David Cantrell 1 v. Joe Easterling

• Decision Date: 01 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. W2009–00985–SC–R11–HC.,W2009–00985–SC–R11–HC.
• Citation: 346 S.W.3d 445
• Parties: David CANTRELL 1v.Joe EASTERLING, Warden.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

346 S.W.3d 445

David CANTRELL 1

v.Joe EASTERLING, Warden.

No. W2009–00985–SC–R11–HC.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

April 6, 2011 Session.Aug. 1, 2011.

Sharon Harless Loy, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, David Cantrell.Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General; Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel; for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. GARY R. WADE, J., filed a separate opinion in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined.CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J.

We granted this appeal to determine if the defendant's four sentences for aggravated rape are illegal because each of the four uniform judgment documents designates the defendant as a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender and does not designate the defendant as a “Multiple Rapist.” Because the four uniform judgment documents indicate that the defendant is eligible for early release on parole, which is in direct contravention of a statutory provision, we hold that the four sentences are illegal and void. The defendant's underlying convictions of aggravated rape, which arose from a jury verdict before a court of competent jurisdiction, remain intact. We remand this matter to the sentencing court for the entry of four amended judgment orders, each to set forth the legal sentence on each of the defendant's four convictions of aggravated rape, including the designation that the defendant is a “Multiple Rapist.”

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1995, a jury convicted David Cantrell (“Defendant”) of four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, that he committed earlier that year. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty years on each of the aggravated rape convictions and structured service of the sentences to result in an effective term of eighty years. On each of the four judgment orders entered on the aggravated rape convictions, Defendant is designated a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender. Although each judgment order also contains a place in which to designate the offender a “Multiple Rapist,” none of Defendant's four judgment orders on his aggravated rape convictions reflects this designation.

Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and claiming that his effective eighty-year sentence was excessive. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence. Although the intermediate appellate court made specific mention of Defendant's sentencing classification as a “Range II Multiple Offender,” it did not address that classification as error. See State v. Cantrell, C.C.A. No. 01C01–9604–CC–00136, 1997 WL 661496, at *5–6 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 24, 1997). This Court denied Defendant's application for permission to appeal. Id., perm. appeal denied (Tenn. July 6, 1998).

On April 21, 2009, Defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the trial court did not have authority to sentence him as a multiple, Range II offender “with a release eligibility of 35%.” The habeas corpus court denied relief, ruling that Defendant's sentences on his aggravated rape convictions were not illegal. Defendant appealed and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the designation of Defendant as a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender was “merely a clerical error.” Cantrell v. Easterling, No. W2009–00985–CCA–R3–HC, 2010 WL 848810, at *5 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar. 10, 2010) The intermediate appellate court reasoned as follows:

Because a multiple rapist must serve his entire sentence by operation of law rather than by designation of the trial court, a judgment's notation that a multiple rapist is anything other than a multiple rapist generally does not create an egregiously illegal sentence “to the point of voidness.”

Id. at *4 (citing Braden v. Bell, No. M2004–01381–CCA–R3HC, 2005 WL 2008200, at *3–4 (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug. 19, 2005)).

We granted permission to appeal to address, once again, the effect of a judgment order which sets forth a sentence that directly contravenes a statute.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether to grant relief upon review of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a question of law. Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn.2000). Accordingly, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the conclusions of the court below. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn.2005).

ANALYSIS

I. Erroneous Sentences

The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing Act”) is codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40–35–101 through –505 (2010). It consists of sixty-six statutes, many containing multiple parts. The multitude of cases explicating these statutes demonstrates that, in application, the Sentencing Act presents challenges to both trial and appellate courts. Mistakes are inevitable. A recurring issue before Tennessee's trial and appellate courts is what to do about these mistakes. The avenue of relief and remedy depends upon what type of error infects the sentence.

A. Clerical Errors

Some errors arise simply from a clerical mistake in filling out the uniform judgment document. As to these types of errors, which we will refer to as “clerical errors,” Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 provides that “[a]fter giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission.” ²

For instance, in Wilkerson v. Carlton, No. E2007–02453–CCA–R3–HC, 2008 WL 4949227 (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov. 20, 2008), the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft over $1,000. The transcript of the sentencing hearing revealed that the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years on the robbery conviction and four years on the theft conviction. In filling out the uniform judgment documents, however, the trial court mistakenly transposed the sentences for the robbery and theft convictions. Thus, the uniform judgment order on the defendant's especially aggravated robbery conviction set forth a sentence of four years, and the judgment order on the defendant's theft over $1,000 conviction set forth a sentence of twenty-five years. The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that this error was clerical in nature and affirmed the habeas corpus court's ruling that the judgments be forwarded to the sentencing court for correction. Id. at *4–6.

B. Appealable Errors

A second category of errors, which we will label “appealable errors,” consists of those errors for which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal:

The defendant in a criminal case may appeal from the length, range or the manner of service of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court. The defendant may also appeal the imposition of consecutive sentences. An appeal pursuant to this section shall be taken within the same time and in the same manner as other appeals in criminal cases.... There is no appellate review of the sentence in a postconviction or habeas corpus proceeding.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 40–35–401(a) (emphases added). Similarly,

The district attorney general in a criminal case may appeal from the length, range or manner of the service of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court. The district attorney general may also appeal the imposition of concurrent sentences. In addition, the district attorney general may also appeal the amount of fines and restitution imposed by the sentencing court.

Id. § 40–35–402(a). And, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40–35–106(d), –107(d), and –108(d) provide that either party may appeal from a trial court's determination that a defendant is a multiple, persistent, or career offender.³ Additionally, the district attorney may appeal a trial court's finding that a defendant is an especially mitigated offender. Id. § 40–35–402(b)(4). The errors contemplated by these statutory provisions occur when the trial court draws a conclusion not supported by the evidence. That is, these are errors that arise from a trial court's findings of fact.⁴

A brief consideration of the methodology used to determine a defendant's offender classification (which also determines his sentencing range), the length of his sentence, the manner of service of his sentence, and whether multiple sentences should run concurrently or consecutively, demonstrates why these issues depend upon findings of fact and are therefore appropriately raised only on direct appeal.⁵ Pursuant to our current sentencing scheme, a trial court's first obligation in imposing a sentence is to “determine the appropriate range of sentence.” Id. § 40–35–210(a). Our sentencing scheme sets forth three ranges: Range I, Range II, and Range III. Id. § 40–35–112. The higher the range, the longer the sentence. See id. A criminal defendant's offender classification, and therefore his sentencing range, is determined on the basis of his or her prior convictions, if any. See id. §§ 40–35–105 through –109. Thus, for example, a defendant who has “[a] minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4) prior felony convictions within the conviction class [for which the defendant is being currently sentenced], a higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes” is a “multiple offender.” Id. § 40–35–106(a)(1). The sentencing range for a multiple offender is Range II, id. § 40–35–106(c), which translates into a term of two to forty years, depending upon the class of the felony for which the defendant is being sentenced, id. § 40–35–112(b).

A trial court's conclusion that a defendant is, for example, a multiple offender, and therefore subject to a Range II sentence, rests on issues of fact—the number, classes, and dates of his prior convictions—which must be...