23, 1979 he was involuntarily committed. He was released to his parent's custody on February 14, 1980, and on that same day readmitted to Broadlawns. The parties refer to his readmission to Broadlawns as the second hospitalization. He was discharged on February 28, 1980 and instructed to attend group therapy. On December 9, 1982 a referee found him to be no longer mentally impaired. Almost one year later, on November 23, 1983, Dautremont filed this action pro se. He was hospitalized for the third time two days later on November 25, 1983 after he contacted the Secret Service and threatened to assassinate the President of the United States. A referee found him to be seriously mentally impaired and ordered him committed for evaluation and treatment. He was discharged on January 4, 1984 and placed on outpatient status.
Dautremont's amended pro se complaint was liberally construed by the court to allege that he was forced to take psychotherapeutic drugs against his will while he was confined at the hospital for a period of time that was unconstitutionally extended. The district court ordered the defendants to undertake a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding Dautremont's complaint and to file with the court a detailed written report setting forth their position on the matter. The defendants complied with the court's directive and, in addition to the report, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The court appointed counsel to represent Dautremont and treated the motion as one for summary judgment in light of the report and the exhibits attached thereto.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and Dautremont has appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Dautremont first contends that the court erred in relying on documents that do not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) and (e). Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) provides, in part, that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge." Dautremont argues that summary judgment was improper here because the record does not contain depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits. The only pleading, other than the complaint, is the answer, which is unverified. The report filed by the defendants' counsel on request of the court, Dautremont adds, is unverified and unauthenticated. Further, the report cannot be considered an affidavit because the information set forth therein is not based on the personal knowledge of its signatories--the defendants' attorneys. Therefore, Dautremont concludes, the district court erred in relying on those documents. We disagree.
First, Dautremont failed to raise the issue in the district court. This may seem harsh at first glance, but we note that Dautremont had appointed counsel who resisted the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment, but failed to object to the lack of certain documents or the deficiencies of others. See Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 228 (8th Cir.1966) (). Second, Dautremont has not challenged the authenticity of any documents in the record. That is, he does not allege and we have no reason to believe the documents in fact are not authentic. Therefore, we fail to see how Dautremont was prejudiced by unauthenticated or unverified documents. Dautremont has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
Dautremont next contends that the court erred in applying the six-month statute of limitations to his claims concerning the first and second hospitalizations. We agree. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates as a matter of law that Dautremont is not entitled to relief on those claims.
The usual rule is that statute of limitations issues in federal cases should be decided in accordance with law existing at the time of the decision. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2879 n. 16, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). In 1985, prior to the district court's decision in this case, the Supreme Court held that the applicable statute of limitations in an action brought pursuant to Sec. 1983 is the state's limitations statute that governs personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Iowa's limitations period for personal injury actions is two years. Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 614.1.2 (Supp.1987).
Dautremont maintains that his claims concerning the first and second hospitalizations accrued when he was released from the hospital in September 1979 and February 1980, respectively. Dautremont filed this action more than two years later on November 23, 1983. It would follow, then, that this action is untimely with respect to those claims if Iowa's two-year personal injury limitations period is applied here. In other words, Dautremont's claims are barred if Wilson is applied retroactively.
The decision to apply Wilson retroactively turns on the particular facts of each case. See, e.g., Jane Does 1-100 v. Omodt, 813 F.2d 910 (8th Cir.1987) (not applied retroactively); Ridgway v. Wapello, 795 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.1986) (not applied retroactively); Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983 (8th Cir.1985) (applied retroactively), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 1230, 89 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986). As the court in Ridgway explained, the facts should be considered in light of the three factor test--commonly referred to as the reliance, purpose, and inequity factors--set forth in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Ridgway, 795 F.2d at 647. After carefully analyzing these factors, we hold that Wilson should be applied retroactively to Dautremont's claims concerning the first hospitalization, but not to his claims concerning the second hospitalization.
Dautremont cannot be said to have reasonably relied on anything but a two-year limitations period in considering when to assert his claims concerning his first hospitalization. To be sure, Wilson overruled clearly established precedent in this circuit, Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S.Ct. 2283, 73 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1982), in which we held that Iowa's "catchall" five-year limitations period governed Sec. 1983 actions. Although Wilson changed the rule that Garmon had established, Dautremont cannot be said to have relied on Garmon as could the plaintiffs in Ridgway and Omodt. See Ridgway, 795 F.2d at 647; Omodt, 813 F.2d at 911. Unlike the plaintiffs' claims in those cases, Dautremont's claims concerning the first hospitalization were already precluded by Iowa's personal injury statute of limitations when we decided Garmon. Dautremont's claims accrued in September 1979 and the two-year period ran in September 1981. We decided Garmon on January 5, 1982. Therefore, the reliance factor favors applying Wilson retroactively.
Moreover, it would not be inequitable to impose the two-year limitations period on Dautremont's claims concerning the first hospitalization. At the time his claims accrued and before our decision in Garmon, the law both nationally and in this circuit was inconsistent and confusing. In...
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