Davies v. Meyer

Decision Date03 October 1975
Docket NumberNo. 17647,17647
Citation528 S.W.2d 864
PartiesA. Donald DAVIES, Bishop Episcopal Diocese of North Texas, Appellant, v. Milton MEYER, County Judge, et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Golden, Potts, Boeckman & Wilson, Claude R. Wilson, Jr., and David Herndon, Dallas, for appellant.

McCreary & Huey, and Robert M. Huey, Austin, for appellees.

OPINION

BREWSTER, Justice.

A. Donald Davies, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of North Texas, plaintiff, filed this suit against the County Judge of Hood County, Texas, the Tax Assessor-Collector of Hood County, the four Commissioners of Hood County, the Granbury Independent School District, and the Tax Assessor-Collector of the Granbury Independent School District, defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that the plaintiff's 155 acre tract located in Hood County that is known and operated as 'Camp Crucis' is exempt under Texas law from ad valorem taxes.

At the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment decreeing and declaring that the 155 acres of land involved is not exempt from ad valorem taxation by the State of Texas, by Hood County, and by the Granbury Independent School District, save and except the home located thereon that is used as a dwelling place for the minister, along with one acre of land, and the open air chapel that is located thereon, along with one acre of land, which two acres referred to were declared by the decree to be exempt from ad valorem taxation by the defendants herein.

This appeal is being made by the plaintiff from that decree.

We affirm.

There is only one point of error, it being that the trial court erred in failing to hold that all of Camp Crucis (155 acres) is exempt from ad valorem taxation under Article 7150, V.A.C.S. as an actual place of religious worship.

We overrule that point.

This is apparently the first Texas case dealing with the question of whether or not the entire area of a tract of land that is used as a church camp is 'a place of religious worship' within the meaning of the law involved and for that reason exempt from being taxed for ad valorem taxes.

The law controlling the decision of the question is contained in the Texas Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 2 and in Art. 7150, V.A.C.S.

The Texas Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 2(a) provides: 'All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax; but the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation . . . Actual places of religious worship, also any property owned by a church or by a strictly religious society for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the ministry of such church or religious society, and which yields no revenue whatever to such church or religious society; provided that such exemption shall not extend to more property than is reasonably necessary for a dwelling place and in no event more than one acre of land; . . . and all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property mentioned in this Section shall be null and void.' (Emphasis added.)

Article 7150, Sec. 1, V.A.C.S., provides: 'The following property shall be exempt from taxation, to-wit: 1. Schools and Churches.--Public school houses and Actual places of religious worship, also any property owned by a church or by a strictly religious society, for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the ministers of such church or religious society . . . and the grounds attached to such buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use and enjoyment of the same, and which yields no revenue whatever to such church or religious society; provided that such exemption as to the dwelling place for the ministers shall not extend to more property than is reasonably necessary for a dwelling place and in no event more than one acre of land.' (Emphasis added.)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed by the trial court at the request of the plaintiff. The findings of fact have not been attacked by any party to the suit, prior to the filing of plaintiff's supplemental brief that is hereinafter mentioned.

Those findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows:

'FINDINGS OF FACT

'(1) Camp Crucis is a 155 acre tract of land with approximately thirty buildings, the title of which is held in the name of A. Donald Davies, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of North Texas. The camp is located in Hood County and the Granbury Independent School District and is used primarily in the summer months for a camp for children for periods from one to ten days.

'(2) There are nineteen cabins, a dining hall, minister's residence, two shower houses, two recreational buildings, one gathering building, an open-air chapel with a covered altar, a home for the caretaker, and a crafts building, two staff buildings, a swimming pool, tennis courts, grass volleyball and basketball courts and a baseball field. There is no roofed or inclosed church building.

'(3) The camp is administered by Reverend Hume W. Reeves who lives in the minister's residence on the grounds. He conducts church services in the City of Granbury each Sunday at the Granbury Episcopal Mission.

'(4) Camp Crucis is non-profit and is subsidized by the Episcopal Diocese. Fees are charged the campers, but they are not sufficient to defray all costs of operation.

'(5) The camp is used almost exclusively for camp purposes, although it has been used by the Optimists Club and a Square Dance Group uses it once a week during the winter months.

'(6) Activities at the camp consist of recreation, crafts and religious activities.

'(7) During the summer months the camp is used for sixty days for camping purposes. During the remaining months of the year, the camp is often used on weekends for church related activities.

'(8) The primary place where the religious services are held is the open-air chapel which has a covered altar mounted on a concrete slab. The benches for the congregation are fixed to the ground but they are not under cover.

'(9) One acre of land is necessary for air, light, ingress and egress, and decoration for the minister's residence.

'(10) One acre of land is necessary for air, light, ingress and egress, and decoration for the open-air chapel with covered chapel.

'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

'(1) The burden of proof rests upon the claimant of exemption from ad valorem taxes.

'(2) The open-air chapel with a covered altar is an actual place of religious worship and is exempt from ad valorem taxation under the provisions of Article VIII § 2 of the Texas Constitution and Article 7150 V.A.T.S.

'(3) The minister's residence is exempt from ad valorem taxation under the provisions of Article VIII § 2 of the Texas Constitution and Article 7150 V.A.T.S.

'(4) The remaining buildings and land are not actual places of religious worship and minister's residences and are therefore not exempt from ad valorem taxation.

'(5) The remaining 153 acres of land, after setting aside 1 acre each for the minister's residence and the open air chapel, is not exempt from ad valorem taxation.'

Texas courts in construing the constitutional and statutory provisions purporting to grant exemptions from taxation give them a strict and narrow construction and will not extend an exempt status to property unless the controlling law clearly shows this to have been intended. River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Sup., 1963); City of Houston v. South Park...

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7 cases
  • Aransas County Appraisal Review Bd. v. Texas Gulf Shrimp Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 27, 1986
    ...exemptions, our courts must resolve any doubts against the exemption because tax exemptions are never favored. Davies v. Meyer, 528 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1975), aff'd, 541 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex.1976); City of Wichita Falls, 170 S.W.2d at 780. The facts of this case are un......
  • Willacy County Appraisal Dist. v. North Alamo Water Supply Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 1984
    ...be resolved against the institution claiming the exemption. Hedgecroft v. City of Houston, 150 Tex. 654, 244 S.W.2d 632 (1951); Davies v. Meyer, 528 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1975, aff'd. 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1976)); Aransas Hospital, Inc. v. Aransas Pass Independent School Distri......
  • Davies v. Meyer
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1976
    ...refused to hold that the evidence established as a matter of law that the entire tract was 'an actual place of religious worship.' 528 S.W.2d 864. We affirm the judgments of the courts The trial judge filed findings of fact and conclusions of law at the conclusion of the trial. The findings......
  • Martinez v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 19, 2011
    ...are given a narrow and strict construction, and all doubts are resolved against the granting of an exemption. Davies v. Meyer, 528 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975), aff'd, 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1976). We review Martinez's argument in this context. Martinez offers no authority to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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