Davies v. Meyer

• Citation: 541 S.W.2d 827
• Decision Date: 29 September 1976
• Docket Number: No. B--5687,B--5687
• Parties: A. Donald DAVIES, Petitioners, v. Milton MEYER et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 827

541 S.W.2d 827

A. Donald DAVIES, Petitioners, v. Milton MEYER et al., Respondents.

No. B--5687.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 29, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 3, 1976.

Golden, Potts, Boeckman & Wilson, Claude R. Wilson, Jr., and H. David Herndon, Dallas, Texas, for petitioners.

McCreary & Huey, Robert M. Huey, Austin, for respondents.

POPE, Justice.

The single question presented by this appeal is whether under the factual development of this case, a church camp is exempt from ad valorem taxation as an 'actual place of religious worship,' as that phrase is used in section 2, article VIII ¹ of the Texas Constitution and sections 1, ² 1a, ³ and 2a, ⁴ article 7150, Texas Revised Civil Statutes. A. Donald Davies, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of North Texas, filed this suit to obtain a declaratory judgment that Camp Crucis, a one hundred fifty-five acre church camp, was exempt from taxation. The trial court after a non-jury trial, rendered judgment that the open-air chapel and an acre surrounding it as well as the minister's residence with its surrounding acre of land were the only parts of the camp that were exempt. The basis for the judgment was that the plaintiff, who was charged with the burden of proof, failed to prove entitlement to an exemption to the remaining one hundred fifty-three acres. The court of civil appeals refused to hold that the evidence established as a matter of law that the entire tract was 'an actual place of religious worship.' 528 S.W.2d 864. We affirm the judgments of the courts below.

The trial judge filed findings of fact and conclusions of law at the conclusion of the trial. The findings and record show that the petitioner A. Donald Davies is the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of North Texas; and in that capacity he is the record title owner of Camp Crucis. The camp consists of about one hundred fifty-five acres in Hood County, part of which has been developed into living, dining, educational and recreational areas. It has an open air chapel where church services are held during the camp sessions. The recreational facilities include a large athletic field, a swimming pool, tennis, volleyball and basketball courts. For sixty days during the summer months, wholesome church camp programs for various age groups are conducted on the property. The summer program includes daily religious services, religious education, crafts and recreation. During other times of the year the camp is used as a meeting and recreational facility for church groups, for leadership training, women's retreats, couples retreats, clergy conferences, and for church picnics. Occasionally it is used by a local service club and a square-dance group. From a map introduced at the trial, it appears that approximately two-thirds of the acreage consists of natural vacant land.

The trial court's conclusions include one which states that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant for an exemption from ad valorem taxes, that the open-air chapel is an actual place of worship, the minister's residence is exempt and that the remaining one hundred fifty-three acres, after setting aside one acre around the two exempt places, are not exempt.

The court of civil appeals correctly held that claims for tax exemptions are strictly and narrowly construed. Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Ind. Sch. Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.1968); River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.1963); City of Houston v. South Park Baptist Church, 393 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ ref'd); City of Dallas v. Cochran, 166 S.W. 32 (Tex.Civ.App.1914, writ ref'd). The court of civil appeals also correctly ruled that the area of an acre around and including the chapel and the minister's residence should be exempt. Our central question is whether the claimant proved as a matter of law that all one hundred fifty-five acres should be exempt.

What constitutes an actual place of religious worship as those words are used in the Constitution and statutes is a fact issue which the claimant has the burden to prove. In the case before us, the claimant failed to convince the fact finder that one hundred fifty-three acres of the camp were entitled to an exemption. We are unable to conclude that the entire camp from the undisputed evidence and as a matter of law should be exempt.

The term, worship, is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., as:

Act of paying divine honors to a deity; religious reverence and homage. Adoration or reverence paid to God, a being viewed as God, or something held sacred from a reputed connection with God.

That definition, and perhaps any definition may be inadequate to embrace all of what is meant by the word, 'worship.' Certainly inspiration and a spirit or renewal may be captured by experiences with nature and the wilderness, but those experiences can also qualify as wholesome recreation which falls short of religious worship.

In a different context, but relevant to the definition of the constitutional and statutory phrase, this court wrote in Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908):

As used in the Constitution the phrase 'place of worship' specifically means a place where a number of persons meet together for the purpose of worshiping God. State v. Swink, 20 N.C. 492. The Century Dictionary gives this definition: 'A building or part of a building set apart for any purpose--as a place of worship.' The worship of God is not prohibited in any place, but we are of the opinion that the spirit of the Constitution would include any place at which the worship might be indulged in so continuously and in such a manner as to give it the character of 'a place of worship.'

There is a difference between a place which is used for religious purposes and a place of actual worship. It was held in Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst- Euless Ind. Sch. Dist., 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App.1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) that the full time use of a building for the preparation of religious sermons, programs and the publication of a religious newspaper while religious in its purpose did not qualify the premises for exemption as a place of worship. A similar distinction was recognized in City of San Antonio v. Young Men's Christian Association, 285 S.W. 844 (Tex.Civ.App.1926, writ ref'd); See also, In re Walker, 200 Ill. 566, 66 N.E. 144, 147 (1902).

The Georgia case of Leggett v. Macon Baptist Association, Inc., 232 Ga. 27, 205 S.E.2d 197 (1974), makes this distinction between religious uses and worship. The property that was the subject of that lawsuit was used as coordinating headquarters for forty-seven congregations which comprised the Macon Baptist Association. The property was used for administrative work, pastors' conferences, seminars and regular religious services. The fact that religious work was conducted on the premises was not sufficient to entitle the...