Davis v. Crush
| Decision Date | 23 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-3361,87-3361 |
| Citation | 862 F.2d 84 |
| Parties | Thomas L. DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, James J. Condit, et al., Attorneys-Appellants, v. Hon. Thomas C. CRUSH, et al., Defendants, Planned Parenthood Association of Cincinnati, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
James J. Condit, Condit & Dressing, Cincinnati, Ohio, Charles T. Lester, Jr., Fort Thomas, Ky., Stephen T. McMurtry, Covington, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Robert A. Pitcairn, Jr., James B. Helmer, Jr., argued, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before LIVELY, MERRITT and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-appellants Thomas L. Davis (Davis) and Donald Lee Johnson (Johnson) appeal the district court's assessment of monetary sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 against them and their counsel. After reviewing the parties' briefs and relevant portions of the record, we reverse because the civil rights complaint filed in federal court by Davis and Johnson does not necessarily reflect a lack of reasonable inquiry into the facts or the law.
This case arose from the intense controversy surrounding Planned Parenthood's Center for Counseling and Medical Operations in Cincinnati, Ohio. On December 30, 1985, the interior of the Margaret Sanger Center, owned by Planned Parenthood, was destroyed by a firebomb. Unable to continue operations there, patients, staff and other personnel relocated to the Center for Counseling and Medical Operations (Center) at 3332 Vine Street in Cincinnati. Shortly after the firebombing, various individuals and organizations began picketing and protesting against the operations conducted in the relocated Center.
From Planned Parenthood's perspective, the protest degenerated into harassment, disruption of lawful business operations, and the creation of a safety hazard to both pedestrians and automobile traffic in the area. To address these perceived problems, Planned Parenthood brought suit in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court, seeking injunctive relief that would impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the picketers' exercise of their first amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly. On June 20, 1986, defendant-appellee Judge Crush, after a hearing and review of videotapes of the activity outside the Center, issued a preliminary injunction placing restrictions on the time, place and manner of the picketers' activities. After the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the protests continued, and, in the view of Planned Parenthood, went beyond what was permissible under the preliminary injunction. Davis and Johnson were arrested outside the Center on June 28 for contempt of court for allegedly violating the preliminary injunction.
After their arrest, Davis and Johnson filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in federal district court against Judge Crush, Sheriff of Hamilton County Lincoln Stokes (Stokes), the Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County, the Planned Parenthood Association, and Robert Hatfield (a director of Planned Parenthood), Timothy S. Black, Esq. and Alphonse Gerhardstein, Esq. The complaint charged that defendants Gerhardstein and Black met and conspired with Chief Deputy Sheriff Colonel Daniel Wolfangel, on June 27, 1986, without notice to and not in the presence of the class representatives or their attorneys, to devise a scheme for enforcing Judge Crush's preliminary injunctive order. Under this scheme, the complaint alleged, Planned Parenthood would be allowed to direct and control Wolfangel and his deputies, who would have no discretion in arresting picketers, but would solely carry out the orders to arrest given by Planned Parenthood. Sheriff Stokes was alleged to have acquiesced in this scheme, and to have participated actively in the arrests of Davis and Johnson on June 28, 1986.
The complaint alleged that defendant Hatfield, an agent of Planned Parenthood, "executed blank affidavits alleging that the plaintiffs Thomas L. Davis and Don Lee Johnson were in violation of the court's injunction and were in contempt thereof." ). At Planned Parenthood's direction, and with active participation from Sheriff Stokes, and his deputy sheriffs, the complaint alleged, Davis and Johnson were unlawfully seized and arrested. The complaint stated that Judge Crush, "by attempting to bind the plaintiffs herein to the terms of the injunction, acted with a clear absence of jurisdiction over the persons of the plaintiffs, or acted with reckless disregard of clearly established law depriving him of jurisdiction." ). It further stated that "Judge Crush knew, or acted in reckless disregard of clearly established law, that he had no authority or jurisdiction to order the arrest of persons such as plaintiffs who were not named as parties or acting in concert with named parties." (Complaint 8, 40). The complaint also alleged, however, that on June 30, 1986, Judge Crush, in open court, dismissed the contempt charges against Davis and Johnson.
The complaint charged that plaintiffs' rights under the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and analogous rights under the Ohio Constitution, were violated. They also alleged that various violations of their Ohio common law rights. Plaintiffs sought $150,000 in compensatory damages, $300,000 in punitive damages, interest, and costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction to prevent all defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the June 20, 1986 preliminary injunction, which they asserted was facially invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
On August 13, 1986, the district court held, without reaching the merits, that entertaining this civil rights action would clearly be contrary to Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), which requires abstention from interference with state court proceedings, and that well-established law gave Judge Crush absolute immunity from damages for his official actions. Davis v. Crush, 646 F.Supp. 1192 (S.D.Ohio 1986). The district court also stated that it "entertain[ed] substantial doubt that plaintiffs were, prior to suit, familiar either with the Younger doctrine or Pierson v. Ray [386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) ]." 646 F.Supp. at 1196. Because it was clear that Judge Crush was absolutely immune from any damages in this suit, the court stated that "[a]ttorneys who have counseled and brought such a suit have interposed an action intended to harass and cause unnecessary delay in violation of Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., and are also liable for reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Ibid. The court dismissed the complaint at plaintiffs' costs. On September 11, 1986, plaintiffs appealed the district court decision to this court, but voluntarily dismissed their appeal on January 23, 1987.
Shortly thereafter, two motions were filed in the district court for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, and fees as sanctions under Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P. Defendant Black filed one motion, and one was filed on behalf of defendants Planned Parenthood, Hatfield and Gerhardstein. Defendants Judge Crush, Stokes and Board of County Commissioners did not request attorney fees. Finding that Rule 11 had been violated, the district court ordered that plaintiffs' counsel pay $1,000 in attorneys' fees to defendant Black, $1,000 in attorneys' fees to defendant Gerhardstein, and $500 in attorneys' fees to defendants Planned Parenthood and Hatfield. Davis v. Crush, 656 F.Supp. 468, 471 (S.D.Ohio 1987). The court found that because of the availability of various state remedies "the selection of the United States District Court was in fact intended to harass." Id. at 470. It found that assertions in the complaint about Black's participation in the alleged conspiracy were "factually incorrect and were known to be so at or about the time the complaint was filed." Id. at 470. The court found the allegations in the complaint regarding Gerhardstein to lack any evidentiary basis whatsoever. Ibid. Arguing that "constitutional rights are not the exclusive province of the Federal Courts," ibid., the court maintained that Rule 11 was violated as to Planned Parenthood and Hatfield because plaintiffs could have appealed the injunction to the proper state appellate court, or applied directly to the Ohio Supreme Court for either a Writ of Mandamus or a Writ of Prohibition. Ibid. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had twice unsuccessfully used Affidavits of Bias or Prejudice (which under Ohio law are presented directly to the Ohio Supreme Court) to attempt to remove Judge Crush from the case. Ibid.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as amended effective August 1, 1983, provides in part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
In order to be exposed to Rule 11 liability, an attorney must sign the pleadings or papers filed in the district court which are the focus of inquiry. Rathbun v. Warren City Schools (In Re Ruben ), 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir.1987).
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