Davis v. Davis (In re Davis)
| Decision Date | 20 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S215050.,S215050. |
| Citation | 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 835,352 P.3d 401,61 Cal.4th 846 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re MARRIAGE OF Sheryl Jones DAVIS and Keith Xavier Davis. Sheryl Jones Davis, Respondent, v. Keith Xavier Davis, Appellant. |
61 Cal.4th 846
352 P.3d 401
189 Cal.Rptr.3d 835
In re MARRIAGE OF Sheryl Jones DAVIS and Keith Xavier Davis.
Sheryl Jones Davis, Respondent
v.
Keith Xavier Davis, Appellant.
No. S215050.
Supreme Court of California
July 20, 2015.
Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli, Sacramento, for Appellant.
Ivie, McNeill & Wyatt and Lilia E. Duchrow, Los Angeles, for Respondent.
Opinion
CANTIL–SAKAUYE, C.J.
In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court determines the division of property between the spouses by first characterizing the parties' property as community property or separate property. (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 324 P.3d 274.) Family Code section 760 provides that all
property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is community property “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” One such statute is Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (section 771(a) ), which provides that “[t]he earnings and accumulations of a spouse ..., while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.” In this case we consider whether a couple may be “living separate and apart,” for purposes of section 771(a), when they live together in the same home. We conclude the answer is no. The statute requires the spouses to be living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be their separate property. Because the Court of Appeal concluded otherwise, we reverse its judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Keith Xavier Davis (husband) and Sheryl Jones Davis (wife) were married on June 12, 1993. They have two children, a daughter born in August 1995 and a son born in November 1999. Wife filed for dissolution on December 30, 2008.
At trial on the issue of the date of their separation, wife described the couple's marriage as turbulent. She testified that they stopped being sexually intimate after their son was conceived in 1999. They never went on a “date” after their son was born. The parties disagreed as to when they stopped sharing a bedroom in their marital home. Husband testified wife moved to another bedroom in 2001; wife testified this happened in 2004. Their trial testimony indicates that they both attended the children's activities, but traveled to the locations by separate cars. Wife did her own and the children's laundry. Husband did his laundry. Both parties prepared meals, but wife would not prepare something different for husband if he was dissatisfied with the meal she made for herself and the children. The parties took some family vacations together, but also
took separate vacations. In deposition testimony, wife claimed that by 2004 they were “living entirely separate lives.” They spoke about divorce, but stayed together for the sake of the children.
The parties maintained a joint bank account from the beginning of their marriage, which wife managed. In 2001, however, husband started his own business and at some point opened a separate bank account. In 2003, wife reactivated a separate bank account of her own to manage her business funds
and pay for her personal expenses. Husband contributed $3,200 a month to the parties' joint account from his separate account for the payment of household expenses. But both parties were unhappy with each other's contributions to the joint account. In January 2006, husband became employed by Clorox, substantially increasing his earnings. Wife was frustrated when he did not increase his financial support to the household.
On June 1, 2006, after the end of their son's school year, wife announced to husband that she was “through” with the marriage. According to her, the “last component” of their marriage was their finances. On June 1, 2006, wife presented husband with a financial ledger that itemized their joint household expenses and their individual expenses. She did this because she wanted the parties to contribute equally to running the home and funding the children's expenses, while being solely responsible for their own respective personal expenses. Wife removed husband from her American Express credit account and returned several of husband's credit cards to him. She believed at this point that they were acting simply as roommates. In July 2006, wife began working full-time, substantially
increasing her earnings. Husband left his job with Clorox in September 2006.
The parties continued to live in the marital home after June 1, 2006. Wife continued to keep her personal belongings there. She continued to receive mail and telephone calls there. She continued to cook meals at the home when she was in town, although she often traveled for her work. She did not change the address on her driver's license. In August 2006, the parties took a family vacation to Hawaii with their children. However, they subsequently took no out-of-state vacations with one another. They continued to celebrate special occasions, such as birthdays and holidays, together as a family as they had previously done. They both continued to use their joint bank account.
When wife filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage on December 30, 2008, she listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006. In his initial response to wife's petition, husband listed the date of separation as January 2, 2009 (a few days after wife's filing of the petition). Wife did not move out of the marital home until July 2011. Husband subsequently filed an amended response listing the date of separation as July 1, 2011.
After trial of the issue, the court found the date of separation to be June 1, 2006. The Court of Appeal affirmed. In relevant part, it disagreed with the majority decision in In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 (Norviel ), which held that physically living apart is “an indispensable threshold requirement” for separation under section 771(a). (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 148.) We granted review to resolve the apparent conflict in interpretation of the statute.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Contentions of the parties and standard of review
Husband contends that spouses cannot be “living separate and apart” for purposes of section 771(a) when they continue to share a residence. He urges such a bright-line rule in order to provide clear guidance to judges and a measure of predictability to attorneys and litigants. Wife contends that no particular fact, including place of residence, is determinative. Instead, wife argues that a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and decide the date of separation based on conduct by either or both of the spouses evidencing a complete and final intent to part ways with no plan of resuming the marital relationship, even if at that time they are still living in the same residence. According to wife, husband's proposed bright-line rule is unworkable and would lead
to harsh results. Husband claims the same thing about wife's proposed rule.
Although the date of separation is normally a factual issue to be reviewed for substantial evidence (In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 (Manfer )), resolution of the opposing contentions here depends on statutory construction of the language of section 771(a), a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1119, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211.)
B. Statutory construction of section 771(a)
Section 771(a) is part of California's statutory community property scheme, a system of law that “originated in continental Europe, came to Mexico from Spain, and became California law through the treaty of 1848.” (
11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Community Property, § 1, p. 529 ; see In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 12, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815.) In interpreting the language of section 771(a), as with all questions of statutory construction, “our objective ‘is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1119, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 302 P.3d 211.) This principle is especially important in construing a statute within the community property scheme because the system itself is a “creature of statute.” (1 Bassett, Cal. Community Property Law: A...
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